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ABSTRACT
A FORGOTTEN SHADE OF BLUE:
SUPPORT FOR THE UNION AND A CONSTITUTIONAL REPUBLIC IN
SOUTHEASTERN KENTUCKY DURING THE CIVIL WAR ERA
Howard L. Muncy
May 2020
This thesis analyzes Southeastern Kentucky’s political and military support for the Union
during the Civil War era. In the decades prior to the 1860 election, Kentucky developed
deep social and economic ties with all sections of the country. After the secession winter
that followed Abraham Lincoln’s presidential election, the statewide population divided
and pockets of significant Confederate sympathies emerged. Kentucky’s southeastern
counties aligned with the Union at the outbreak of the Civil War because of a strong
national identity and the absence of a large slave population. As the war unfolded,
Southeastern Kentuckians played an important role in the disruption of repeated
Confederate invasions. Kentucky split again in the emancipationist phase of the war
when guerilla warfare engulfed the slave state, but southeastern Kentuckians continued to
support federal efforts with votes, enlistments, and service. In the final months of the
conflict, and the years that followed, a core of Kentucky’s southeastern counties did not
drift toward the Confederacy’s “lost cause,” nor to the Democratic Party, as did much of
the state. Instead, citizens from Southeastern Kentucky offered robust support for Union
veterans and other Republican candidates who ran for both state and federal offices. This
thesis illuminates the political activity and military service of citizens from Southeastern
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Kentucky during those turbulent years with attention to national events and other local
populations proximate to the region of study.
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INTRODUCTION
“THESE HONORED DEAD”

When the full history of the war is written we shall
realize more than we do our debt to the loyal people
of the South. There [was] a larger proportion of
descendants of revolution soldiery in Kentucky than
any other state [who could] overflow their
mountains and reinforce the nation.
– Theodore Roosevelt, 1897.1
This master’s thesis analyzes Union support from the Southeastern Kentucky
population during the Civil War era. In 1861, when citizens across the South debated
secession, Kentucky legislators rejected Governor Beriah Magoffin’s Confederate
maneuvering and pursued the impossible path of neutrality before eventually siding with
the Union. As Kentucky Unionists and the state’s General Assembly sought to preserve
Kentucky’s place in the nation—Confederate sympathies endangered the state’s loyal
position from within. Political and military leaders from the newly formed confederacy
added to the internal threat of disunion and tried to reverse Kentucky’s chosen course
with a series of invasions and raids throughout the duration of the war. Historians have
long sought to explain Kentucky’s motives and loyalty during the period. To complicate
Kentucky’s Civil War legacy, the rise of a Confederate identity in the postwar period has
done much to distort the state’s important contributions to the Union victory. However,

From Theodore Roosevelt’s 1897 speech at Boston’s Trinity Church as quoted in Anne
Marshall’s Creating a Confederate Kentucky: The Lost Cause and Civil War Memory in
a Border State (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010), 120.
1

1

modern Civil War scholars have started to devote more historical attention to the
significance of the Border States, including Kentucky. Much of the early historiography
on the Appalachian regions of the United States identified a strong Union sentiment, but
some modern works have pushed back against those conclusions with new claims that the
unionism was overestimated. New studies that focus on smaller segments of the
American population during the secession crisis, within smaller defined areas, advance a
more complex understanding of the war. This thesis seeks to add to that secondary
literature with focus on residents and soldiers in the southeastern region of Kentucky.
Evidence suggests that the southeastern population of Kentucky formed a deep loyalty to
the Union that, unlike many other areas in the state, increased as the war progressed.
Events and records reveal a pattern of social, military, and political support from the area
that proved vital to the Union and unique from the other portions of the Commonwealth.
To understand Southeastern Kentucky’s Unionism at the outset of the Civil War,
Chapter One of this study analyzes the election of 1860. The chapter seeks to create a
national context of Abraham Lincoln’s election before the analysis turns to Kentucky’s
statewide outlook on the presidential race and then narrows down to examine results from
a few counties in Southeastern Kentucky. Lincoln finished last in a four-way contest
among the 1860 Kentucky electorate and the eventual sixteenth president registered less
than one percent of the total state vote. A defined geographic area in Southeastern
Kentucky offered Lincoln a significant portion, of his otherwise miniscule, political
support in the Commonwealth. Chapter One also focuses on Kentucky’s early
abolitionist and antislavery movements. The chapter identifies a combination of
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religious, economic, and social forces that shaped opinions in the local area prior to the
outbreak of war.
Chapter Two examines the formation of Kentucky Union military regiments
during 1861. The need for military volunteers to protect Union interests interconnected a
mixture of federal, state, and local officials. Politicians tapped influential rural citizens to
recruit and organize Union troops in Southeastern Kentucky. Many of those prominent
individuals possessed valuable experience with raising troops from America’s previous
wars and recruiting officers observed both patriotism and duty in their recruits. Chapter
Two explores a variety of primary accounts and statistics to capture the sentiment of the
region as the Civil War entered its first year. Actions in 1861 from Southeastern
Kentucky’s politicians in the General Assembly, and attitudes from area voters in
statewide elections, reflect the same Unionist spirit observed in volunteers during the
1861 call to arms.
Chapter Three and Chapter Four present narrative histories of Kentucky’s
important Civil War events and features soldiers’ experiences from Kentucky regiments
that fought in the Western Theatre of Union military operations. Chapter Three focuses
on the winter invasion of 1862 with attention to the repulse of Confederates at the Battle
of Mill Springs. Following that Confederate failure, General Braxton Bragg and Kirby
Smith’s larger invasion in the summer campaign of 1862 reveals another example of the
Confederates’ difficulty with turning the state toward their cause. Chapter Four explores
the second half of the Civil War and examines Kentucky’s reactions to emancipationist
policies. As a new resistance to federal policies emerged and violent guerilla attacks
engulfed the state, Southeastern Kentucky’s Union support remained firm. A
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combination of strong political and military support from Kentucky’s southeastern
counties contrasted with the fracturing loyalty found in other regions of the state during
the final years of the war.
The thesis concludes with examination of Kentucky’s postwar sentiment.
Historians have claimed that Kentucky joined the Confederate cause in the aftermath of
the war, but the southeastern population chose a post-war Republican identity. Majority
support for Republican Union veterans at the federal and state level from Southeastern
Kentuckians marked a stark departure from other regions of the state. A lingering pride
in Union military service, combined with mountain Unionists’ violent encounters with
pro-Confederate raiders, hardened the loyal sentiments of the population.
Regardless of origin, motivation, or location, Kentucky men who served in Union
Blue contributed to the North’s victory. Historian Richard Current Nelson summarized
the importance of southern soldiers:
The Union cause was aided by men who did nothing more heroic than
garrison posts or guard bridges at some distance behind the lines . . .. Men
of that kind at least made it possible for other soldiers to be released for
combat with the rebels. Indeed, anyone who joined the Union army, or
who served with loyalist state troops instead, or who merely resisted the
Confederate draft helped the cause by depriving the Confederacy of its
most desperately needed resource—military manpower.2
Historian William W. Freehling took a slightly different stance with Kentucky’s early
actions in mind. Freehling added:
Kentuckians contributed most to the Union’s interval of preparation by
what they did not do, namely, disrupt either Grant’s or Buell’s sanctuary
to receive supplies. . . . By lacking the zeal to harass Yankees who would
subdue slaveholders, Kentuckians vindicated what more zealous prewar
Southerners had long worried about: The most northern third of the South
Richard Nelson Current, Lincoln’s Loyalists: Union Soldiers from the Confederacy
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 195.
2
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might become fatally indifferent to Lower South proslavery
preoccupations.3
Southeastern Kentuckians contributed in a variety of ways throughout the entire war
including State Guard service, as part of large armies engaged in important battles, and,
at times, by Freehling’s concept of “what they did not do” in effort to deprive
Confederates.4
Early historians questioned Kentucky’s role in the Civil War. E. Merton Colter
labeled Kentucky a “pariah” to the Union who aligned with the Confederacy after the war
was over.5 Modern historians have pushed back on those early claims and found
Kentucky’s Unionism, particularly at the beginning of the war, essential for the nation’s
survival. Indeed, Kentucky’s choice to remain in the Union made a significant difference
in the federal prosecution of the war throughout the conflict. This study illuminates how
that one segment of the Kentucky population provided support, endured privation, and
remained steady in the face of violence for preservation of the Union. Furthermore, this
thesis seeks to establish the role Southeastern Kentuckians played in the Civil War era
and to understand how their actions helped the Commonwealth, and the nation, avoid a
Confederate fate in a period of contested loyalties.

3

William W. Freehling, The South vs. The South: How Anti-Confederate Southerners
Shaped the Course of the Civil War (New York: Oxford University Press), 72.
4
Ibid.
5
For a strong rebuke of Coulter’s conclusions see Thomas C. Mackey’s “Not a Pariah,
but a Keystone: Kentucky and Secession,” in Sister States, Enemy States: The Civil War
in Kentucky and Tennessee, editors Kent T. Dollar, Larry H. Whiteaker, and W. Calvin
Dickinson, (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2009), 25-45.
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CHAPTER ONE
“GENTLEMEN, I TOO, AM A KENTUCKIAN”:
KENTUCKY AND THE ELECTION OF 1860

I.
The election of Abraham Lincoln broke the United States apart. In the Fall of
1860, eligible voters from thirty-three states cast ballots in the federal election—with
fifteen of those states still maintaining a legal form of slavery. After decades of sectional
political turmoil, the new Republican platform that emerged from the May 1860 Chicago
convention—with its amalgam of northern political interests—signaled, to most
southerners, overtures of an unacceptable outlook for the future of the country.
Republican promises to limit the spread of slavery to western territories generated much
of the South’s rejection. However, other planks of the Republican platform, including
federal plans connected to western land policy, tariffs, and the building of a
transcontinental railroad, raised additional southern concerns about the young Republican
Party’s proposed role of government in the lives of Americans. The new energy
observed in the North’s collective commitment to a free labor ideology stoked southern
fears about the possibility of a transformed country. Staunch supporters of slavery, with
predictions of their own electoral defeat, maneuvered away from the politics of
compromise and advocated for an immediate separation. Other citizens from the
northernmost slaveholding states rejected such drastic action and offered guarded support
with some forming conservative groups such as the Conditional Unionists. In sum, the
6

election of 1860 revealed a spectrum of complex opinion regarding the future of slavery
and the United States, it uncovered a variety of philosophical and economic outlooks, and
it exposed opposing forms of constitutional interpretation.
Leading up to the election, opinions hardened in southerners toward what they
feared was a new aggressive hostility toward slavery. Many in the South cast the
northern acceptance of the Republican Party as evidence of a potential threat to their
entire way of life. Richmond, Virginia and Charleston, South Carolina newspapers
seized the opportunity to advance claims of the coming northern industrial drudgery and
warned of underlying long-range political plans to transform the South.6 The hysteria
caused southerners to overestimate northern support for radical efforts to attack slavery
where it existed. In fact, the selection of Abraham Lincoln as the candidate to bear the
Republican’s new program of economic and political reform resulted from an internal
effort to find a moderate candidate to thwart the more ambitious antislavery wing of the
Republican Party.7 As a new political party, less than a decade old, the Republicans
wanted to appeal to voters in the southern portions of free states such as Illinois, Indiana,
and Ohio. Radical efforts to attack slavery in the South would have produced another
electoral loss that resembled Republican John C. Frémont’s 1856 presidential campaign
against Democrat James Buchanan. Even though the selection of Lincoln multiplied
critics on both sides of the slavery argument, in 1860 many Republicans believed that a
centrist and moderate approach was crucial for electoral success.
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Eric Foner, Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of the Republican Party
Before the Civil War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), 66.
7
Richard Cawardine, Lincoln: A Life of Purpose and Power (New York: Knopf
Publications, 2006), 118-126.
7

The 1860 election did not result in a clean, nor quick, political split limited to just
two opposing sides. Prior to the wrangling of the National Convention in Chicago,
political divisions occurred during the Charleston Democratic Convention within a bloc
of southern slave states. Southern fire-eaters, concentrated but not limited to South
Carolina, had hoped for secession for over a decade and made up the most extreme group
of voters.8 But a series of late 1850s events brought broader swaths of southern opinion
closer to their position. The 1857 Scott v. Sandford Supreme Court case that denied
freedom to a former slave named Dred Scott, and the outrage that surrounded radical
abolitionist John Brown’s failed October 1859 raid on Harper’s Ferry, combined to either
embolden advocates for slavery’s expanse or instilled fear of northern abolitionist
designs—in many instances the combination accomplished both.9 These two crucial
developments worked in tandem to create a majority of delegates within the Deep South
who rejected the moderate Democrat Stephen Douglas and it caused many southerners to
throw their support behind the more hardline proslavery candidate John C. Breckinridge.
In addition to the Republican Lincoln and the two competing Democratic candidates, a
viable fourth candidate emerged in Constitutional Unionist John Bell to muddle the
situation. A former Whig and Tennessee native, Bell promoted a platform of moderation
and compromise. The Constitutional Union Party wanted to capture conservative voters
put off with the more radical voices coming from the far wings of the Democrat and
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Douglas R. Egerton, Year of Meteors: Stephen Douglas, Abraham Lincoln, and the
Election that Brought on the Civil War (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2010), 70-76.
9
For more on the implications of the Dred Scott decision see Earl M. Maltz’s Dred Scott
and the Politics of Slavery. (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2007). Southern
opinion toward John Brown’s raid is thoroughly covered in Stephen B. Oates’s, To Purge
This Land With Blood: A Biography of John Brown (Amherst: The University of
Massachusetts Press, 1970).
8

Republican parties in a schemed effort to peel off enough electoral votes to send the
election to the House of Representatives.10 The four-candidate race exposed the deep
fault lines from the fracturing American political landscape.
An examination of the latitudinal center of the United States reveals the most
evidence of a split political opinion during the pivotal 1860 presidential campaign. With
the northern-most states offering strong support for the Republican candidate Lincoln,
and the Deep South safe in the Breckinridge column, in 1860 the Border States, free and
slave, emerged as the most contested region in the election. Pennsylvania and the
Midwestern states of Indiana and Illinois helped tip the election of 1856 for Democrat
James Buchanan. Those same three states, alongside Ohio and the Upper South,
appeared to strategists of the day as the political battleground for the presidency.
Historian James McPherson concluded that “the campaign resolved itself into two
separate contests: Lincoln vs. Douglas in the North; Breckinridge vs. Bell in the South.
Republicans did not even have a ticket in ten southern states . . ..”11 The five slave states
that included Lincoln as a candidate on their ballots produced only a small quantity of
votes for the eventual president and various levels of support for each of the other three
candidates appeared on the final tallies.
Among the five states that practiced slavery but included Abraham Lincoln as a
choice for president was the Republican’s birth state—Kentucky. As a former territory of
Virginia, the Bluegrass State inherited a strong foundation for the “peculiar institution” of
slavery long before 1792 statehood. Kentucky experienced minor efforts to rid the
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James McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1988), 221-222.
11
Ibid., 223.
9

commonwealth of slavery during the early debates of its first two state constitutions.
After the unsuccessful effort to abolish slavery from the outset, Kentucky moved forward
with slavery woven deep into the social and economic fabric of the Commonwealth. A
New History of Kentucky estimated the number of 1850 slaveholding families in
Kentucky at just over a quarter of total households—a rather large number among the
fifteen total slave states.12 But an uneven geographical distribution of slave ownership
existed within that amount across the state. Most Kentuckians, like most other
southerners, never owned slaves because of either cost or, the less likelihood, objection.13
Portions of the state not conducive to the financial support of slave labor were another
factor. Mountainous regions of Kentucky, like areas of eastern Tennessee, western North
Carolina, and western/southwestern Virginia, produced isolated localities separated from
the planation life experienced in larger portions of those states. Mountainous locations
formed a blend of social bonds and institutions both connected to, and unique from,
broader state and national trends.
Perhaps the political traditions experienced in Kentucky’s seven decades of
statehood did as much, if not more, than geographic factors to distinguish the slave state
from the others that held humans in bondage. Many believe that the rise of Henry Clay to
national prominence created strong bases of intrastate support for Whig politics. The
local Kentucky politicians who supported ideas fundamental to the party’s cause
benefitted and many of the Commonwealth’s citizens developed a level of widespread
Whig loyalty not observed in any of the other southern states. Central to Clay’s identity
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Lowell Harrison and James C. Klotter, A New History of Kentucky (Lexington: The
University Press of Kentucky, 1997), 168.
13
Ibid.
10

lay the belief in an American System—a plan that combined federal tariffs, banking, and
infrastructure projects to accelerate economic development.14 Policies of legislative
compromise contributed to Clay’s legacy as well. Clay helped Congress navigate
through three potential constitutional crises with legislative efforts to heal the nation in
1820, 1833, and 1850. Notable state historian and Clay biographer James Klotter
claimed that for those citizens of the Commonwealth who constructed a strong
antebellum self-view, “many Kentuckians had been well inculcated in Clay’s vision of
America and accepted it as their own.”15
Recent scholarship also points to a deeper economic picture as the primary
catalyst for Kentucky’s antebellum political leanings. In James A. Ramage and Andrea
S. Watkins’s Kentucky Rising: Democracy, Slavery, and Culture from the Early Republic
to the Civil War, the authors argued that Jeffersonian Republicanism declined in
Kentucky in the pre-war decades.16 Ramage and Watkins suggested that many elements
of the pure Jeffersonianism that dominated southern political culture ran counter to the
idea of the numerous “frontier men and women [who] came to Kentucky for the
opportunity to work hard, earn money, and rise in society; [they had] no intention to live
poor in a poor man’s country.”17 Evidence of a distinct economic mindset was present
throughout the four decades prior to the Civil War when Kentuckians displayed a devout
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For more on Henry Clay see Robert Remini, Henry Clay: A Stateman for the Union
(New York: WW Norton & Co., 1991) and James Klotter, Henry Clay: The Man Who
Would Be President (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).
15
James C. Klotter, “Kentucky, the Civil War, and the Spirit of Henry Clay,” The
Register of the Kentucky Historical Society, 110, (2012), 251.
16
James A. Ramage and Andrea S. Watkins, Kentucky Rising: Democracy, Slavery, and
Culture from the Early Republic to the Civil War, (Lexington: The University Press of
Kentucky, 2011).
17
Ibid., 89.
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political loyalty and provided reliable vote returns for Whig candidates—a trend not
observed in any other southern state. Most of the South, in those same years, offered
near unwavering support for Jeffersonian, and later, Jacksonian candidates. Henry Clay’s
influence was the most common conclusion for historians seeking to explain the
motivation of Kentucky’s political behavior during that period. However, instead of the
talented Clay directing the state’s political whims, sentiment from the population may
have at least aligned, or at most shaped, Henry Clay’s core convictions. Jeffersonian
purity and Jacksonian philosophy stood at odds with federal guidance in economic
policy—and sometimes the two political movements produced politicians quick to
challenge federal authority. Historian Stephen Fackler claimed early Kentuckians
“wanted secure land titles, cheap money, and relief from debts. But most were unwilling
to flout the Constitution to achieve their ends.”18 This opinion led many Kentucky
homesteaders to vote from the economic and political perspectives that they found in
“Henry Clay’s and Alexander Hamilton’s nationalistic vision to succeed in diversified
farming.”19 The election of 1860 reflected interesting residues of Kentucky’s decades
long political heritage.
Closer examination of the voting citizens of Kentucky in 1860—drawn from a
population of just over one-million and one-hundred thousand (1,155,684) residents—
revealed a complex picture of the presidential election. The state held the ninth largest

Stephen W. Fackler, “John Rowan and the Demise of Jeffersonian Republicanism in
Kentucky, 1819-1831,” The Register of the Kentucky Historical Society Volume 78
(1980), 23.
19
Ramage and Watkins, Kentucky Rising, 89.
18
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population total in the Union and the third most among slave states.20 Of the presidential
candidates’ success in Kentucky, Constitutional Unionist John Bell received (45.2%)
66,501 votes, Southern Democrat John Breckinridge (36.4%) 53,143, Northern Democrat
Stephen Douglas (17.5%) 25,638, and Republican Abraham Lincoln (0.9%) 1,364.
Nationally, Bell carried the Bluegrass State along with Virginia and Tennessee. To the
west, Stephen Douglas carried neighboring Missouri. These four states’ results reflected
the Upper South’s reluctance to vote in lockstep with the Deep South or with the
Republicans of the North. The returns from Kentucky signaled a desire to avoid the more
extreme candidates in search for either a moderate politician or a compromise to deal
with the national emergency. Breckinridge secured a narrow victory in Maryland and
scored his only comfortable win in the entire Border Region with Delaware’s small
population. The aftermath of the 1860 election produced, and continues to produce, a
multitude of speculative questions from political observers and historical scholars alike.
One can only guess where Kentucky’s Bell voters would have turned had Bell not run. A
unified Democratic ticket may have carried all the southern states and made larger gains
into the Midwest. Seldom asked, however, are two-related questions, specific in nature
but worthy of historical attention: where was Lincoln’s minimal support in Kentucky and
what drove that support?
Lincoln’s lack of political appeal throughout the entire South resulted from the
Republicans’ strong stance against slave expansion in the West. Traditional voters of the
Whig party, the previous opposition to the Democrats, did not transition into the ranks of

Kenneth H. Williams and James Russell Harris, “Kentucky in 1860: A Statistical
Overview,” The Register of the Kentucky Historical Society, 103, (Autumn 2005), 751.
20
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Republicans in the South during the 1850s as happened in the North. Instead, many
searched for a middle ground and joined various parties such as the nativist KnowNothings, the American Party, and the Constitutional Unionists. Conservative citizens
opposed to Democratic threats of secession, but not ready for an attack on southern
slavery, wandered in a “political desert” where consensus was slow to coalesce.21 Many
former southern Whigs, alarmed at new attitudes toward slavery, tossed their lot in with
the Democratic Party and acted as moderates. Regardless of party affiliation, larger
segments of the Border State electorate, including Kentucky, feared that the “election of a
Republican president would galvanize the northern and southern extremists.”22 Abraham
Lincoln’s background and Kentucky roots did little to attract a significant number of
Kentucky voters in favor of the Republican candidate.
Born in 1809 in Hardin County to parents Thomas and Nancy Lincoln, Abraham
Lincoln came from a typical early Kentucky family. The Sinking Spring Farm
represented then, and still symbolizes today, a frontier opportunity to advance up the
American social ladder. But Kentucky’s rampant issues with clear land titles dampened
that opportunity in the early 1800s and the Lincolns moved to another nearby farm at
Knob Creek. Abraham Lincoln’s first seven years of life brought exposure to the
Kentucky frontier lifestyle including the hard realities associated with rugged farming,

Thomas C. Mackey, “Not a Pariah, but a Keystone: Kentucky and Secession,” in Sister
States, Enemy States: The Civil War in Kentucky and Tennessee, editors Kent T. Dollar,
Larry H. Whiteaker, and W. Calvin Dickinson, (Lexington: The University Press of
Kentucky, 2009), 29.
22
Christopher Phillips, The Civil War in the Border South, (Santa Barbara: Praeger,
2013), 5.
21
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limited educational opportunities, and even a near drowning.23 In 1816, the Lincoln
family moved across the Ohio River to a location in Indiana. Even though the move
meant a permanent departure from the Commonwealth, the future president continued to
develop important relationships connected to Kentucky for the rest of his life. Wife Mary
Todd, law partner William Herndon, best friend Joshua Speed, and newspaper editor
George Prentice of the Louisville Journal stand out as a few examples of the many
Kentuckians who surrounded and influenced Abraham Lincoln.24 Aside from the long
list of direct Kentucky relationships, perhaps political influence represented a more
important aspect of potential appeal for voters in 1860. Historian Stephen Oates wrote:
Like his father, young Lincoln was a Clay man and “all but worshipped
his name.” He liked Clay’s ringing nationalism. He liked Clay’s
economic program, whose goal of sectional interdependence and national
unity appealed to Lincoln’s love of logic, of symmetry and stability. And
he liked Clay’s stand on slavery and colonization.”25
As a staunch Whig, Abraham Lincoln’s political career, until his election as
president, resulted in more defeats than victories. Illinois leaned toward Jacksonian
candidates in the time of Lincoln’s earliest races for public office. The mid-term election
of 1846 provided one bright spot in a long list of defeats when local leaders of the Whig
party, along with Illinois voters, awarded Lincoln a two-year legislative term, 1847-1849,
in the United States House of Representatives. Lincoln’s commitment to towing the
Whig Party line from his Illinois days made little impression on most of the voters in

The historiography on Abraham Lincoln’s early biography is large. Lowell Harrison’s
Lincoln of Kentucky (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2000); David H.
Donald’s Lincoln (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995) offer some of the most useful
analysis on Lincoln’s first years in Kentucky.
24
Harrison, Lincoln of Kentucky, vii.
25
Stephen B. Oates, With Malice Toward None: A Biography of Abraham Lincoln (New
York: Harper & Row, 1977), 21.
23
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Kentucky during the 1860 election. Paradoxically, Lincoln’s political philosophy paired
much better with his native Kentucky during the 1830s and 1840s than it did in Illinois.
However, enough had changed in the minds of Kentucky voters during the 1850s to
marginalize any benefit from Lincoln’s history of Whig loyalty going into the 1860
election.
Attitudes toward slavery and disunion accounted for the biggest challenge in the
political environment that Abraham Lincoln encountered in Kentucky. The Kentucky
sentiment against disunion damaged John Breckinridge’s ability to carry the state, but
those same threats connected to the Breckinridge candidacy also influenced opinion
against Abraham Lincoln. As 1920s historian E. Merton Coulter surmised:
As threats were frequently heard from the South during this campaign that
secession must follow if Lincoln is elected, the Breckinridge Democrats
were assaulted on all sides by their Kentucky opponents with the charges
of standing for disunion. Their party was committed to secession, it was
said, if Lincoln succeeded. Their candidate, Breckinridge, was a
disunionist.26
This political sentiment resulted in an act of collective self-interest for a substantial
number of Kentuckians who wanted to avoid the violence that might engulf the state.
Breckinridge garnered the vote of those who put slavery above all else, but Lincoln had
no real constituency in Kentucky for appeal. Instead, his possible victory represented a
real threat of future trouble to most Kentuckians. John Bell benefitted the most in this
political climate. Historians attribute Bell’s appeal in the Border States to the large
number of voters who sought to protect the state from becoming an up-close battleground
for the conflict. Scores of Douglas supporters might fit a similar categorization. In
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judgement of the immediate aftermath of the election when Kentuckians rejected
secession, Coulter provided a similar conclusion:
But here on this borderland the preservation of the Union and the
preservation of slavery went hand in hand; for if the country divided,
Kentucky would almost sure to be on the frontier, regardless of which side
she should choose. The destruction of the Union would sound the doom
of slavery; for if she went with the South, it would make the northern
banks of the Ohio a refuge for fugitive slaves, and if she should go with
the free North she could not hope to maintain slavery long. It took no
great amount of foresight to show that disunion must ultimately destroy
slavery in Kentucky.27
If this opinion was prevalent in Kentucky after the election, amidst a wave of secession,
one could reason that some semblance of the same line of thought influenced voters’
choices during the election. In a desperate pitch for union, Kentucky voters felt
compelled to reach for a kind of hopeful status quo. The final election results from
Kentucky in 1860 reflect such a conclusion. The political positions of the four candidates
left a small bloc of voters who were either ardent enough against slavery to disregard the
threats of disunion or with enough political desire for change to reject the self-preserving
sentiments as the only constituency for Lincoln to capture in Kentucky. Few voting
Kentuckians arrived at such a position.
II.
In 1860, one-hundred and ten counties comprised Kentucky. Of those numerous
counties in the election of 1860, Jackson County offered Republican Abraham Lincoln
his greatest Kentucky support. Jackson County, carved out of portions of Madison,
Estill, Owsley, Clay, Rockcastle, and Laurel counties in 1858, represented one of the
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youngest counties of the nation on the eve of the Civil War.28 Jackson County lies near
the center of the Kentucky Appalachian Mountain chain that cuts in a diagonal line across
the southeastern portion of the state. The northwestern-most boundary of the county
adjoined Madison County and acted as a passage into the central Bluegrass Region of the
state. The inaugural population of Jackson County in the 1860 census recorded 3,087
residents. The number of slaves included in that same count totaled seven and belonged
to four separate slaveholders. Of the other thirteen Appalachian counties classified as
“Southern Eastern Highland” counties, all boasted slave populations of seventy or more,
with eleven of the total fourteen counties that listed over one-hundred slaves each.29 In
short, each county in the region had at least ten times more slaves than Jackson County
and adjacent Estill County possessed the most with over five-hundred. For comparison,
just to the north, in the “Lexington/Inner Bluegrass Region,” Madison County recorded
over six-thousand humans in bondage.30 The census listed twenty-one free blacks for
Jackson County, amounting to the only county in the region, and state, and possibly the
entire South, with a number of free blacks that surpassed the number of slaves.
Statewide, Jackson County possessed the fewest number of slaves.
Of the 390 votes counted in Jackson County for the 1860 presidential election,
over a quarter (25.8%) went to Lincoln. The next two highest percentages of Republican
voters in the state occurred in the two Ohio River counties of Campbell (11.9%) and
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Kenton (7.5%).31 For comparison, in forty-five counties statewide, nearly half of the
Commonwealth, Lincoln received either one or zero votes.32 The finally tally in Jackson
County awarded Constitutional Unionist John Bell 140 votes, Southern Democrat John
Breckinridge 136 votes, Republican Abraham Lincoln 101 votes, and Northern Democrat
Stephen Douglas 13 votes. The newly formed county voted with Kentucky in the
selection of John Bell as its winner but provided Abraham Lincoln some of his strongest
support from any area in the nation with legal slavery. The near absence of slavery
attributed to this total, but elements of abolitionism made an impact as well.
More so than other slave states, Kentucky experienced limited, yet important,
abolitionist activity. As a Presbyterian minister, David Rice rose as one of the earliest
Kentucky voices against slavery.33 Rice’s pamphlet Slavery Inconsistent with Justice and
Good Policy attacked slavery in Kentucky from a religious and moral standpoint during
the earliest statehood debates in 1792. Rice predicted that the end of slavery would
transform Kentucky into a more virtuous society and would boost an influx of “useful”
citizens.34 Another Kentucky minister, Baptist David Borrow, took a similar stance
against the institution of slavery. Borrow published a fifty-five-page pamphlet in 1808
that denounced the limited opportunities afforded to blacks and argued that the Kentucky
economy drove inequality among the entire population.35 In 1821, the Kentucky
Abolition Society published a year-long series of monthly newsletters entitled Abolition
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Intelligencer and Missionary Magazine edited by another minister, John Finley Crowe.36
Abolitionists and emancipationists advocated for change and operated early in
Kentucky’s history. In the 1830s another group emerged in the antislavery effort—
proponents for colonization.
The American Colonization Society rose as a suitable alternative for many
Kentuckians put off by radical abolitionism. The fundamental mission of colonization
included the emancipation of slaves coupled with deportation to the African colony of
Liberia. Thirty-one colonization societies existed in Kentucky in 1832 and Henry Clay
emerged as one of the scheme’s leading figures. Pulitzer Prize winning historian Eric
Foner assessed the appeal and evolution of colonization in places like Kentucky. Foner
claimed, “Planters and political leaders from the Upper South dominated the American
Colonization Society. Few were more adamant about linking colonization with
emancipation than Henry Clay.”37 The Kentucky-backed approach later echoed with
Abraham Lincoln and Foner added:
Clay’s outlook on slavery—condemnation of the institution and
affirmation of the blacks’ humanity coupled with the conviction that
emancipation could only come gradually and should be linked with
colonization—strongly affected Lincoln’s. More than once during the
1850s when speaking about slavery and race, Lincoln quoted or
paraphrased Clay. “I can express all my views on the slavery question,”
he once said, “by quotations from Henry Clay.”38
Colonization drew contemporary criticism, and for modern Americans, the practice
appears in hindsight as an inhumane solution to a vile institution. While many of these
assessments are undeniable, in mid-nineteenth century Kentucky, colonization became
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the most attainable end to slavery for those committed and willing to lend their voice to
stop human bondage within a slave society.
Supporters of colonization and other emancipationist efforts moved the debate
over slavery to the forefront of Kentucky political thought in the antebellum years.
Kentuckians agreed to call a third constitutional convention in 1848. While the primary
purpose of the convention centered upon a growing state debt, legislative spending,
spoils, and gerrymandered districting; eager Kentuckians, against slavery, inserted the
issue for discussion.39 Debates across the state turned violent while those opposed to
slavery remained hopeful for some type of political success. In the end, however, the
new 1850 Kentucky Constitution not only fell short to the hopes of those against the
practice of slavery, but the whole process strengthened the institution and provided a
serious setback to the abolitionists and emancipationists in the state.40 In addition, the
proslavery victory emboldened advocates to further antagonize and silence opponents of
slavery. Even with Henry Clay as an admired advocate of colonization, and numerous
moderate citizens seeking to move the Commonwealth away from slavery, the abject
failure of antislavery measures in 1849 secured slavery’s immediate future in Kentucky.
The political victory further empowered slavery’s supporters and even pushed some
frustrated Kentucky abolitionists to look for residence in other states.41
Areas in Southeastern Kentucky experienced only limited exposure to antislavery
efforts prior to the 1830s and 1840s. Much of the historical record trace early efforts of
Kentucky abolitionism to the central and northern portions of the state where slavery
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thrived. A far higher percentage of the state’s slave population accompanied the location
of the bourgeoning communities and economy of the central Bluegrass Region. The
Jackson Purchase and other portions of Western Kentucky also surpassed Appalachia in
both free and slave populations in the decades following statehood. The counties south
of Lexington and east of Bowling Green remained isolated in this American period of
economic growth. But Appalachian Kentucky was not devoid of slavery, nor of citizens
interested in the issue. Estill, Clay, and Knox Counties combined to list 1,345 slaves in
the 1860 census.42 Political and religious developments brought voices opposed to
slavery to mountainous areas as attention to the issue rose on at the national level.
Cassius Marcellus Clay and John Gregg Fee became the two most significant
figures associated with abolitionism in Southeastern Kentucky.43 The two men were of
different backgrounds, possessed different philosophies on how to rid the nation of
slavery, and held conflicting views on matters of self-defense—views often challenged
by angry Kentucky mobs. But both Clay and Fee shared a common passion against the
institution of slavery, and both wanted to convince Kentuckians of slavery’s detrimental
effects on society. The citizens of Appalachia Kentucky, overall, were more receptive to
antislavery and abolitionist messages than their northern or western Kentucky neighbors.
Clay delivered a political approach and Fee appealed with a religious one.
Cassius Clay, as a prominent politician, took a more aggressive stance against
slavery than did his Kentucky counterparts. Cassius bore the same last name as
Kentucky’s most famous statesman, and older cousin, Henry Clay. Educated at Yale,

Williams and Harris, “Kentucky in 1860: A Statistical Overview,” 750.
Christopher Phillips, The Rivers Ran Backwards: The Civil War and the Remaking of
the American Middle Border (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 64-65.
42
43

22

Cassius Clay heard William Lloyd Garrison speak during the abolitionist’s rise to become
one of the nation’s most important voices against slavery. Clay’s educational experience
and exposure to abolitionism brought northern viewpoints into Kentucky. Furthermore,
Clay’s success in Whig politics and adherence to Henry Clay’s economic programs of a
commercialized economy worked to manifest his antislavery views in favor of a
transformed Kentucky economy. In the 1844 presidential race between Democrat James
K. Polk and Whig Henry Clay, Cassius campaigned on Henry’s behalf in the North. The
Whigs needed Cassius Clay’s antislavery bona fides to attract wavering northern voters
and, on one occasion, Clay followed famous Massachusetts senator Daniel Webster in a
series of speeches delivered on Boston Common. Cassius Clay aimed his efforts, as a
spokesman of the South and advocate for Henry Clay, at securing abolitionists who were
tempted to vote for third-party candidate James G. Birney.44 With Boston as a hub of
abolitionist activity that included devout followers of Garrison’s ideas found in The
Liberator, the task represented a show of political confidence in Cassius Clay’s ability to
appeal to northerners. But the Kentuckian stopped short of the Garrisonian brand of
abolitionism noted for overt criticism of America’s founding and constitution. Instead,
Clay judged that Garrisonian “abolitionists committed the grave error of attacking the
Constitution; their efforts brought disruption to the Union rather than a rational solution
to the problem of slavery.”45 While William Lloyd Garrison converted numerous readers
with more radical and immediate solutions to ending slavery, those views would have
driven away Kentuckians. Cassius Clay’s positions made him a moderate in the North
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and, in the South, as close to a radical as possible with any ability to retain a degree of
influence. The political straddle brought numerous threats of bodily harm to Clay, to
which he responded in kind.
Cassius Clay earned the nickname “the Lion of White Hall” while defending his
ideas and his Kentucky home. Situated between the Bluegrass region and the
Appalachian Foothills, Clay’s White Hall estate in northern Madison County made for a
location resembling his national political reputation—positioned between two different
bodies of opposing opinion. Resorting to violence for self-protection is where Clay drew
his biggest distinction from other opponents of slavery around the nation. Clay’s 1845
antislavery publication of the True American earned him quick scorn and numerous
threats from proslavery forces around Central Kentucky. Cannons, powder, muskets, and
other arms lined his printing office as a lethal warning to intruders committed to silencing
his paper or doing him bodily harm.46 Determined not to suffer a fate like the murdered
abolitionist Elijah Lovejoy of Illinois, Clay’s armed efforts allowed subscriptions of the
Lexington based paper to climb to over 3,000 in the publication’s duration. In 1849,
during the contentious debates of Kentucky’s election of delegates for a third state
constitutional convention, Clay debated proslavery candidate Squire Turner in Madison
County. Turner’s son Cyrus took exception to Clay’s comments and approached the
podium. A scuffle ensued between Clay and several proslavery men before an injured
Clay fatally stabbed Cyrus Turner with a Bowie Knife.47
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John Fee joined with Cassius Clay in the 1850s. Fee, a Kentucky born minister
trained at Lane Theological Seminary, befriended Clay in the late 1840s. The two
formed a bond to oppose slavery when Clay gifted a portion of land in southern Madison
County, near Jackson County, for the purposes of a school. Fee’s belief of racial
harmony and opportunity positioned him as a radical outsider in slave state Kentucky.
Glade, the name of the land Fee received, later became better known as Berea. The
American Missionary Association, a protestant-based abolitionist group from New York,
offered some material aid and kept close ties with Fee’s progress. Clay’s reputation
offered a degree of security for Fee to operate, but the pastor faced multiple incidents of
proslavery harassment of his own. As Fee’s southern abolitionist experiment expanded,
the founder of Berea needed additional help.
George Candee was born in 1831—the same year that literate preacher Nat Turner
led America’s most violent slave rebellion in Virginia and the same year William Lloyd
Garrison launched The Liberator. Candee attended Oberlin College and later graduated
from Oberlin Theological Seminary just outside of Cleveland in 1857. When Oberlin
adopted the policy of admitting students “irrespective of color,” the only college In
America to do so, the institution attracted national attention.48 The American Missionary
Association recognized the young pastor’s talents and Candee preached in Appalachia
under the auspices of the organization. In 1913, The Berea Citizen conducted an
interview with Candee from his Ohio home and published an extended work on his
recollections of antebellum and Civil War experiences in Southeastern Kentucky in a
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series entitled “Reminiscences.”49 Candee introduced himself to readers, “I was a born
Abolitionist. My father was the keeper of an Underground Railroad station.”50 Interest
related to travel and residence in the South first arose in Candee in 1854 when two
Oberlin friends, Humphrey Marshall and O.B. Waters, selected Kentucky as the
destination to teach students. With Marshall and Waters planning to take up work in
Kentucky, Candee’s burning desire to join John G. Fee and offer his services for the
leader’s abolitionist effort overtook him, and he accompanied the duo on a trip scheduled
for northern Kentucky.51 Aboard the train to Cincinnati, with expectations to rendezvous
with John Fee just across the Ohio River, Candee opened a letter that informed him of
John Fee’s relocation to southern Madison County. Candee used most of his remaining
money to get further south to Lexington and held only twenty-three of the twenty-five
cents needed for the additional stagecoach to Richmond.52 The driver accepted the fare
as sufficient and Candee arrived penniless in Richmond, Kentucky.
The young pastor walked south from Richmond in search of Fee and Cassius
Clay’s antislavery community. Aware of the danger, Candee recollected:
I did not mention [Cassius] Clay’s name until I heard it well spoken of at
Rogersville. I was afraid enemies of Mr. Fee and Mr. Clay would
misguide me—or do something worse. They had quite recently ducked a
‘wild’ Abolitionist—repeatedly in a watering pond until he swore with his
hands on his own Bible that he would leave the State and never return.53
Candee, also aware of Clay’s designs for Berea, referred to John Fee as “a sort of bishop
in that central place over all his anti-slavery constituency for political reform purposes.”54
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If Fee was the bishop, Candee seemed poised to act as an itinerant for his message. One
of the earliest experiences for Candee included delivering sermons in the winter of 1855
just outside of Berea. Soon thereafter, George Candee found himself located further into
the southern Appalachian Mountains.
Jackson County and Candee became interwoven around the county’s inception in
1858. Theophilus Tolman (T.T.) Garrard, Levi Jackson, and representatives from seven
separate counties met in March to finalize plans for creation of Jackson County.55 Early
settlers selected McKee as the county seat. Local residents, Jerman Thompson, and later
Solomon Stephens, offered Candee overnight hospitality as he travelled and awaited his
move into central Jackson County.56 Candee claimed himself as the first person to move
into McKee and estimated that the entire county did not have a “half dozen slaves,” but
did have “quite a list of radical abolitionists. . .”57 Among these abolitionist inhabitants
was a man who mirrored Cassius Clay’s violent style of self-preservation—Bob Nichols.
Bob Nichols lived in the southern portion of Jackson County at a location called
Moores Creek. Nichols read classics such as Newton’s Principia, Harriet Beecher
Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin, along with a host of other antislavery and abolitionist
publications.58 Upon greeting, Nichols recited on frequent occasion that he was “an
abolitionist, a patriot, and a lover of my country” as a common introduction.59 Described
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as a “fist and skull pugilist,” Nichols fought back against proslavery in a violent manner.
Just more than a year after Candee’s arrival in McKee, a neighboring Madison Countian,
Wash Maupin, traveled to Jackson County to collect information on Candee and his
followers. The effort followed John Brown’s raid at Harper’s Ferry in Virginia and came
after a proslavery mob chased John Fee from his Berea home and out of Kentucky.
When Maupin arrived in McKee hoping to initiate plans for a similar outcome for George
Candee, local Jackson Countians informed Maupin that if a Madison County mob
marched to McKee—armed citizens would meet any effort to harm Candee. According
to a witness, the strong rebuke caused a threatened Maupin to ride in fear for the county
line.60 George Candee avoided the 1859 political exile that John Fee experienced. The
threat of mob violence, however, would return.
Proslavery advocates whipped Jackson Countians into another frenzy following
the Maupin incident. An aide to Candee, Jim Seaborn returned to a Jackson County post
office one morning with news of another hatched plan for proslavery mob violence.
Seaborn rode south, horseback, for over ten miles to alert Bob Nichols at his Moores
Creek home of the proslavery threat. Around 2:00 A.M. Nichols, a Baptist minister, and
several other armed citizens arrived at McKee to protect Candee. Townsfolk later
discovered the threat false and that a town drunk promulgated the entire alarm. Most of
the men spent the night in McKee and walked around the streets of the town, armed, the
next day in a show of force.61 A Richmond Kentucky newspaper, The Mountain
Democrat, reported sixty armed men opposed to slavery who came out to protect Candee.
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Perhaps in a stroke of irony, a frustrated John Fee at one time protested to the American
Missionary Association in 1857 that to have “the protection of a civil officer will not be
wrong. Paul [the apostle] had an escort of 60 horsemen on one occasion.”62 Candee
received the protection Fee desired from local residents willing to fight for his safety.
The combination of a religious Candee and a political Nichols appeared to
parallel, in many ways, the early relationship of Fee and Clay. Through Candee’s
traveling sermons, interaction with residents at Estill County’s Station Camp, Rockcastle
County, and areas of northern Laurel County brought the pastor into contact with
abolitionist sympathies just across Jackson County lines.63 Candee wrote of warm
receptions and of the courteous hosts found in his frequent religious meetings with
numerous Appalachian citizens. Bob Nichols admired Cassius Clay’s political abilities
and welcomed the Lincoln spokesperson to Jackson County in 1860. Candee recalled:
While a radical Republican, [Clay] parted with John Fee and other radical
abolitionists who championed immediate abolition. He did not stand by
the Bereans at the time they were mobbed out of the state but did some
damaging characterizing of Brother Fee for which I criticized him in a
private letter.64
In recollection of the period just before the 1860 election, Candee stated:
[Clay] was a little fearful of the Jackson County radicals. But when the
[1860] election campaign was on, the radicals and the conservatives of
Jackson County united and called Clay to come up and give us a
Republican speech. I was appointed committee to send him the invitation;
which service I performed as gracefully as I could, inviting him to be my
guest. . .. A great mass of people greeted him. I doubt if a single man in
Jackson County who was able to be there was absent.65
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A banquet followed, and Bob Nichols and his wife provided a portion of the food. Clay
spoke to Candee and expressed his surprise about such safety and enthusiastic support.66
In a May 1860 correspondence with the future president, Clay promised to raise as much
support as possible for the election. Lincoln wrote back:
I shall, in the canvass, and especially afterwards, if the result shall devolve
the administration upon me, need the support of all the talent, popularity,
and courage, North and South, which is in the party; and it is with sincere
gratification that I receive this early indication of your unwavering
purpose to stand for the right.67
Candee and Nichols’s relationship did not deteriorate over politics as did Fee and Clay’s.
Nor did Nichols abandon the protection of his local abolitionist pastor as Fee supporters
accused of Clay. After the shelling of Fort Sumter in 1861, Candee did leave the state
and pro-Confederate sentiment seemed to rise in the county he left behind. However,
Candee received a letter only a few weeks after his departure that relayed news of the
quelling of Confederate voices led, no doubt, by Bob Nichols and men like him.

III.
The events in McKee appear to exist as one of the only real examples of success
related to Cassius Clay’s earlier promise to raise political support for the presidential
candidate Abraham Lincoln. Of the 1,364 Kentucky votes counted for Lincoln in the
election of 1860, 101 Jackson Countians, 56 Estill Countians, 64 Rockcastle Countians,
and 10 Laurel Countians—all in proximity of McKee influence—cast their votes for the
Republican candidate. The amount accounted for nearly 20% of Lincoln’s total

66

Ibid.
Abraham Lincoln, The Collected Works IV, 1860-61 (New Brunswick: Rutgers
University Press, 1959), 53.
67

30

Kentucky vote, but the defined boundary of the populations where the votes appeared
made up less than 1% of Kentuckians.
John Bell’s Constitutional Unionism peeled away many of Kentucky’s traditional
Whig voters. Even without his candidacy, the support of Lincoln may have only made
marginal gains. Samuel Haycraft, a Whig and Union man, tried to convince Lincoln to
campaign in his birth state during the 1860 race. After Lincoln denied that request, he
wrote Haycraft a letter where he offered an optimistic outlook: “Rest fully assured that
the good people of the South who will put themselves in the same temper and mood
towards me which you do, will find no cause to complain of me.”68 The results proved
otherwise.
A strong stance either against slavery or for abolitionism emerged as the only
constituency for Lincoln to capture in Border States where sentiments for slavery and/or
safety existed as the two most important issues. Opponents of slavery in Kentucky, and
the nation, witnessed how events and movements in the 1850s eroded the modest gains of
previous decades. Increased sectionalism also made it difficult for moderates to justify
positions that could jeopardize the future political standing of their respective regions of
the country. Abraham Lincoln’s non-appearance on ten states’ presidential ballots
exemplified the level of opposition his candidacy faced.
Jackson County’s location, economy, and isolation made for an exception.
Appalachian southerners did not benefit from the slave economy and many of the
mountain residents harbored suspicions towards the institution. With Cassius Clay’s

As quoted in Michael Davis’s, The Image of Lincoln in the South (Knoxville: The
University of Tennessee Press, 1971), 18.
68

31

example only miles away, one can only wonder how much influence penetrated the area
before the county’s 1858 formation. Instead, the vote tally and stories of pastor George
Candee present the most tangible evidence of the small population’s political departure
from the rest of the state. But the label anomaly, the term most often used to describe the
political action of mountain whites, sells short the values, commitment, and convictions
of a people who voted and supported an idea. Isolation and the physical environment
hardened abolitionists of Appalachia. Historian Stanley Harrold added:
Their experience with the issue of violent means in confronting a social
evil within their society demonstrates the limits of peaceful reform in a
slave state and suggests the dynamic interaction of abolitionist ideas and
southern culture. As members of that culture seeking fundamental change,
the Kentucky abolitionists may provide a better paradigm of the
predicament of American reformers than abolitionists in the North, who
usually confronted slavery only from a great distance.69
Proslavery advocates willing to engage in violent intimidation forced Kentucky
abolitionists to develop systems of protection or risk being silenced. The residents of
Southeastern Kentucky reflected this conclusion. The effects raged from their courage in
ballots to the protection of a northern stranger.
After winning the election, Abraham Lincoln wrote a speech intended, but never
delivered, for a Kentucky audience. The remarks would have been part of Lincoln’s
communication to Americans along the journey to his inauguration. Seven states chose
secession before Lincoln took office, but the speech would have appealed for Kentucky
to accept the constitutional process.
Is there a Bell-man, a Breckinridge-man, or a Douglas man . . . amongst
you would not die by the proposition, that your candidate, being elected,
should be inaugurated, solely on the conditions of the constitution, and
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laws, or not at all. What Kentuckian, worthy of his birthplace, would not
do this? Gentlemen, I too, am a Kentuckian.70
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CHAPTER TWO
“THE UNION SENTIMENT AMONG THE PEOPLE LARGELY
PREDOMINATES:” SOUTHEASTERN KENTUCKY IN 1861

In the state of Kentucky during the Civil War era, the southeastern Appalachian
population provided a great amount of loyalty to the Union in sentiment and action. The
philosophies and outlooks that drove this staunch Unionism has long evaded and
frustrated many Kentucky Civil War scholars. Some historians dismiss the contributions
as a southern anomaly, others question the depth and significance of the loyalty of that
region. The simple conclusion many researchers put forth is that the area’s lack of a
slave economy caused Kentucky’s Appalachian residents to develop either a natural
antislavery mentality or an isolated indifference. Records and events, however, suggest
that significant portions of the population from Kentucky’s southeastern mountains
aligned with the opponents of secession prior to, during, and, unlike much of the state,
even after the conflict ended. Evidence also suggests that the alignment resulted from a
rich Whig political tradition, a strong civic connection to the founding, and a deep
national pride connected to military service in America’s previous conflicts. Also
important for the residents of Southeastern Kentucky were issues related to class. Many
of the mountainous citizens cast a suspicious eye towards the central Kentucky
slavocracy—including a mistrust of the Bourbon aristocracy types found in Lexington.
These traditions and outlooks combined to form a strong self-view and shaped the
opinions of residents on the eve of civil war, who in large number, were reluctant to give
34

up on the idea of a United States Republic. Those factors deserve more weight than
earlier historians and their historiography have allowed. During the critical year of 1861,
the call to arms and political activity in southeastern Kentucky reflected a deep national
spirit that aided the Union.
Events following the November 1860 election of Abraham Lincoln revealed
varying degrees of uncertainty about the future for the state governments and the people
below the Mason-Dixon Line. In the cotton producing states of the Lower South, the
decision to secede came swiftly after Lincoln’s electoral victory. Beginning in December
1860, South Carolina led an initial wave of secession that resulted in seven states leaving
the Union before Lincoln’s March 1861 inauguration. The remaining eight states with
slavery, including Kentucky, practiced a more measured caution towards choosing
disunion in the immediate aftermath of the Republican Party victory. The Upper South,
comprised of Virginia, Tennessee, North Carolina, and Arkansas, abandoned the Union
after assessing the federal reaction to the April 12 events at Fort Sumter, Charleston,
South Carolina. By the summer of 1861, eleven states claimed to have left the Union for
the Confederacy and it appeared that more might follow. Missouri, Delaware, Maryland,
and Kentucky earned the label “Border States” as a result of their proximity to the free
North while possessing slavery within their borders. The historical grouping of the states
suggests a neat geographic and chronological break, south to north, for state governments
dissatisfied at the prospects of a new Republican administration and its stated position to
halt the spread of slavery westward. However, the political reality within Kentucky
leading up to, and during, the Civil War was much more complex than textbooks present.
For citizens of Kentucky, news of regiments on the move struck a deep chord of concern
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among its population and the path of choosing a side in the Civil War proved to become
one of the most precarious in the nation. The state’s demographic mix from its short
history complicated the path to the Union North or the Confederate South.
In 1792, when eighteenth century Kentucky leaders secured legislation from
Virginia for separation, Kentucky became the fifteenth state in the Union and the second
to form after the ratification of the United States Constitution. Kentucky attracted most
of its migrants from Virginia, Pennsylvania, and North Carolina in the sixty years
between statehood and the Civil War.71 A diverse mix of ideas, experiences, and
backgrounds flowed into the Commonwealth. Northerners, a few generations removed
from living near a burgeoning slave economy, and southerners, already acclimated to the
“peculiar institution,” combined to form a unique culture within the young state’s
population. Early efforts to eliminate slavery in Kentucky proved unsuccessful for those
opposed to the institution and most slaveholders settled in the central and western
portions of the state—areas with a topography and soil more conducive to the use of
slave labor.
At its 1792 inception, Kentucky had three counties—Lincoln, Jefferson, and
Fayette. It did not take long for local communities to carve out more counties from
within the boundaries of these original three to bring local government closer to the
residents scattered across the Commonwealth. Clay County became one of the earliest
and most influential counties in the southeastern portion of Kentucky. Formed in 1806
and named after Green Clay, Clay County’s original county lines included the future
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county seats of Leslie, Perry, Knott, Owsley, and Lee Counties and portions of future
Jackson, Laurel, Bell, Harlan, and Breathitt counties. Like most of antebellum Kentucky,
Clay County showed enthusiastic support for Whig policies in its first half-century of
political existence and cast admiration toward the first cousin (Henry Clay) of the
county’s namesake. Sociologists Dwight Billings and Kathleen Blee wrote:
Clay County’s unswerving loyalty from 1828 to 1851 to Henry Clay’s
Whig Party, a party committed to “enhancing the profitability of
property,” suggests that is was no different. The strength of its voters’
commitment to the principles of Whiggery placed it among Bluegrass and
other southeastern counties in the “Whig Gibraltar,” while the actions of
its county court prior to the emergence of political parties suggest that
Clay County leaders aggressively pursued policies associated with
modernization and economic development.72
Henry Clay’s popularity stemmed from his political ability to capture the frontier
attitudes connected to Kentucky’s egalitarian spirit and the rise of a professional class. In
this environment, Clay rose as a leading spokesman in what state historian James Klotter
identified as “a hybrid society, with roots planted in both America’s past and in its
future.”73
The political and economic activity in areas south of Lexington drew interest from
a national level. Henry Clay’s American System sought to advance western frontiersmen
with a system of tariffs, banking, and internal improvements. The system appealed to
most Kentuckians and many of the residents in these underdeveloped areas believed the
measures were sorely needed. However, when the Whig Party’s influence faded in the
1850s following Clay’s death, few Kentuckians sought the move to the new Republican
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Party as an alternative. As a recent convert to the Republican Party in 1858,
Pennsylvania Senator Simon Cameron wrote about Kentuckians south of Lexington and
concluded that “these poor white men of the South, who are our brothers, and our natural
allies, must be taught . . . we are battling for their rights.”74 As far back as the 1840s,
prominent northern politicians cast a hopeful eye toward Kentuckian Cassius Clay’s
efforts to cultivate antislavery sentiments in the slave state and northerners supported his
efforts in hope that his followers signaled a “harbinger” of hidden southern sentiment.75
Throughout the Antebellum Era, more mountainous areas of Kentucky established new
counties as the history of the state progressed. But even if these localities split
geographically from parent counties, familial ties and traditions caused them to resemble
one another in culture, economy, political structure, and outlook.
The demographic complexity affected Kentucky and debates over Union or
secession provided a contrast in experience for residents in different regions of the state.
Arguments reached a fevered pitch after the violent encounter at Fort Sumter on April 12,
1861. Accused of harboring deep feelings for the southern cause, Governor Beriah
Magoffin maneuvered to keep Kentucky “neutral” in the aftermath.76 The political tugof-war between Kentucky’s more pro-Union General Assembly and Governor
Magoffin’s Confederate sympathies produced a series of ill-conceived attempts to
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remove Kentucky from making a choice of joining either the Union or the Confederacy.77
On May 16, the House of Representatives voted 69-29 for a resolution of strict neutrality.
The Senate passed similar legislation and Governor Magoffin declared Kentucky’s
neutrality in the days that followed. 78 The legislative effort to stay out of the conflict,
however, made little difference to recruiters who sought soldiers from the state willing to
fight as agents from the Confederacy and Union made efforts to recruit soldiers from
across all parts of the state.
During the days of the state government’s debate that pronounced Kentucky
“neutral,” William “Bull” Nelson visited President Abraham Lincoln in Washington,
D.C., to request 5,000 arms to outfit Unionist Kentuckians.79 Nelson developed a
distribution scheme for the rifles that involved eight prominent Kentuckians, including
Lincoln friend Joshua F. Speed, to help carry out the plan. On July 1, federal authorities
directed Nelson to establish a camp in the southeastern part of the state and to collect
three regiments of Union-minded Kentuckians. National, as well as state, politicians
identified the northern Ohio River region and the Appalachian area as possessing the
most pro-Union citizens. Southern historian E. Merton Coulter added, “This was a bold
and daring attempt to capitalize on the strong Union sentiment that existed in the eastern
regions of Kentucky and Tennessee, and to lay hold on the strategic passes from
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Tennessee and the Southwest into Virginia.”80 Most of the original 5000 guns federals
allocated for Kentucky went to the northern and central portion of the state, but the
southernmost destination, which became Camp Dick Robinson, received a shipment that
helped outfit some of the southeastern Kentuckians who volunteered to fight for the
Union.81 The weapons that arrived received the name of “Lincoln Guns” and constituted
a source of criticism for Confederate supporters inside and outside of Kentucky.
Newspapers in the northern and more populated parts of the state added to the
excitement of southern Kentuckians joining the ranks of the Union. The Louisville Daily
Journal featured stories connected to the fears of a Confederate invasion. On August 12
the paper stated:
Kentucky Invaded! Arouse, Union Men! We have just received the
information that a force of between two and three thousand disunion
troops have marched into Kentucky through the Cumberland Gap. The
Union men in that vicinity immediately sent runners to Owsley, Jackson,
and Estill, and other counties in the region. The Union men are rapidly
gathering in those counties and arming with rifles, shotguns, etc.82
Yet, a coordinated invasion of any real size would not occur for another month. Fearful
that the pro-Union headlines might result in accusations of aggression, the paper sought
to clarify the following day with the reassurance “if the Union troops are mustering in the
counties of Kentucky near the Cumberland Gap, it is to defend Kentucky soil from
invasion and not to invade the soil of Tennessee.”83 Nonetheless, uneasy Kentuckians in
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the Southeast poured into Camp Dick Robinson in answer of the call for defense. On
September 9, the Louisville Daily Journal reported that “Camp Dick Robinson is
swelling at a rate of two hundred per day and already extends a mile and a half down the
road.”84 Local community leaders, not newspapers, likely did more getting men to the
camp for protection of the state.
Theophilus Tolman Garrard was one of the earliest and most influential leaders
who gathered Union troops in Southeast Kentucky. Garrard formed deep connections to
Clay County and was from a line of early prominent Kentuckians. Grandson of
Kentucky’s second governor James Garrard, Garrard served as a main point of contact for
General Nelson into the populations of Southeastern Kentucky. Garrard’s father, Colonel
Daniel Garrard, became famous for his leadership in marching Clay County troops into
Canada at the onset of the War of 1812. Theophilus Garrard, referred to at T.T., already
had a history of getting southeastern Kentuckians to volunteer for a national cause dating
back to the conflict with Mexico. In April 1847, Garrard recruited and collected over
forty men in Manchester and Booneville to join Company E of the 16th Infantry for the
Mexican-American War.85 Garrard served as a Captain in the Mexican-American War
and rose to the rank of Colonel. Over a decade later, the federal government entrusted
Garrard again and, in the summer of 1861, selected him to raise a regiment of Union
volunteers for Camp Dick Robinson. Nelson’s request of T.T. Garrard violated the

Newspapers, Vol. 1, 1861, edited by Stephen L. Wright (Utica: McDowell Publications,
2009), 89.
84
The Louisville Daily Journal, September 9, 1861.
85
Papers related to T. T. Garrard’s service in the Mexican-American War are found in
both the Kentucky Room at the Jackson County Library and at the Clay County
Historical Society.
41

state’s policy of neutrality; but, both Union and Confederate leaders at the national and
local levels were nervous about the invasion of troops near the Kentucky-Tennessee
border. The recruitment went forward and the 3rd Kentucky Regiment of Infantry (soon
renamed the 7th) was noted as the only regiment with a full quota of 1000 troops when,
on September 22, the group mustered in at Camp Dick Robinson.
T.T. Garrard’s calls for Union service went beyond just his home of Clay County
and men from surrounding areas started to respond. A town in neighboring Owsley
County, Sturgeon provided another important outpost for Garrard’s recruitment. In 1854,
the former Justice of the Peace of Clay County, William Clark, left his native county and
bought a farm in Owsley County at a location named Green Hall (which was to become
part of Jackson County in 1858). Once word traveled to the Clarks of Garrard’s call for
recruits, William’s two sons, Andrew and Henry, enlisted in Company D and made their
way to Camp Robinson.86 Andrew Clark rose to the title of First Captain of Company D
for Garrard’s 7th regiment. Clark, who reenlisted on February 23, 1863, used his own
influence for an effort like Garrard’s to raise the 47th Kentucky Mounted Infantry of
which 71 Jackson Countians volunteered. Another prominent Jackson Countian, Levi
Pennington, became captain of Company C for the 7th Infantry (Pennington would later
die at Chickasaw Bluffs in General Grant’s first assault on Vicksburg.) In all, 31 Jackson
Countians were part of this earliest company and their service resulted in many of the
local men fighting in a variety of future campaigns.
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A high percentage of other Southeastern Kentuckians answered the call to
volunteer as well. Historians credit Captain George M. Jackson, the editor of a Unionist
newspaper in Winchester named The National Union, for raising the first Kentucky
recruitment of voluntary troops for Union service.87 A central Kentuckian, Jackson
organized the volunteers of his group at the Red River Iron Works in Clark and Powell
Counties. The Red River Gorge area was important because it formed the boundary
separating the central Kentucky Bluegrass Region and the mountains of eastern
Kentucky. The site of recruitment, on the Appalachian side of Captain Jackson’s native
Clark County, became an ideal temporary location for receiving Union volunteers from
the southeastern mountains. Afterwards, Jackson marched to Camp Robinson and wrote,
“We reached Camp Dick Robinson about daylight on the morning of August 7th, where
we met other volunteers, and they commenced pouring in from all points. Thus, was
neutrality discarded, and the first camp established on Kentucky soil.”88
Another Union Captain, T.J. Wright, recounted a positive experience in the
gathering of recruits in areas of Southeast Kentucky. Wright met with fresh volunteers of
the Home Guard during July in Estill County, twice a week, to drill and to maintain an
organization in case of emergency. Wright observed that the men were excellent
marksmen and judged that they had handled firearms since an early age.89 The group
went to the southern portion of neighboring Madison Country, again where the Bluegrass
and Appalachia met, and drummed up even more recruits from the mountainous region.
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By September, the unit reached enough recruits to form the B, C, and H Companies. At
Station Camp, located just a few miles from Jackson County’s northeastern border,
Wright’s men celebrated the achievement of filling the ranks and local residents provided
a feast. Wright observed that the recruits were “followed by drums and fife, appealing to
the patriotism of the young men to take up arms of the best Government ever vouchsafed
to man on earth.”90 On September 26, from Station Camp, Captain Wright and Captain
R. Winbourn split up and made their way deeper into the mountains and arrived at a
neighboring farm where potential recruits awaited in Owsley County. Wright recalled
the experience:
The surrounding hills re-echoed the sound of our martial band, the music
of which was not the best, but the patriotic ardor being augmented by the
rumored invasion of the State by the rebels under Zollicoffer, caused men,
women and children to collect from all directions, some bearing large
baskets filled with provisions, all with hearts full of love for our old flag
and freedom. At 10 o’clock a.m. several hundreds of eager, expectant
persons had assembled.91
When reading personal accounts from the journals or memoirs of military leaders,
it is important to use other sources of evidence to make sure exaggerations and
embellishments do not outweigh the trustworthiness of the source. Taken
together, however, a pattern of enthusiasm emerges as recruiters made their way
around the southern mountain counties.
Statistics of United States enlistment shed some light on the state’s geographical
pattern of service. Accurate statistics on Civil War enlistments vary and exactness is
difficult, if not impossible, to obtain. Kentucky Adjutant General D. W. Lindsey
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compiled what historians believe to be one of the more trusted county-by-county lists at
the end of 1864.92 In the Jackson Purchase region of the state, the seven counties
classified to that area boasted a population of 64,507 based on the 1860 census and
provided 650 military personnel for the Union, a rate of 1% of the population. Historians
considered that area as one of the strongest for pro-Confederate activity and Lindsey’s
numbers back that claim. Based on the same metric, for the Eastern Pennyroyal portion
of the state made up of sixteen counties ranging from just east of Bowling Green to
Somerset, the population stood at 153,443 with enlistments at 10,766 or 7%. For the
Southern Eastern Highlands, the population was 80,360 with a total enlistment of 6,853
or 8.5%. Narrowing down to just Jackson, Clay, Owsley, and Estill Counties, the
population of those four adjoining counties stood at 21,960 in 1860 and they combined to
provide 2681 soldiers or 12%. Three of Kentucky’s larger counties, all north of the
region, offer an interesting contrast as Jefferson (89,404 population, 6,578 enlistments or
7%), Fayette (22,599 population, 703 enlistments or 3%), and Madison (17,207
population, 539 enlistments or 3%) all provide numbers far below their southeastern
counterparts.93 Some of the percental discrepancy of military enlistment lies in the small
portion of slaves in the populations of the smaller southeastern counties. But even with
slaves removed from the numbers, the southeastern rate of participation still outweighs
the contributions of the areas listed here. That also brings into focus an interesting
historiographical debate as many modern scholars analyze Kentucky’s Unionist activity
as a mix of interests that included a large portion who fought to protect slavery within a
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constitutional Union. Motivations to enlist varied across the state and records suggest
prominent men in the central Bluegrass and western regions of the state fought to protect
slavery within a constitutional union.94 The protection of slavery did little to motivate the
men of the Southern Eastern Highlands.
1861 political activity revealed another aspect of Kentucky’s allegiances as voting
at the polls matched the Union spirit of the volunteering men who made their way to
camps. The state’s bicameral legislature grew in pro-Union sentiment in the summer
elections of August. After the vote for the State House of Representatives, pro-Union
men outnumbered confederate sympathizers at a count of 76-24. In the Senate the
number stood at 27-11. Just how much this vote changed the dynamic of the Kentucky’s
state legislature is hard to measure, but historians agree that these gains produced sizeable
majorities in each chamber of the General Assembly. Billed as a referendum on
secession, the statewide election that followed the wave of southern secession allowed
Kentucky voters to express their position on the issue. Moreover, the results meant that
the legislature held enough votes to override any of Magoffin’s vetoes and resulted in the
power to impeach the governor if he tried to aid or shield the Confederacy.95
Prior to the General Assembly election, Kentucky held an election for federal
representatives on June 22 due to President Lincoln’s call for a special session. In the ten
seats up for grabs, nine Unionist candidates won. Perhaps more interesting is the gaps
that exist deeper inside the raw numerical results. The State’s Rights candidate won the
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first district, the far western end of Kentucky, and the victory marked the only race the
Confederates could claim. The Unionist candidate took the second and third districts,
which both were in the next two western-most portions of the state, by an average margin
of three to one. In the fourth and fifth districts, located in the central portion of the state,
the Unionist candidate won by a rate of four to one. In the seventh, eighth, ninth, and
tenth districts, which included the northern portion of the state and its most important
cities, the Unionist candidate won between 60% and 80% of the vote in each. The final
election tallies of 1861 suggest that Kentucky objected to secession and the Confederacy.
In the sixth district, which included the Southeastern Appalachian counties, the Unionist
candidate won 8,181 of the 8,410 votes cast—a total of 97%.96 These numbers in total,
and the absence of enough serious secessionist sentiment to even field a viable candidate
in the sixth district, reveal that Confederate support lagged Unionist sentiment throughout
most of the state in 1861. In the southeastern mountains, however, the Confederate spirit
not only lagged—it was nearly non-existent.
Confederate military strategy targeted Kentucky in the late summer of 1861
around the same time that the political picture came into focus. Events in the far western
portion of the state occurred first and the actions prompted decisions from the new
General Assembly. By September 3, Confederate General Leonidas Polk’s troops
occupied the bluff above Columbus Kentucky near the Mississippi River. On September
10, Jefferson Davis placed Albert Sidney Johnston in command of a large portion of
Confederate operations in the western theatre of the war. Leaving Richmond Virginia
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with his new appointment, Johnston headed to Nashville to conduct operations from
Central Tennessee. General Johnston arrived and signaled a more aggressive approach as
one of his first decisions was to appoint Simon Bolivar Buckner as brigadier general and
to order him to occupy Bowling Green.97 But prior to reaching Nashville, Johnston
stopped in Knoxville to confer with Confederate General Felix Kirk Zollicoffer.
Zollicoffer, whose only military experience prior to the Civil War was as a volunteer
lieutenant for Andrew Jackson in the 1835 Second Seminole War, received the command
of East Tennessee on the recommendation of Confederate General Polk prior to
Johnston’s appointment.98 Like Buckner and Polk, Zollicoffer prepared for a
Confederate invasion into Kentucky.
The Confederate military plans carried out in September 1861 did much to push
the state of Kentucky further into Union arms. As Polk moved Confederate Brigadier
General Gideon Pillow into Colombia at the far western end of the state, and Buckner
eyed Bowling Green near the southern center, Zollicoffer gathered soldiers around
Cumberland Gap for a northern advance from the southeast on the old Wilderness Road
toward Lexington. The military operations on each southern corner of the state occurred
within a week of one another. However, the move into the area north of the Cumberland
Gap presented logistical and environmental challenges for the Confederates unlike the
other operations. On September 10, 1861 Zollicoffer relayed the difficulty to Samuel
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Cooper at the War Department calling the country between Cumberland Gap and Camp
Dick Robinson “poor and hostile.”99 The soldiers at Camp Dick Robinson represented
the most important line of defense between an invasion from the southeast and
Kentucky’s central region of cities, navigable rivers, and other resources. Union military
leaders assigned Colonel T.T. Garrard’s regiment to protect the Rockcastle Ford on the
Wilderness Road, south of Camp Robinson.100 Colonel Garrard’s company,
undersupplied and underfed, received little training before being moved to the strategic
position. During the time of preparation and guard, Garrard communicated to Brigadier
General George H. Thomas who replaced General Nelson in early September as
commander of Camp Dick Robinson. General Thomas, in turn, wrote General William
T. Sherman who oversaw the countering of Buckner’s move into the south-central part of
the state.
The Confederate offensive into the far western portion of the state proved a
poorly planned strategy and Pillow’s occupation of Columbus provided enough
immediate concern for the General Kentucky Assembly to make the decision to end
neutrality. Under command from General John C. Frémont, General Ulysses S. Grant
moved into Paducah to counter the Confederate advance. Confederate leaders decried the
actions of the Federals with complaints that Camp Dick Robinson, the shipment of guns,
and covert actions into Kentucky’s Mississippi River towns were the first violation of the
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state’s neutrality policy. The political criticism from the Confederates on who violated
neutrality first, however, did little to influence Kentucky’s General Assembly. For
Kentucky’s members of the House and Senate, the Confederate earlier move into
Columbus militarily justified the Union’s counter into Paducah—a place of more
strategic value. As historian Steven Woodworth noted:
The irony lay in the fact that as long as the Federals held Paducah,
Columbus, which could thus be easily outflanked, was of no military value
whatsoever to the Confederacy. The state of affairs that Polk saw as the
confirmation of the correctness of his decision was in fact the very thing
that made his action futile. This fact was seen at once by an intelligent
soldier and pro-Southern Kentuckian, Simon Bolivar Buckner, and pointed
out within a few days in a letter to Richmond.101
The town acted as a trap, and the political repercussions damaged the Confederate’s
broader overall Kentucky strategy.
In September 1861, the General Assembly flexed some of its new political
strength gained from the August elections and ended the policy of neutrality only four
months after passing the measure. On September 18, following the first Confederate
invasions into the state, the assembly passed a series of resolutions that favored the
Union. The statement started with a strong rebuke of Confederate actions and
proclaimed, “Whereas, Kentucky has been invaded by the forces of the so-called
Confederate States . . . be it resolved by the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of
Kentucky, that the invaders must be expelled . . ..”102 The second resolution elevated
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General Robert Anderson, federal hero of Fort Sumter and native Kentuckian, to “take
instant command, with authority and power of this Commonwealth to call out a volunteer
force in Kentucky for the purpose of repelling the invaders from our soil.”103 The
resolutions ended with a plea “that the patriotism of every Kentuckian is invoked, and is
confidently relied upon to give active aid in the defense of the Commonwealth.” Four of
the affirmative votes on all five of the resolutions came from James W. Anderson
representing Knox County, Albert A. Curtis representing Estill and Jackson Counties,
E.B. Bacheller representing Laurel and Rockcastle Counties, and Alex T. White
representing Clay and Owsley Counties. Two days after the vote, Governor Beriah
Magoffin responded that he did not support the language of the resolution and showed
specific concern about the appointment of General Anderson. Magoffin stated:
I object to these resolutions, secondly, because they needlessly invite a
military officer in the Federal service to take command of the department
of the Cumberland, embracing Kentucky, who will not be bound by the
expressions of your resolutions, but will be required to obey the orders of
the Federal government, whether they be consistent with your resolution
or not, and whose powers will not be limited by any acts of the
Legislature.104
The governor’s stern warning about the implications of empowering federal authorities
did not discourage the General Assembly and the body passed the measure over
Magoffin’s objections. The vote totals in the House hovered around a three-quarter proUnion and one-quarter state’s rights split. The pro-Union caucus neutralized any of
Magoffin’s actions to position Kentucky as either neutral or pro-Confederate. Even
though many Kentuckians wanted to keep the Commonwealth from becoming a
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battleground, the language and political posture from the summer of 1861 suggest that a
Union path emerged.
Zollicoffer found conditions in East Tennessee difficult as that mountainous
portion of the state held a sizable pro-Union presence of its own. The area resembled
Southeastern Kentucky in environment and temperament. A large portion of these
Southern Unionists in East Tennessee traced familial lines to the North and many had
relatives in Kentucky. At a higher rate than anywhere else in the Confederate South,
these residents developed a distrust of the slave power and viewed the Confederacy as an
aristocratic regime at odds with the common folk of those areas.105 Like Southeastern
Kentucky, a leftover Whig residue was one of the strengths in Eastern Tennessee that
obstructed the earliest secessionist effort. William G. Brownlow owned a popular paper
called Brownlow’s Knoxville Whig that boasted a circulation of twelve thousand—the
largest in the state.106 Historian Daniel Crofts adds:
In November and December 1860 Brownlow and the Union Whigs from
Knoxville undertook to block the ‘wild stampede toward secession.’ They
stirred the ‘friends of the Union’ from the outlying countryside. . . At a
memorable five-hour public meeting on December 8, in a courthouse
building so jammed that many people could not fit inside, Brownlow and
the unconditional Unionists adopted resolutions denouncing secession.107
Considered for a Unionist candidate for governor, Brownlow established a strong Whig
following in the eastern part of the state in the antebellum years. Brownlow’s reputation
and influence must have made an impact on the military loyalties of the area. Historians
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have estimated that up to 100,000 white southerners from seceded states fought for the
Union, with 42,000 of those men coming from East Tennessee.108
In Southeastern Kentucky, the movement of both Union and Confederates did not
match the quick unfolding of events of Grant and Pillow near the Mississippi River.
Instead, the environment and population interrupted and slowed the pace of Confederate
advance. One soldier remarked that some of the troops nearly walked off bluffs due to
fatigue and another observed “long haired men with long squirrel rifles ever ready to
shoot a Rebel when opportunity presented.”109 Twenty miles north of the Cumberland
Gap, the small town of Barbourville became the first significant encounter of resistance
for the invading Confederates on their way up the Wilderness Road. On September 18,
Zollicoffer ordered an advance of eight-hundred troops where they were met with threehundred Home Guard Kentuckians located at Camp Andrew Johnson.110 The clash
resulted in a number of dead soldiers, the destruction of the camp, and a victory for
Zollicoffer’s men. Although small in scale, the event drew national, state, and local
attention. General Robert Anderson telegraphed Abraham Lincoln September 16 with
the warning “We have received positive information that the Tennesseans are invading
Kentucky through the Cumberland Gap. We can get plenty of men if we can obtain arms
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for them. This is of vital importance.”111 Lincoln responded, “From what you telegraph
today, I think you better take active command in Kentucky at once. War Department will
telegraph you about arms tomorrow.”112 Once Zollicoffer established a presence in
Barbourville, the Goose Creek Salt Works in Clay County represented a cache of
resources and became the first major Confederate target in Southeast Kentucky. A week
after arriving in Barbourville, Zollicoffer alerted Albert Sidney Johnston that he would
make a move on the Manchester location.113 The raid proved to be a material success.
Zollicoffer’s troops collected 8,000 cartridges, 3 kegs of powder, 6 barrels of salt, 3
horses, 25 pairs of shoes, and several guns. Beyond material gain, the general wanted to
convert the population to his side. Historian Brian McKnight assessed:
Although Zollicoffer’s raid on the saltworks was successful, he remained
doubtful about the support of the mountaineers. During the raid on the
works, several of Zollicoffer’s men took time to harass the population.
While they did little more than destroy haystacks and burn rails, their
inadvisable actions weakened the already limited Confederate support in
the region.114
The Louisville Daily Journal reported later that “Zollicoffer’s robbers have been running
riot in Knox, Whitley, Laurel, Clay and Rockcastle Counties.”115 T.T. Garrard relayed
news of the events in Manchester to General Thomas at Camp Dick Robinson.
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On September 22, only a few days after the events in Barbourville and
Manchester, President Lincoln penned his most famous statement about the importance
of keeping Kentucky in the Union. Lincoln’s message to Orville H. Browning, another
Kentucky-born Illinois politician, revealed how important that the sixteenth President
viewed the Bluegrass State as he lamented, “to lose Kentucky is nearly the same as to
lose the whole game. Kentucky gone, we cannot hold Missouri, nor, as I think,
Maryland. These all against us, and the job on our hands is too large for us. We would
as well consent to the separation at once, including the surrender of this capitol.”116 The
context of Lincoln’s concern related to Union General Frémont’s heavy-handed actions
and confiscations in Missouri—an approach that alarmed the slaveholding populations of
the Border States. As the picture in the western and central portion of the state raised
fears of Confederate political momentum, Lincoln turned toward gains made in the
General Assembly and the situation in the eastern portion of the state to balance his
negative prognostications. The letter to Browning, and the fears of “losing the whole
game” if Kentucky aligned with the Confederacy, is often quoted and captures the
significance of the President’s birth state. On October 1, two weeks later, Lincoln issued
a “Memorandum for a Plan of Campaign.” The message opened with thoughts on
securing the area around Cumberland Gap. Lincoln assessed the situation with more
detail with a careful eye on Southeastern Kentucky:
That point is now guarded against up by Zollicoffer, with 6000 or 8000,
rebels at Barboursville, Kentucky, say twenty-five miles from the Gap
towards Lexington.
We have a force of 5000 or 6000, under General Thomas, at Camp Dick
Robinson, about twenty-five miles from Lexington, and seventy-five from
“To Orville H. Browning, September 22, 1861,” The Collected Works IV, 1860-61,
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Zollicoffer’s camp on the road between the two, which is not a Railroad,
anywhere between Lexington and the point to be seized—and along the
whole length of which the Union sentiment among the people largely
predominates.117
Further north up the Wilderness Road from Zollicoffer’s position in Barbourville,
Colonel Garrard guarded London with local volunteers, and the position developed into
an important piece for the Union’s long-range plan and, more importantly, the immediate
defense of Eastern Kentucky.
The 7th Kentucky Infantry Regiment moved south from Camp Dick Robinson, to
a position near the city of London, and the troops settled at Camp Wildcat near the
Rockcastle River. As Zollicoffer’s force of 5,000 approached north from Barbourville,
Garrard’s group of 900 stood as the main obstacle. Garrard reached out to General
Thomas for more troops and provisions in desperation. Union reinforcements arrived on
October 20 when Hungarian-born Brigadier General Albin Schoepf took command. The
next day a battle involving over 12,000 troops led to a Union victory and Zollicoffer’s
withdrawal back to the Cumberland ford. Casualties were low, but the defeat marked a
major disruption and setback to Confederate strategy. In the weeks that followed, many
of the Tennessee Unionists wanted to seize the opportunity to push south and to liberate
eastern Tennessee. Instead, Brigadier General William T. Sherman ordered General
Schoepf to move from Somerset to central Kentucky in something frustrated Federal
troops despairingly called the “Wildcat Stampede.”118 General Thomas convinced
Sherman that the position in southern Kentucky needed Schoepf more and the general

“Memorandum for a Plan of Campaign, October 1, 1861” The Collected Works IV,
1860-61, 544.
118
Stuart W. Sanders, The Battle of Mill Springs, (Charleston: The History Press, 2013),
20-23.
117

56

was relocated back to Somerset. Confederate leadership eyed a western shift for a
follow-up Kentucky invasion as Johnston and Zollicoffer decided for a push toward the
Cumberland River.
Zollicoffer’s October attack and retreat stands as an important moment in 1861
for the commonwealth of Kentucky—and the nation. The federal response and Union
leadership averted disaster in southeastern Kentucky. Garrard’s unit of local men held
the position and faced certain defeat. But the bigger picture was that it symbolized a
capstone of unwavering support from a people willing to defend their home and country.
The recorded experiences of recruitment officials leading up to the engagement,
alongside the percentage of Southeast Kentuckians who served in the early ranks for the
federal cause, provide documented evidence of strong Union support. Voting patterns in
state and national congressional elections revealed a political leaning that matched the
military service. Northern political leaders around the country, including President
Abraham Lincoln, spoke of the area with hope and a confidence that the people were on
their side. Headlines from partisan newspapers and even reflections from Confederate
Generals seemed either eager to expose the alliance of these mountainous residents or to
concede the prospects of changing their minds. Lost Cause historians like E. Merton
Coulter have minimized or ignored the buffer that these citizens provided for the Union.
More recent scholars continue to attribute “mountain unionism” to the absence of a slave
economy. Like all areas, this region produced Confederates, proponents for slavery, and
citizens who wanted to protect the institution from within a constitutional union. But the
overwhelming statistical evidence, partnered with the social history of the area, disputes
that people of Southeastern Kentucky fought for any reason other than for what the
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traditions and customs of their culture directed them. While the geography of the region
and the expensive cost of slaves did prevent the rise of a plantation society in
Southeastern Kentucky, deep moral and social viewpoints combined to develop a culture
that attracted settlers opposed to slavery to the area during the Antebellum Era. Those
negative attitudes toward slavery made a difference in the build up to war and the earliest
stages of the war. As the war progressed, Confederate and guerilla attacks on the area
further hardened opinions of Appalachian citizens toward their southern neighbors.
Southeastern Kentuckians also held and displayed a pride in the service of preserving the
Union when many others around the state either bolted for the Confederacy, started to
develop southern sympathies, or simply fought for state preservation. Combined, these
characteristics of the pro-Union sentiment in the region present a complex picture that
may help uncover multiple causes related to Kentucky’s deepest pocket of loyalty to the
Union. Moreover, the political stance and military contributions of Southeast
Kentuckians proved valuable to the preservation of the Union.
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CHAPTER THREE
“THEY ARE HAVING A STAMPEDE IN KENTUCKY, LOOK TO IT”:
CIVIL WAR AND SOUTHEASTERN KENTUCKY IN 1862
The Civil War shook Kentucky in 1862 more than any other year of the conflict.
While the state experienced skirmishes, raids, and other war activity throughout the entire
period of the national crisis, the size and scope of military focus toward Kentucky during
1862 surpassed all other years of the Civil War. Kentuckians expressed concerns during
the presidential election of 1860 about the state becoming the front-lines if war broke out.
In 1862, those fears manifested into a harsh reality during the second year of fighting. A
back and forth for control of the state between pro-Confederate Governor Magoffin and
the pro-Union General Assembly offered positive signals to both sides in the earliest
stages of the war. As a result, this waffling caused Union and Confederate leadership to
remain cautious in their approach to Kentucky’s loyalty. After the initial 1861
Confederate invasion into the state failed, and a Union path emerged for the
Commonwealth, more aggressive military objectives replaced political strategy. For
Southeastern Kentuckians, the shift in direction brought violence and large foraging
armies into their communities. The residents of the area maintained a strong loyalty to
the Union Army and many of the men who volunteered for the Union cause found
themselves at the center of important battles—both near home and far away. Within the
state, engagements at Mill Springs, Big Hill, Richmond, and Perryville produced mixed
results; yet, by the year’s end, the Confederates abandoned any real hope to seize
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Kentucky. The Union soldiers from Southeastern Kentucky, as well as larger portions of
the local population, provided resistance and endured great hardships throughout 1862 to
stop the Confederate military invasion and political takeover.

I.
After the October 1861 Battle of Wildcat Mountain and the retreat to Tennessee
that followed, Confederate leadership planned to move General Felix Zollicoffer who
was just outside of Somerset, in another effort to invade central Kentucky. Instead of
following the original path that held close to the Wilderness Road, the new Confederate
position shifted the strategy of attack over forty miles westward into Pulaski County.
That location provided access to the Cumberland River and the coal needed to supply
Nashville.119 In charge of Kentucky operations for the Union, Brigadier General
William T. Sherman believed the new Confederate movements posed a direct threat to
the key cities of Louisville and Lexington. No decision to march south after the Battle of
Wildcat Mountain to liberate eastern Tennessee, as many of the troops within the Union
ranks wanted, occurred. Instead, Sherman reacted to the new southern positioning of the
Confederates and pulled General Albin Schoepf back to central Kentucky to defend the
Bluegrass region—a movement that signaled the priority of the Union military and one to
the disappointment of the Tennessee Unionists. A series of additional changes followed
in November and December 1861. Union General George Thomas advocated and won a
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decision that returned General Schoepf back to the Somerset area in the late fall of 1861.
In addition, federal leadership replaced a worrisome Sherman with Don Carlos Buell as
the new brigadier general in charge of Kentucky.120 Sherman’s hasty movements and his
claims that hundreds of thousands of troops were needed to defend Kentucky led to the
replacement.121
General Buell faced an issue deemed important to the Lincoln administration with
the situation in eastern Tennessee during the early stages of his military appointment.
The concern was not a new development as advocates for an eastern Tennessee invasion
emerged in the earliest stages of the war. In September 1861 during the initial three-part
Confederate invasion into Kentucky, a Unionist congressman from Tennessee, Horace
Maynard, advised President Abraham Lincoln about the dire situation in his home state.
Elected to the United States House of Representatives prior to Tennessee’s secessionist
vote, Maynard came from a district that shared a political outlook much like Southeastern
Kentucky’s—a concentrated pro-Union population in the slave south. But unlike
Kentucky, Tennessee had seceded, and the congressman worked to elevate the urgency of
a federal military response to the relief of his Appalachian citizens.
The advice and requests of Maynard shaped much of Lincoln’s correspondence
with his generals in the western theatre in the second half of 1861 and at the start of 1862.
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As early as September 1861, plans to liberate the Unionist portion of Tennessee drew
support from Lincoln and the newly appointed General Commander of all Union
armies—George B. McClellan. Due to the area’s important logistical role in southern
railroad commerce, eastern Tennessee stood as a place of strategic military value. But
other factors also weighed on President Lincoln. As historian Michael Toomey noted:
Lincoln also believed that he was morally obligated to come to the aid of
Southern Unionists wherever possible, and no region of the South had a
more visible or active Unionist population than East Tennessee. That such
extensive loyalty existed within the bounds of a seceded state was seen as
remarkable at the time and has continued to attract the attention of
scholars and others who seek to understand the origins and motivations for
Southern Unionism in general. It is clear that a number of factors were
involved, but it appears that the strength of the Unionist movement in East
Tennessee was among rural middle-class farmers.122
General McClellan worked on complex plan to advance from Kentucky into eastern
Tennessee as part of a “three-way pincer”—with the two additional Union positions
closing in from Virginia and the Carolina coast.123 Hundreds of miles from Washington,
D.C., however, regional Union command in southern Kentucky balked at such
recommendations and turned attention away from a possible southeastern thrust to
concentrate, instead, on central Tennessee. The military department commanders of
Buell (Kentucky) and Union General Henry W. Halleck (Missouri) decided the eastern
Tennessee plans were either untenable or logistically impossible.124 Buell viewed
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Zollicoffer’s move west and, with much more interest, a potential route to Nashville as
more pressing targets.
The Confederate Army experienced their own confusion and changes in
leadership during the closing months of 1861 as well. The son of famed Kentucky
Senator John Crittenden, General George C. Crittenden assumed Confederate command
over the occupied district of East Tennessee. Confederate President Jefferson Davis’s
choice of the West Point-educated Crittenden replaced General Albert S. Johnston’s
reach at the critical time of Zollicoffer’s November reentry into southern Kentucky.
Unbeknownst of the changes, Zollicoffer elected to take a westward route to the city of
Jamestown, Tennessee, due south of Monticello, Kentucky, to begin a northern march as
an alternative to the Cumberland Gap.125 In a November 27 message, Zollicoffer
reported that the path was bountiful with beef, pork, and corn. Commenting on the war
sentiment he encountered the general added that “the better classes of citizens sympathize
with us in this part of Kentucky.”126 This message contrasted with the General’s
September communication where he expressed a frustrated tone during his prior journey
through southeastern Kentucky along the Wilderness Road. Zollicoffer arrived outside of
Somerset and established a winter camp on the north bank of the Cumberland River at
Mill Springs. The camp placed his army between a river and an opposing force; a
dangerous choice if faced with the need to retreat. Military historians have speculated
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that the lack of communication during the period of changing Confederate command may
have led to Zollicoffer’s strategic mistake.
While Zollicoffer’s Confederate campaign for a second Kentucky invasion
unfolded, Tennessee Unionists stationed in southeastern Kentucky received news in
November 1861 that renewed their hopes for a push southward. Much of the arousal
stemmed from written confirmation of a series of bridges burned in East Tennessee.
Prior to the attack, federal authorities undertook an effort to elevate career naval officer,
Samuel P. Carter, to the position of brigadier general. Union command hoped to use the
Princeton-educated Tennessean’s well-established connections to their military advantage
in the Appalachian region. Those plans appeared to coalesce when Carter’s younger
brother, William, sent message that he had coordinated the destruction of bridges used
between Tennessee and Virginia and between Tennessee and Georgia. In November
1861 Colonel Samuel Carter, stationed in London with three Union regiments including
Colonel T.T. Garrard’s 7th Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, hoped to make a move based
upon his brother’s reports. Historian Brian McKnight analyzed the effects of the news
and concluded:
With local citizens excited to the point of action and knowing that the
destruction of those vital east-west links would result in a firm response by
the Confederate Army, Samuel Carter urged General Thomas to “urge the
commanding general to give us some additional force and let us advance
into East Tennessee; now is the time.”127
While exciting to the Tennessee Unionists, the destruction did not lead to any immediate
change of General Buell’s federal plans in the closing weeks of the first year of the war.
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However, a combination of pro-Union Tennesseans and Kentuckians proved instrumental
in the engagement that took shape in southern Kentucky during January 1862.

Prior to the Battles of Wildcat Mountain and Mill Springs, in private
correspondence Union military leaders disparaged many of the inexperienced Kentucky
recruits. In a September 23, 1861 letter from Colonel Thomas Bramlette to General
George Thomas, Bramlette remarked that “the inertness of the Union men, their
sensationalism, their utter backwardness in rushing to the call of our country is
annoying.”128 By October 1861 General Thomas wrote to General Sherman and added
“to advance into Tennessee, I ought to have four more regiments from some other State
than Kentucky to follow us as a reserve . . . If I could get four additional regiments of
Ohio or Indiana volunteers, I would be perfectly willing to dispense with all the
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Kentucky regiments I have.”129 In the eastern portion of the state Colonel James A.
Garfield, later the twentieth President of the United States, complained that:
the Fourteenth Kentucky is composed of excellent material, but is in a
wretched state of discipline. Very few of its members have been drilled in
the school of the soldier, much less that of the company and battalion. It
can be considered but little better than a well-disposed, Union-loving mob,
which, if its scattered fragments can be gathered up, may be converted into
a very serviceable regiment.130
Stationed at Camp Calvert near London, General Schoepf struck a different tone and used
his correspondence to repeatedly request supplies for his Kentucky men. Many of the
southeastern Kentuckians in London who protected the road to Richmond and Crab
Orchard lacked the shoes, blankets, and coats needed for winter duty. Soldiers faced a
similar predicament near Irvine where Colonel Sidney M. Barnes raised the Kentucky 8th
Volunteer Infantry at Estill Springs. These men from Estill, Jackson, and Owsley
Counties also suffered from a shortage of equipment. As the group continued to
assemble in September 1861, Barnes relayed to General Thomas that:
we camped here yesterday with two full companies raised in this county,
and we are looking for another from Owsley County this evening; also one
from Jackson County. . .. We need blankets, tents, and other camp
equipage, and guns, and I know we ought to have them right away. Great
activity in the counties around on the part of the secessionists. . ..
Blankets, tents, and guns will help us and give our people confidence.
More depends on this than men ordinarily imagine. The mountain people
are peculiar, and I know them.131
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The 4th, 7th, and 8th Kentucky Infantries received praise for their organization and
discipline in the earliest stages of the war. Many of the other units, at least early,
frustrated the command of which they served.
The invading Confederates stationed around Somerset faced their own hardships.
Zollicoffer’s winter camp boasted around 4000 Confederate soldiers with nearly a quarter
who lacked guns to fire at the enemy. Conditions deteriorated during the Kentucky
winter and hampered Zollicoffer’s hopes for a potential advance east against London or
north toward Danville.132 With the Confederates hunkered down, Union General Schoepf
strengthened his Somerset position in early December with the addition of two regiments
of East Tennessee Unionists from Colonel Carter’s London force. Buell ordered General
Thomas and General Schoepf to launch a tandem attack on the Confederate position just
after Christmas. Included in General Thomas’s army were the Colonel Speed S. Fry led
4th Kentucky Volunteer Infantry Regiment and the Colonel John Marshall Harlan (later
Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court) led 10th Kentucky Volunteer
Infantry Regiment—both comprised of Kentucky soldiers organized at Camp Dick
Robinson. Men from central Kentucky made up the bulk of soldiers for the 4th Kentucky,
but volunteers from the southeastern counties of Estill, Laurel, and Rockcastle also
served in the ranks. Fry, a strong Unionist, came from a family with central Kentucky
ties and his grandfather had even taught the noted emancipationist politician Cassius
Marcellus Clay.133 Colonel Harlan led central-western Kentuckians in the Kentucky 10th.

132
133

Harrison, The Civil War in Kentucky, 25.
Sanders, The Battle of Mill Springs, 63.
67

Infantry regiments from Minnesota, Ohio, Indiana, alongside a Kentucky volunteer
cavalry, rounded out Thomas’s troops.
In January 1862, just after Confederate General Crittenden arrived at Mill Springs
to assume control, Union General Thomas continued to advance, through rugged
conditions, on the Confederate position. The swollen river canceled any ability for
relocation. Trapped between the Cumberland River and an approaching federal force,
General Crittenden recognized the volatility of his situation and took preemptive action
on January 19, sending troops at General Thomas. One of the fiercest encounters of the
clash developed between the Union Kentucky 4th and the Confederate Mississippi 15th at
a location called Fishing Creek near Logan’s Crossroads. The conflict featured soldiers
fighting in close proximity, ammunition troubles, faulty weapons, and the order of fixed
bayonets. During the heat of the battle, General Zollicoffer mistakenly rode behind
enemy lines and into the 4th Kentucky Regiment to issue an order. Once the Union
regiment realized the general’s identity, Colonel Fry fired his pistol and other
Kentuckians launched a volley killing the Confederate leader. Fry, and other veteran
Kentuckians of the 4th, told and retold various accounts of the climatic encounter.
Colonel Samuel Carter’s 12th Brigade experienced heavy fighting during the
conflict as well. The 12th Brigade consisted of around fifteen hundred men comprised of
the 1st and 2nd East Tennessee Volunteer Infantries alongside the 12th Kentucky Volunteer
Infantry. Colonel Carter acted as brigadier general to lead the combination of
Tennesseans and Kentuckians. With roots in Garrard County near Camp Dick Robinson,
Colonel William Hoskins led the portion of Kentucky volunteers in the 12th and noted the
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cooperation between the units in an official report.134 Hoskins regretted “that in this
action the soldiers of the Twelfth Kentucky did not have the opportunity of displaying
more fully their chivalry” but added that “in any position in which duty may call them
they will deport themselves as soldiers worthy the renown of their fathers.”135
Colonel John Marshall Harlan offered similar praise for his group of soldiers of
the Kentucky 10th Volunteer Infantry. Harlan claimed his men “made a march (18 miles
in about six hours) which indicated their willingness, even eagerness, to endure any
fatigue or make any sacrifice in order to meet on the field of battle those wicked and
unnatural men who are seeking without cause to destroy the Union of our fathers.”136
In the end, the encounter at Mill Springs resulted in a Union victory and a second
Confederate retreat to Tennessee. The conflict involved around 8000 total combatants.
The Confederates suffered over 500 killed, wounded, and missing while Union losses
numbered under 300.137 Many Civil War scholars point to the January 19, 1862 battle as
the first major Union victory of the war. On January 22, President Lincoln and Secretary
of War Edwin Stanton communicated praise through a congratulatory order in the
immediate days that followed the battle:
The President, Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, has received
information of a brilliant victory by the United States forces over a large
body of armed traitors and rebels at Mill Springs, in the State of Kentucky.
He returns thanks to the gallant officers and soldiers who won that victory
. . . The purpose of this war is to attack, pursue, and destroy a rebellious
enemy, and to deliver the country from danger menaced by traitors . . . In
the prompt and spirited movements and daring battle of Mill Springs the
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Nation will realize its hopes, and the people of the United States will
rejoice to honor every soldier and officer who proves his courage by
charging with the bayonet and storming intrenchments, or in the blaze of
the enemy’s fire.138
The military success lifted the spirits of a nervous executive who had waited a half-year
for a meaningful victory since the disastrous federal defeat in Northern Virginia at Bull
Run in July 1861. The event also marked a starting point for other federal advances in
the Western Theatre, which stood in great contrast compared to the lack of military
progress near the nation’s capital. The outcome shaped the early direction of the Border
States and darkened the overall Confederate prognostication of the war. Historian
Christopher Phillips concluded that “after a string of shocking Confederate defeats [east]
of the Mississippi—Mill Springs, Fort Henry, Fort Donelson, Pea Ridge, New Madrid
and Island No.10, Shiloh, and New Orleans—for southerners in the West the spring of
1862 was a season of despair.”139
For residents and veterans of Southeastern Kentucky who supported the Union
effort, a sense of pride swelled for those who fought near the Cumberland River on that
January day. Zollicoffer was dead. Local soldiers proved important, again, and aided the
repulse of the second Confederate push into Kentucky. Praise replaced criticism in many
of the evaluations of Kentucky Union soldiers in the line of fire. East Tennessee units
fought alongside Unionist Kentuckians against enemy soldiers from their respective
home states. The differences in military strategy between Lincoln and many of his
generals in the field revealed a divide in the priority of aiding the Unionist southerners.
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The westward shift in attention continued and soon after the 1862 spring season,
Confederates planned yet another invasion to “liberate” Kentucky.

II.
Events in the western portion of Kentucky pushed the war forward. Following the
Confederate defeat at Mill Springs, other early 1862 engagements south of Columbus,
Kentucky, moved the center of the conflict toward the Tennessee and Mississippi Rivers.
General Ulysses S. Grant won two more important Union victories in Tennessee at Fort
Henry and Fort Donelson in early February 1862—just below the Kentucky state line.
With the fall of Fort Donelson General Grant earned the reputation of demanding
“unconditional surrender” with his issuance of the order to native Kentuckian turned
Confederate General Simon Bolivar Buckner. After the defeat of the Confederates in
Mill Springs and at the two river forts, General Albert Sidney Johnston concluded that he
could not hold the important city of Bowling Green.140 The area surrounding Bowling
Green and Barren County was home to some of Kentucky’s strongest Confederate
sympathizers during Civil War Era. The location even acted as the capital of a makeshift
Confederate provisional government where George Johnson served as Kentucky’s
“Confederate governor.” But Union advance put the location between General Thomas’s
troops to the east and, to the west, General Grant’s army near Columbus. On February
11, Confederates began to evacuate the city and destroyed bridges and anything of
strategic military value that could not be transported south. Confederate high command
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decided Nashville, too, was indefensible and pulled soldiers even further into secure
southern territory. The Union plans of General Halleck and General Buell had a pinching
affect that pushed the western Confederate position down into Mississippi.
The large-scale retreat south resulted in the concentration of Confederate forces
near Corinth, Mississippi, and led to a climatic April 1862 encounter at Pittsburgh’s
Landing—known better as the Battle of Shiloh. Located in southern Tennessee above the
Mississippi state line, the enormous clash at Shiloh included over 100,000 combatants
and featured Kentuckians fighting on each side of the battle. Grant and Buell defeated a
Confederate force led by Generals Johnston, Braxton Bragg, and P.G.T. Beauregard as
the Union, again, proved victorious. To the shock of the nation, the engagement
produced some of the most horrific casualties of the Civil War up to that point and
surpassed all prior encounters in the number of soldiers lost on the field of battle.
Confederate General Johnston and Kentucky Confederate Governor Johnson were both
slain and among the combined 20,000 killed, wounded, and missing. The collective
reports that emerged from the Battle of Mill Springs, Fort Donelson, and Shiloh reflected
“federal victories [with] each progressively bloodier than any yet fought on this
continent.”141 Shiloh also did much to end national hopes for a short or limited war, but
for Kentuckians the Confederate slide south helped the Commonwealth avoid a major
battle fought on its soil during the spring campaign of 1862. Kentucky state historians
James Klotter and Lowell Harrison noted the possible alternative: “The expected battle of
Bowling Green had been fought at Shiloh, and the Confederates lost.”142
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From April to mid-summer in 1862, warfare and major engagements in Kentucky
entered a lulled state. Small bands of marauding guerillas replaced large mobile armies.
The theft of resources at the hands of Confederate raiders gave rise to minor skirmishes
and new federal policies. On May 27, 1862, federal authorities appointed Jeremiah
Tilford Boyle, of Mercer County, to oversee the District of Kentucky in an effort to curb
guerilla and Confederate activity.143 Boyle enacted a policy that assessed the monetary
damages of raiders, arrested southern sympathizers, and levied punishment to those who
aided the Confederates.144 Many of the vulnerable farms and homesteads around areas of
the state lacked men, or any type of organized law force, to counter the guerilla activity
due to the absence of locals who fought and marched with armies far away.145 Violence
and lawlessness filled the void. Historian Christopher Phillips provided a vivid summary
of the phase:
Bits of news circulated illicitly of brave deaths on battlefields or senseless
ones in the camps behind the lines, of wounded soldiers freezing to death
and their mercy killings, of unmarked mass graves, and of prisoners being
scalped by rebel Indians and merciless guerillas. More frightening, armed
nightriders stole indiscriminately, broke into homes, pistol-whipped or
harassed white unionists, captured or shot free blacks and slaves, and
burned houses and barns.146
It was the beginning of a pattern of activity that returned and intensified in Kentucky
during the latter half of the war.
Plans for a third, and much more coordinated, Confederate invasion of Kentucky
took shape in July 1862. Stationed in eastern Tennessee, Confederate General Kirby
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Smith looked to reenter the state through the Cumberland Gap. Under the command of
General George W. Morgan, Union forces occupied the gap and had strengthened their
hold on the mountain pass in June 1862 with a flanking movement that moved the
Confederates south of the position.147 But with Buell’s larger Union Army occupied in
central and southern Tennessee, the success of John Hunt Morgan’s Confederate summer
cavalry raids into Kentucky encouraged an anxious Smith to make an advance north.
From Georgetown, Kentucky, John Hunt Morgan sent report that:
I am here with a force sufficient to hold all the country outside of
Lexington and Frankfort. These places are garrisoned chiefly with Home
Guards. The bridges between Cincinnati and Lexington have been
destroyed. The whole country can be secured, and 25,000 or 30,000 men
will join you at once. I have taken eleven cities and towns with very
heavy arms stores.148
Morgan’s Confederate raids caught the attention of Union leadership as well. President
Lincoln messaged Henry Halleck, stationed in Corinth, Mississippi, to alert the general
that “they are having a stampede in Kentucky. Please look to it.”149 From central
Kentucky, Thomas Clay confirmed both Lincoln’s concerns and Morgan’s claims with a
July 24 letter to the president that described Morgan’s presence in Lexington. Clay
indicated a Confederate struggle with the recruitment of locals but concluded with an
urgent plea for help as he believed that the raiders posed an imminent danger to the
property and people of central Kentucky.150
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On August 9, 1862 Smith communicated to General Bragg his plan to move upon
the Cumberland Gap and to march toward Lexington. The following day, Bragg replied
with a strategy that signaled approval of the plan, but the general counseled caution and
suggested that his army should act as a supporting force to disrupt a potential encounter
with General Buell’s Union troops to Kirby’s west. Some of Kirby’s own Kentucky
troops further incited the General with predictions that Kentuckians would join the
Confederate ranks in large number and that the work of manipulative politicians had kept
the state in the Union against the greater will of the people.151
General Kirby Smith wanted to test the Union loyalty of East Tennesseans who
served in the Union Army first. In an August 13, 1862 pronouncement, Smith proposed:
To the East Tennesseans in the U.S. Army. You must all now be
convinced that you have been grossly deceived by the misrepresentation of
those under whom you are serving. I therefore announce to you that a
final opportunity is afforded you to return to your homes and your
allegiance. I offer you a general amnesty for all past offenses, the only
condition being that you take the oath of allegiance to the Government and
that you conduct yourselves as becomes good citizens.152
On the same night, Smith began his northern march toward the Cumberland Gap on a
path that resembled Zollicoffer’s first invasion a year earlier. The heat and slippery
conditions of the roads killed some of Kirby’s men, but local Unionists made the journey
even more dangerous with the “bushwhacking” of tired Confederate troops.153 The
march brought Confederates back into southeastern Kentucky and Smith set up camp on
August 18 at Barbourville in Knox County. From those headquarters, Smith sent an
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August 25 message to General Bragg that expressed both his frustration and optimism.
Smith complained of the limited supplies in the area and warned that he would not be
able to wait long for the coordinated invasion Bragg wanted to develop, but instead felt
that he faced the two options of either a retreat to Tennessee or a march on to Lexington.
Like Zollicoffer in 1861, Smith assessed the sentiment around him in Southeastern
Kentucky and determined that “thus far the people are universally hostile to our cause.
The sentiment extends through the mountain region of Eastern Kentucky.”154 Smith
concluded the correspondence with the positive prospect of finding a different situation
with local sentiment in the Bluegrass Region of central Kentucky and hoped that he could
soon “test their loyalty.”155
A plea from members of the Kentucky Provisional Confederate Congress to
Confederate President Jefferson Davis raised Smith and Bragg’s optimistic outlooks.
Members of the delegation included Robert J. Breckinridge Jr. and George W. Ewing. In
the appeal to Davis, the Kentuckians alluded to the restrictive policies of Union General
Boyle and stated that once the Confederate force reached central Kentucky “a large
majority of the people of the State sympathize with the South and that a large proportion
of the young men will at once join our army . . ..”156 Between the reports of John Hunt
Morgan, optimistic predictions of a favorable outcome from Kentucky’s own
Confederate soldiers, promises from pro-Confederate politicians, and the lack of a
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formidable Union army presence beyond the Cumberland Gap, Kirby Smith pushed north
through southeastern Kentucky with his goals set on reaching central Kentucky.
Before Kirby Smith departed Barbourville, Colonel John Scott’s Louisiana
Confederate Cavalry moved out in front of the larger invading Confederate force to
secure the roads to central Kentucky. Scott’s reconnaissance brought him into contact
with Union troops in Laurel and Rockcastle Counties. The mounted soldiers of Louisiana
struck London first on August 17 and forced Union Colonel Leonidas Hauk’s 3rd
Tennessee Regiment, who guarded the small city, into a retreat toward the Cumberland
Gap. The skirmishes and raids in London opened the opportunity for the Confederates to
seize materials, horses, mules, and a shipment of military supplies in the surrounding
area.157 Next, the Confederates ran into two companies of Colonel T. T. Garrard’s 7th
Kentucky Voluntary Infantry a little further north in Laurel County. Garrard’s detached
troops guarded the Laurel Bridge, but the strategic defense proved little obstacle to
Scott’s superior numbers which ended in another Union retreat—this time to Whitley
County. The Confederates continued their advance and descended upon Mt. Vernon
before their push toward Richmond, Kentucky.
A larger battle broke out on August 23, 1862 when Scott’s Confederates
encountered Kentucky-born Mexican-American War veteran, Colonel Leonidas
Metcalfe, and his inexperienced 7th Kentucky Calvary on the road between Mt. Vernon
and Richmond. On August 21, Metcalfe’s officers wired a frantic dispatch from
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Rockcastle County to Governor James Robinson (replacement to Beriah Magoffin who
had resigned the office only three days prior) which described his concern:
I learn the Rebels are in Great Force and below Lebanon, about one
thousand cavalry and three or four thousand infantry [soldiers] beyond and
towards Barbourville. Metcalfe says the country is desolate and no
subsistence for man or Beast. He is falling Back and calls loudly for
support if General Morgan is to be relieved. We need every man who can
raise a gun.158
Metcalfe relayed the urgency of his situation in a separate letter to Union Quartermaster
S. B. Brown stationed in Fayette County. Metcalfe warned:
They have destroyed everything south of here and we are feeding the last
corn we can get: we cannot live here—there is nothing more for horses—it
is all nonsense to talk about feeding the little patches of green corn to our
horses, that would starve the women & children & kill our horses. There
are also four hundred rebels at Mt. Vernon. They are threatening me from
both positions & some danger of them getting between me and Richmond.
The Country is perfectly desolated. How the people are to live here I can't
see.159
The clash developed at a location where Jackson, Rockcastle, and Madison Counties
joined. The fresh recruits of Metcalfe’s 7th Kentucky Cavalry fared no better against the
Confederate force than did the Union troops of the prior days. One key difference was
that Metcalf held the numerical advantage. Mustered in near Lexington for less than a
month, Metcalfe’s unit met Scott’s cavalry in an engagement later called the Battle of Big
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Hill. Union reports numbered Scott’s Confederates at 1,200 mounted troops during his
rounds through southeastern Kentucky, but Scott reported he arrived at the mountainous
location with 650.160 Scott’s approach to Big Hill found Colonel Metcalfe in a strong
topographical position and with over one-thousand Union men at his command.161 A
detachment of Hauk’s 3rd Tennessee Unionist infantry, led by Lieutenant Colonel John C.
Chiles, supported Metcalfe’s Kentucky soldiers. Early in the battle, Colonel Metcalfe
called for a Union charge at Scott’s troops, but when the Colonel looked behind, less than
one-hundred of his regiment followed him.162 After the failed charge, the Union men
continued to break ranks and run from the sound of cannon. Lieutenant Colonel Chiles
and the Tennessee battalion provided cover and rescued Metcalfe from the predicament.
The Battle of Big Hill between Scott’s Confederates and Metcalfe’s Union men
marked the largest clash, up to that point, of the August 1862 campaign. The battle
resulted in 16 Confederate casualties and anywhere from 50 to 120 Union casualties.
Aside from the poor performance of the raw Kentucky soldiers, Confederates captured
Metcalfe’s horses and found his jacket which contained important details about the Union
position at Richmond.163 The Union debacle, with untested recruits who suffered a
lopsided defeat, foreshadowed a much larger failure to come within the same week only
miles away.
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The city of Richmond, Kentucky, is the gateway from the mountains of Eastern
Kentucky into the Bluegrass region of the state. After Scott’s successful clearing of any
major Union resistance along the important roads from Barbourville to Richmond,
General Kirby Smith marched over 6000 Confederate soldiers to where the Union
military strategy had assembled a larger force to impede the Confederate advance. At
Richmond, General William “Bull” Nelson commanded a Union army, over 6000 strong,
made up of the veteran 18th Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Lieutenant Colonel Chiles’s
Tennessee troops from Big Hill, as well as inexperienced soldiers from President
Lincoln’s July 1862 call for volunteers that included men from Ohio, Indiana, and
Michigan—some of whom conducted their first organized drills a day before the
engagement.164 The August 30 encounter at Richmond proved to be another disaster for
the Union. Once again, Union command suffered a defeat as Confederates swept
disorganized and inexperienced troops from the battlefield. Even in defeat, the actions of
the Kentucky soldiers impressed an Indianan, Brigadier General Charles Cruft. Cruft
reported:
The men were all fresh recruits, except the Eighteenth Kentucky, which
had seen no field service, very little drill, and was now, for the first time
since its formation, collected as a regiment. . .. It was, however,
impossible, with the troops composing our lines, to stand against the
impetuosity of [the Confederate] charge. The center gave way, then the
right flank. The left made still a show of resistance, and the Eighteenth
Kentucky, Colonel Warner, was brought up to its aid. This regiment made
here a gallant fight, and by its brave stand broke the force of the enemy’s
attack and prevented the retreat at this time from becoming a rout. The
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men and officers of most of the regiments, however, fled in confusion to
the rear through the fields.165
The Union Army mustered in the 18th Kentucky Volunteer Infantry on February 8, 1862
and the unit was active in the pursuit of John Hunt Morgan prior to the Battle of
Richmond.
Another Indiana native, Brigadier General Mahlon D. Manson concurred with Cruft’s
report and described the chaos:
The three remaining regiments of General Cruft’s brigade arrived just in
time when our troops were on full retreat and the rout had become general,
the Eighteenth Kentucky being in advance, under the command of Colonel
Warner. This regiment was immediately deployed into the line and made
a desperate effort to check the advancing enemy, and contended with him
single-handed and alone for twenty minutes, when, after a severe loss,
they were compelled to give way before overwhelming numbers. . .. The
Twelfth Indiana and Eighteenth Kentucky Regiments, being placed in the
woods, contended against fearful odds and repulsed the rebels several
different times. . .. I have neglected to state in the proper place that I was
joined in the second engagement by a portion of the Third Kentucky
Infantry, who had passed from General Morgan’s command at the
Cumberland Gap with some Government horses. These men dismounted,
hitched their horses, and did excellent service. I do not know the names of
any of the accomplished officers who commanded this detachment, or I
should gladly give them a place in this report.166
Troops from the Kentucky 3rd Volunteer Infantry were part of Colonel Thomas
Bramlette’s initial wave of volunteers who organized at Camp Dick Robinson. The aid
of those veteran soldiers may have impressed the Indiana command, but it did little to
affect the outcome. Scott’s cavalry intercepted the retreat and General Nelson’s Union
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men suffered around 1,000 casualties and 4,300 lost as prisoners.167 Smith and the
Confederates lost fewer than 500 soldiers.
The engagement at Richmond opened the road to central Kentucky and occurred
during the same days as the Union defeat in northern Virginia at the Second Battle of
Bull Run. Historian Kenneth Noe added, “the Battle of Richmond would be the most
lopsided Confederate victory of the war, as Kirby Smith’s men inflicted casualties so
staggering that entire Union brigades ceased to exist.”168 With Buell’s veteran army
away in Tennessee, the Union lacked a large supply of experienced soldiers to check
momentum of the invading force. The Battles of Big Hill and Richmond stood in stark
contrast to the outcomes at Wildcat Mountain and Mill Springs where the Union
prevailed. Unlike Zollicoffer’s first two Confederate invasions, General Smith executed
a plan to penetrate the central portion of the state, cut his army off from secure lines of
communication in a show of confidence, and even compared the journey that anticipated
no retreat to Hernan Cortes’s conquest of the Aztecs.169
The Confederate Army occupied Lexington on September 1, 1862, and Frankfort
in the days that followed. General Kirby Smith, content to wait in Lexington for Bragg’s
larger army to join him, elected not to advance his army on the open road to Louisville or
Cincinnati where citizens waited in fear for the next Confederate move. Instead, Smith
only sent small detachments north and northwest to the populated locations on the Ohio
River. The Confederate General kept most of his troops in Lexington and hoped to add
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recruits from around the Bluegrass region to enlarge his army.170 The pro-Confederate
sympathies of central Kentucky raised the expectations of the invading force as citizens
of Lexington greeted Smith’s troops with dozens of Confederate flags and enthusiasm.171
Confederate General Bragg began his move north toward Kentucky from
Chattanooga on August 28, 1862—two days before the Battle of Richmond. With a force
of more than 30,000 battle-hardened troops, Bragg crossed the Tennessee River, then the
Cumberland River, marched through Middle Tennessee, and reentered Kentucky near
Glasgow. Much of the Confederate advance went undetected by the Union military. The
Lincoln administration, aware of the disastrous results from Richmond, Kentucky, and
the Second Bull Run in Virginia, panicked at the loss of observation of the large force in
the early weeks of September. President Lincoln sent an inquiry on September 7 to
General Boyle and asked “Where is General Bragg? What do you know on the subject?”
and another to General Buell with the question of “What degree of certainty have you,
that Bragg, with his command, is not now in the valley of Shenandoah, Virginia?”172
Buell assured Lincoln that Bragg was in Tennessee and that his army would look to stop
the Confederate plans in Kentucky.
General Bragg arrived at Glasgow, Kentucky, on September 13, 1862 with a
message that echoed General Smith earlier tests of loyalty. Bragg announced:
Kentuckians, I have entered your State with the Confederate Army of the
West and offer you an opportunity to free yourselves from the tyranny of a
despotic ruler. We come not as conquerors or as despoilers, but to restore
to you the liberties of which you have been deprived by a cruel and
170
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relentless foe. . .. Will you remain indifferent to our call, or will you not
rather vindicate the fair fame of your once free and envied state?173
The strategic location of Bragg’s Army, between Smith’s force that occupied Lexington
and Buell’s Union army that caught up from Nashville, put Confederate plans in a strong
position for success.174 But the ease of Confederate plans for a takeover of Kentucky
started to decline after Bragg left Glasgow. Buell’s force, the Union Army of the Ohio,
entered Bowling Green over thirty miles west of Glasgow around the time Bragg offered
his proclamation. Bragg, in effort to keep his army between Buell and Smith, marched
north on September 15 and encountered a situation in Munfordville—an import railroad
town with an elevated rail bridge near Mammoth Cave and Lincoln’s Hodgenville
birthplace—that delayed the advance. Bragg selected the native-born General Simon
Bolivar Buckner to accompany him in an effort to win over fellow Kentuckians, and after
a few days of deployments that surrounded the position, Buckner negotiated and accepted
the surrender of the Union troops guarding the Munfordville rail line on September 17—
the same day as the Battle of Antietam in Maryland.
The days lost at Munfordville proved critical to Bragg’s Confederate Army.
Buell’s Union troops raced for Louisville and Bragg set up headquarters in Bardstown,
with the expectation of a rendezvous with General Kirby Smith’s smaller force. Smith’s
troops, however, supported a Confederate cavalry engaged with Union troops at Mt.
Sterling, east of Lexington, over a hundred miles away. The two Confederate armies
drifted further apart, and the lack of communication impacted coordination. Bragg’s
situation also deteriorated when any achievable goal, central to a strategic Confederate
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military outcome, seemed to evade the general. Kentucky historian Lowell Harrison
added, “But on one important point the Confederate commanders were united: they
shared a bitter disappointment over the failure of Kentuckians to join their armies in large
numbers. The wagon trains had hauled thousands of stands of arms to equip the
anticipated horde of volunteers, but most of the rifles remained in the wagons, despite the
obvious Confederate sympathy of many of the state’s inhabitants.”175 Another problem,
Kentucky’s heat and conditions of drought, pushed the armies to search for water.
Perryville emerged as one of the locations thought to have the precious resource.
III.
The important encounter at Perryville marked a turning point for the 1862
Confederate campaign in Kentucky and for the broader Western Theatre in general.
After a few weeks in central Kentucky, including a brief occupation of the capitol in
Frankfort, General Bragg planned an October 4 Confederate gubernatorial inaugural ball
for the slain George Johnson’s replacement—Kentucky’s second Confederate Governor,
Richard Hawes.176 Bragg hoped the placement of Hawes as a state executive would
signal proof of a permanent Confederate presence and that the new appointed governor
could provide a means to enforce a conscription law to draft soldiers into the invading
southern ranks—a measure the Confederate legislature passed in the spring of 1862.177
However, Buell’s large Union army disrupted those plans through military pressure and
forced the Confederates to turn away from their political focus. By October 8, 1862, a
series of Union movements had pushed Confederates out of Frankfort and other northern
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portions of the state where they drifted south and collected with Bragg’s other scattered
divisions in central Kentucky looking for water around the town of Perryville. The
largest battle ever fought in Kentucky followed. A portion of Bragg’s army, 16,000 men,
attacked Buell’s force of 55,000.
Divided into three corps, Generals Don C. Buell and George H. Thomas led the
Union Army of the Ohio. General Alexander McCook commanded the First Corps,
General Thomas L. Crittenden—another son of former Senator John J. Crittenden and
brother of Confederate General George Crittenden—commanded the Second Corps, and
General Charles C. Gilbert led the Third Corps. The First Corps experienced most of the
fighting at Perryville, followed by the Third who saw some action, while the Second
Corps did not play a significant role due to the confusion that surrounded the battle.178
Unaware of the consolidation of the Union force, Bragg launched an attack against
superior numbers. For Buell, a phenomenon known as an “acoustic shadow” prevented a
larger engagement as the General did not hear the start of the battle even though the
cannons thundered only a few miles away.179 This atmospheric condition delayed the
Union’s ability to capitalize on their numerical advantage. Even with the uncoordinated
deployment of troops, the Battle of Perryville developed into the largest engagement and
produced the costliest totals for Kentucky during the entire Civil War. The one-day
encounter resulted in 4,211 casualties for the Union and 3,396 for the Confederates.180
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The two groups comprised of the most Southeastern Kentuckians experienced two
different roles at the Battle of Perryville. Colonel Sidney Barnes and the 8th Kentucky
were present, under General Crittenden’s command, but like most of the soldiers of the
Second Corps, not called into action. In contrast, Colonel T.T. Garrard’s 7th Kentucky
played a significant role as part of the First Corps, 10th Division, 33rd Brigade. Garrard
led a detachment comprised of one company of the original 7th Kentucky Volunteers
formed of southeastern Kentucky men, a company of 32nd Kentucky Volunteers, and one
company of 3rd Tennessee Volunteer Infantry. The group of 193 soldiers provided
support for an artillery battery alongside Ohio, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, and Illinois
Infantries.181 The 33rd Brigade found itself engaged in some of the heaviest fighting of
the entire field and located between two potential sources of water—Wilson’s Creek and
Chaplin River—near Benton Road. Colonel Garrard’s detachment suffered one killed,
thirty wounded, and eight missing, while the entire 10th Division, made up of just two
brigades, accounted for over a quarter of all Union casualties at Perryville.182
The Union’s Third Corps experienced varying levels of participation at Perryville.
General Schoepf and General Fry, both important in repelling Zollicoffer’s two prior
invasions, helped command parts of the 1st Division in the Third Corps, but the veteran
officers did not participate in a major engagement at the battle. The 1st Division included
the 4th, 10th, and 12th Kentucky Volunteer Infantries. General Phil Sheridan led a separate
division in the Third Corps that employed the aid of the 9th Kentucky Calvary. Sheridan,
who went on to become one of the most important generals by the war’s end, sustained
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significant casualties at Perryville, although the Kentucky Calvary unit incurred only a
minor role.
The early confusion benefitted the Confederates and evened the numbers for
Bragg’s attacking force. Historians have even judged the results at Perryville as a
“tactical victory” for the Confederates.183 However, by the day’s end, Bragg decided to
retreat to Tennessee after he realized the size of the force he faced, weighed the cost of
the battle, and speculated about his prospects in Kentucky. Bragg’s retreat south brought
the Confederate Army back into contact with Southeastern Kentuckians. On October 12,
Bragg met with Confederate command to decide to march to the relief of Chattanooga
where Confederate reinforcements were needed.184 The lack of local Kentuckians joining
the Confederate ranks did a great part to affect the decision. An estimated 2,500
Kentucky citizens took up arms for Bragg’s army, much less than the 25,000 to 30,000
volunteers that some of the southern leadership had predicted and at a rate that did not
even cover the losses of the campaign.185 Both Bragg and Smith disparaged the
unwillingness to find support in Kentucky.186 The Confederate Army marched to
Harrodsburg first, then Danville, before arriving at Lancaster where Bragg decided to
split the force. From Lancaster, worried about the numerous armed Unionists sure to be
found along the way, Bragg chose to take his army through Crab Orchard, sent
Confederate General Marshall’s troops toward Virginia, and instructed Kirby Smith to
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move back toward the hostile area of Big Hill.187 Union General Buell chased the fleeing
force as far as London, where he abandoned the pursuit to turn his attention, once again,
to Middle Tennessee.
Some historians have analyzed the Confederate invasion of Kentucky as part of a
broader strategy that linked the two theatres, East and West, together. Christopher
Phillips called the coordinated effort the “Confederate Tet.”188 Historian James
McPherson judged the results of the Confederate invasion and subsequent withdrawal as
part of a progression of major turning points that affected the eventual outcome of the
war:
The first [critical point] occurred in the summer of 1862, when the
counter-offensives of Jackson and Lee in Virginia and Bragg and Kirby
Smith in the West arrested the momentum of a seemingly imminent Union
victory. This assured a prolongation and intensification of the conflict and
created the potential for a Confederate success, which appeared imminent
before each of the next three turning points. The first of these occurred in
the fall of 1862, when battles at Antietam and Perryville threw back
Confederate invasions, forestalled European mediation and recognition of
the Confederacy, perhaps prevented a Democratic victory in the northern
elections of 1862 that might have inhibited the government’s ability to
carry on the war, and set the stage for the Emancipation Proclamation
which enlarged the scope and purpose of the conflict.189
The impact of the failed invasion changed the path of the war. Privately President
Lincoln acknowledged the sacrifice of the soldiers in an October 8, 1862 letter to Thomas
H. Clay where Lincoln denied Clay’s request—on the same day as the Battle of
Perryville—to place additional Union soldiers in Cincinnati, Ohio, to protect exiled
Kentucky Unionists. Lincoln added, “Buell’s old troops, now in pursuit of Bragg, have
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done more hard marching recently. And, in fact, if you include marching and fighting,
there are scarcely any old troops East or West of the mountains that have not done as
hard service.”190 Lincoln’s admiration expressed toward the Army of the Ohio troops did
not extend to the General himself.
Buell’s movements, and lack of communication, concerned President Lincoln. At
the critical juncture of pursuit, the General avoided contact with the Commander-inChief. In two separate telegraphs in mid-October, Lincoln reached out to General Boyle
and asked, “please send any news you have from Gen. Buell to-day,” and followed the
next day with “we are very anxious to hear from Gen. Buell’s Army. We have had
nothing since day-before yesterday. Have you anything?”191 Lincoln wanted Buell to
pursue Bragg’s retreat though the rest of southeastern Kentucky and to the relief of
Eastern Tennessee. General Halleck relayed the President’s wishes to Buell and
questioned the General’s logistical reluctance to carry out Lincoln’s objective. Halleck
ended the directions with the assurance, “once [you] hold the valley of the Upper
Tennessee, the operations of guerillas in that State and Kentucky will soon cease.”192
Buell refused to follow the path through the Cumberland Gap and raised the issue that
insufficient resources in the area would not support an advance. Lincoln’s patience wore
out. On October 30, 1862, General William S. Rosecrans assumed command of the
Army of the Ohio after Lincoln removed Buell from his position and, shortly thereafter,
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the Department of the Cumberland renamed the veteran group the Army of the
Cumberland.
Between Lincoln’s October message to General Boyle and his removal of Buell, a
development in Southeastern Kentucky illuminated the cost and sacrifice endured by the
civilian population during the Civil War. Without the occupation of a formidable Union
force in Southeastern Kentucky to guard resources, General Crittenden of the Second
Corps for the Union Army issued orders to destroy the Goose Creek Salt Works inside
Clay County, Kentucky. A conglomerate of owners had claim to the salt production and
operations for the business spread over several locations. Less than two months from his
command at the Battle of Richmond, the Union Army selected Brigadier General Charles
Cruft to carry out the order and he began the two-day destruction on October 23, 1862.
Cruft’s night arrival to the location found a large Confederate cavalry that occupied a
nearby farm. The Confederates broke camp and scurried away. General Cruft also
reported that “the people in the mountain districts in direction of Manchester are loyal
and true to the Government. They have been robbed by the rebel army of nearly all of
their available property—cattle, horses, and crops—and are left generally in a destitute
condition.”193 Soldiers destroyed the bored wells, over five-hundred feet deep, pumps
and the drills necessary for new wells. The commodity lost represented a very important
nineteenth-century means to preserve food for the communities surrounding the area.
But Confederate raids and guerilla warfare thrust women and children into the effects of
war, as the shortage of food threatened starvation to many segments of the population
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across the country.194 On the recommendation of General Cruft, the Union Army
allowed local citizens to take as much salt as they needed before completion of the
destruction. An Ohioan and West Point graduate, Brigadier General William Sooy Smith
added:
The Salt-Works are situated in the midst of a population whose loyalty and
patriotism are not excelled in any portion of our country. Much suffering
must result to the poor people in the surrounding region from the lack of
salt . . . the noble conduct of some of those interested in the works,
especially of Mrs. Garrard, who expressed her entire willingness that not
only that valuable property, but all else that she and her husband (a colonel
in our service [T.T. Garrard]) owned, might be destroyed if such
destruction would help restore the Union, constrains an earnest
recommendation that prompt restitution be made for the damage done.195
In an area that both Union and Confederate officials deemed poor throughout 1862, the
Garrard family surrendered a huge portion of the best resource the locality possessed for
the Union cause and offered to sacrifice even more material aid than requested. The act
symbolized much of what the population that surrounded the location were willing to
give to stop the Confederate occupation.
Events in Kentucky during 1862 brought the war up close to residents who lived
in the Commonwealth. For the men who volunteered for the Union Army, military
service resulted in long marches, a privation of resources, and violent encounters.
Civilians in the area experienced the theft, destruction, and shortage of food. The 1861
Battle of Wildcat Mountain and the early 1862 Battle of Mill Springs stopped
Confederate advance in southern Kentucky before it could reach the Bluegrass Region.
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But in the summer of 1862, General Kirby Smith exposed the Union’s diverted attention
to central Tennessee and entered Kentucky through the Cumberland Gap in a campaign
that endangered the state’s place in the Union. The mountainous topography—and a
population loyal to the Union—helped disturb the beginning of that campaign. Some of
the armed men left behind to guard the state, including several like-minded Eastern
Tennessee Unionists who were often paired with southeastern Kentucky Unionists,
suffered casualties and put up resistance against Smith’s invasion. Perhaps more
important, Kentuckians and Tennesseans loyal to the Union did not join the ranks of
Confederates in any significant number during the invasion. Separate appeals promising
liberty and amnesty from the invading Confederate generals had little effect on
strengthening their numbers. The disagreements between President Lincoln’s desire to
come to the aid of Unionist southerners and General Buell’s refusal to advance through
the portion of the country necessary to that aim left the Appalachian civilians in a tough
situation. Evidence, including numerous accounts from military leaders of both sides,
suggests that the Union loyalty and resolve of the population in Southeastern Kentucky
remained firm.
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CHAPTER FOUR
“AS SOLIERS SUFFER TO ANYTHING, EVEN UPON DEATH”:
KENTUCKY AND THE SECOND HALF OF THE CIVIL WAR

Many historians break the five-year period of the American Civil War into two halves.
Carrying out strategies for politicians, Union and Confederate generals fought the first
half of the war with eighteenth century tactics and manners. This approach produced
horrific casualties as soldiers with modern weapons met on remote battlefields and
volleyed musket and cannon fire into long lines of exposed soldiers. The second half of
the war devolved into a much uglier reality. The war continued to cause alarming
casualty rates and some military leaders clung to those old tactics, but the successful
targeting of infrastructure and resources added effects felt by civilian populations. The
loss of those resources caused armies to take entrenched defensive positions or to raid
communities for much needed materials. Some historians have labeled the turn a “total
war” or a “hard war.” This model of “halves” may or may not reflect the nature of the
Civil War; but, the model does apply to the experience of Kentucky during the national
conflict. In Kentucky, guerrilla warfare replaced the large organized and foraging armies
of 1861 and 1862. For the second half of Civil War in Kentucky, Union volunteers from
the state played significant roles in securing important victories in the Western Theatre of
the war and in defending Kentucky against raids and local uprisings. The state
population faced violent upheaval from frequent Confederate invasions and the political
fallout from local residents in reaction to new federal policies. Southeastern Kentucky
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continued to provide a strong loyalty to the Union cause during the post-emancipation
phase of the Civil War, while most of the state experienced a fracture or shift in national
sympathies.

I.
The Confederate decision to abandon large-scale military operations in Kentucky
following the failed 1862 invasion provided some relief for the Unionists of Southeastern
Kentucky and for the Commonwealth in general. Concluding with General Braxton
Bragg and General Kirby Smith’s hasty retreat into Tennessee, many standard accounts
on the Civil War depart from offering any further historical insight about the war’s
impact on Kentucky. President Abraham Lincoln’s October 1862 replacement of General
Don Carlos Buell with General William S. Rosecrans to command the Army of the Ohio
(afterwards renamed the Army of the Cumberland) signaled an ongoing difference in
military strategy related to the Appalachian region—with Buell’s reluctance to pursue a
retreating enemy through southeastern Kentucky or to liberate East Tennessee as major
factors that led to his dismissal.196 However, General Rosecrans’s approach did not bring
an immediate change in strategy, nor a large Union presence, to the Appalachian
Mountains. Like Buell, Rosecrans focused on securing central Tennessee. But the Union
Army’s October 1862 follow-up destruction at Manchester of the Goose Creek Salt
Works suggested the Civil War would continue to affect Southeastern Kentuckians.
Even with the Union’s dismantling of attractive resources in effort to deter a Confederate
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return and the absence of a large military occupation by either side, Civil War activity
remained close to the local population. In December 1862, Union military plans brought
the movement of troops back to the southeastern portion of Kentucky again, only a
couple of months after the Battle of Perryville and the subsequent Confederate retreat.
In the fall of 1861, Tennessee Unionists led the destruction of a series of southern
railroad bridges to attract federal attention to an area sympathetic to the Union but under
Confederate control. Those attacks did not move the Union Army to act. A year later,
however, Union officials revived Samuel P. Carter’s November 1861 original request to
infiltrate and target infrastructure in eastern Tennessee. Moved up from colonel to the
rank of brigadier general, officials selected Carter to lead a small expeditionary force
with orders to strike the East Tennessee and Virginia Railroad.197 Three weeks later the
effort began to unfold when General Carter left Lexington, Kentucky, and traveled south
with the 2nd Michigan Calvary and the 9th Pennsylvania Calvary. The group marched up
Big Hill, to Jackson County, where the soldiers waited two days in the town of McKee
for a delayed provision train.198 Leaving McKee on Christmas Eve, Carter’s route went
through Clay County, toward Red Bird River, where the 7th Ohio Calvary joined the
group and bolstered the numbers of the expeditionary unit to over nine-hundred men.
Next, the force crossed Pine Mountain on December 28, traveled both day and night, and
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entered the southwestern portion of Virginia through a pass called Crank’s Gap located
near Harlan, Kentucky. Once in Virginia a few Confederates, believing the mounted
troops to be friendly cavalry, passed through the lines of Carter’s infantry and the small
Union force captured the confused soldiers. News began to spread ahead of the group
that a Union advance from Kentucky was underway, but southern locals dismissed the
reports as unbelievable.199
After an undetected arrival in Tennessee on December 30, the 2nd Michigan
Calvary led an attack on a railroad line near the town of Blountsville. The Union military
encountered and captured thirty soldiers from Colonel Henry L. Giltner’s Confederate 4th
Kentucky Cavalry. General Carter’s troops managed to evade the larger Confederate
presence in the area and executed the destruction of a 150-foot-long railroad bridge over
the Holston River in a town once called Union, (at the time renamed Zollicoffer)
Tennessee. General Carter’s brother, Colonel James P.T. Carter, led a detachment of
Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Michigan soldiers that destroyed another important railway
bridge over the Watauga River, ten miles west of Union.200 The expeditionary force also
laid waste to several supplies of Confederate material aid, a wagon bridge, and other
equipment in addition to burning the two railroad bridges. As the Confederates began to
mount a counterattack in reaction to the destruction, General Carter, outnumbered and
deep within Confederate territory, called for his men to leave the area on a path that
retraced their arrival. Armed bushwhackers and Confederate infantry disrupted the
Union’s departure during their trek back through the mountain passes of Tennessee and
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Virginia. Carter’s men made a strenuous non-stop march that crossed the Cumberland
mountains and reentered Kentucky through Crank’s Gap on January 2, 1863. The group
reached southeastern Kentucky on January 5 and, in an area safe from Confederate harm,
General Carter allowed soldiers a couple days rest before their return to the central
portion of the state.
Union command heaped praise upon the actions of Carter and his men. The
operations in East Tennessee resulted in less than twenty casualties for the entire unit
while reports counted over five-hundred killed, wounded, and captured Confederates as a
result of the stealth journey into the South.201 General-in-Chief of the Union Army
Henry W. Halleck responded to a summary of General Carter’s work in Tennessee and
concluded that “the daring operations and brilliant achievements of General Carter and
his command are without a parallel in the history of the war.”202 In his own report,
General Carter acknowledged the leadership of the Kentucky cavalry who had
accompanied him on the expedition. Carter also singled out two individuals to credit for
the mission’s success:
To Colonel [James] Carter’s knowledge of the people and country in the
vicinity of the railroad bridge is mainly due our success at those points,
with so small a loss of life. Colonel [T.T.] Garrard, an officer of sound
judgement and great discretion, was of invaluable service in passing
through the mountains of Eastern Kentucky. He gave his whole heart to
the work and was of great service to the expedition.203
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Colonel Garrard directed Union soldiers through southeastern Kentucky without any
significant violent confrontations in the area—an experience that contrasted with the type
of encounters Union soldiers faced in eastern Tennessee and southwestern Virginia.
Tennessee Unionist Colonel James Carter, who had already served as future president
Andrew Johnson’s bodyguard in June 1861, utilized his local knowledge of the area south
of Kentucky to help carry out the plan.204 The achievement owed much to the
cooperation between Unionists of Southeastern Kentucky who provided safe passage and
Unionists of Eastern Tennessee, determined to free the area of Confederate control,
working together to aid the mission’s success.
The impact of the expeditionary force did not offer immediate relief for the
Unionist citizens, but the effort was important in disrupting the flow of materials to
Confederates during a larger engagement to the southwest. Around the same time of the
Carter brothers’ destruction of Confederate targets in northeastern Tennessee, the larger
Army of the Cumberland moved in to attack Bragg’s Army of Tennessee at a location
south of Nashville near Murfreesboro, Tennessee. The movement constituted part of a
broader strategy that coincided with the beginning of General Ulysses S. Grant’s siege of
Vicksburg, Mississippi, to the west, and General Ambrose Burnside’s attack against
General Robert E. Lee at Fredericksburg, Virginia, to the east. But in the weeks before
that offensive took place, Union command started to note the preliminary fallout from the
Emancipation Proclamation. President Abraham Lincoln’s September 1862
announcement of the Emancipation Proclamation, and the war’s new developments that
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targeted southern slavery after the Union victory at Antietam, produced internal critics
within the Union ranks. The proclamation acted as a war measure that declared freedom
to all slaves as a military exigent in areas under Confederate control. Border State
suspicions that the abolition of all slaves might follow more battlefield successes
presented new challenges for the Army of the Cumberland during the winter campaigns
of late 1862 and early 1863. Union officers who expressed negative opinions related to
the emancipation of slaves raised alarm among both the executive administration in
Washington and the highest-ranking generals in the field.205
Early in his appointment, General Rosecrans worried about how reactions to
emancipation could influence the morale and strength of the Army of the Cumberland.
Those concerns were well placed. In the first weeks of his command, records reveal that
6,484 soldiers had left Rosecrans’s Army of the Cumberland without permission either
during or just prior to his takeover—including many disgruntled Kentucky troops who
had not received pay for eight or nine months.206 Central Kentucky figures, such as
Major Benjamin Forsythe Buckner of the 20th Kentucky Volunteer Regiment, expressed a
bitterness and developed an open hostility toward executive emancipation in late 1862
that symbolized many pro-slavery Unionists’ opinion of Lincoln’s effort.207 Some of the
officers resigned, numerous more soldiers deserted, and historians have explored the
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impact of the proclamation upon the North as “two-fifths of Union men had a Democratic
background and at least one-tenth hailed from a border state.”208
Negative protest emerged within the local populations in Kentucky as a result of
Lincoln’s emancipationist policy and those protests threatened to divide Union soldiers.
Some northern units, more sympathetic to both confiscation and emancipation, clashed
with pro-slavery Union soldiers and citizens. National headlines captured events such as
when a mob of central Kentuckians from Georgetown assaulted a Wisconsin regiment
nicknamed “the abolitionist regiment.”209 In Mount Sterling, another central Kentucky
town, a tense confrontation occurred between an Illinois regiment and Kentuckians
furious at the group for their reputation of being “slave hounds.” 210 The event
culminated when Union soldiers of the 14th Kentucky Infantry arrived at the scene ready
to attack the Illinois troops. The standoff never erupted into a full violent exchange
between the two Union regiments, but the situation in central Kentucky displayed a
fracturing loyalty due to the nature of the war’s new policy toward southern slaves.
Historian Michael Rhyne described the violence that engulfed the Bluegrass Region as
“less a component of the larger war between the states but rather a blossoming revolution
against federal authority.”211 Nonetheless, the Emancipation Proclamation became
effective on January 1, 1863—one-hundred days after the September 17, 1862 issuance.
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The soldiers who comprised the Army of the Cumberland, many from areas where
resistance to Lincoln’s war policy was in hot debate, secured one of the war’s most
important victories in the days surrounding the beginning of southern emancipation.
Outside of Murfreesboro, Tennessee, Stones River resulted in another large battle
between the Union and General Bragg’s Confederate forces. Union General William
Rosecrans reorganized the troops he inherited from the relieved Don Carlos Buell. The
corps in Buell’s former army took the new names of “the right wing,” “the center,” and
“the left wing” with generals Alexander McCook, George Thomas, and Thomas
Crittenden leading the respective three Union corps.212 On the morning of December 31,
1862, General Bragg ordered an offensive at the approaching Union Army. The first day
of the battle, fought on the final day of 1862, ended with General Philip Sheridan’s
division holding out against Bragg’s assault. From Brigadier General Horatio Van
Cleve’s division, Union Colonel Samuel Beatty led a brigade comprised of Indiana, Ohio,
and Kentucky troops involved in some of the most intense fighting.213 By the end of the
encounter, Beatty’s troops, which included two Kentucky regiments, suffered the
heaviest casualties of any Union group at Stones River with nearly fifty percent of the
brigade fallen to either death or injury.214 Overall, the Murfreesboro battle took shape as
a deadly clash of brigades that vied for control of the coveted Nashville Pike and the
Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad that ran just behind the road.215 General McCook’s

212

Earl J. Hess, The Civil War in the West: Victory and Defeat from the Appalachians to
the Mississippi (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2012), 127.
213
Hess, The Civil War in the West, 130; Daniel, Days of Glory, 215.
214
Daniel, Days of Glory, 224.
215
For more on Stones River see James Lee McDonough’s Stones River: Bloody Winter
in Tennessee (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1983) and Larry J. Daniel’s
Battle of Stones River: The Forgotten Conflict Between the Confederate Army of
102

corps, as had happened at the Battle of Perryville, found themselves the most engaged.
On January 1 the two armies did not order any significant attacks, but on January 2
Confederate General John C. Breckinridge renewed the offensive and suffered heavy
casualties when his divisions marched into a location fortified with Union artillery.
Fearful about the number of Union troops that the Confederate Army faced and the
potential reinforcements on the way, General Bragg ordered a retreat the following day
and looked to reposition the Army of Tennessee further south to Tullahoma. While the
losses were high, the Union claimed a strategic victory.
The Army of Cumberland’s success at Stones River helped offset Burnside’s
December 1862 defeat at Fredericksburg and Grant’s slow progress with the Mississippi
River town of Vicksburg. The battle produced near 23,000 casualties total, and each side
sustained over 10,000 soldiers lost to either death, wounds, or capture. A distraught
federal executive celebrated the victory as news of defeat to the east and a lack of
progress to the west threatened to jeopardize the entire Union war effort. Many believed
that a Union defeat in southern Tennessee, alongside the other setbacks, may have
brought foreign assistance to the Confederacy. Stones River stood as the only good news
to start 1863 and northern newspapers heaped praise on the leadership of General
Rosecrans.216 Some executives even considered relocating Rosecrans to the Eastern
Theatre where he could be used against the momentum of General Lee and the Army of
Northern Virginia. President Lincoln summarized the significance of the Tennessee
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encounter months later when he addressed the Army of the Cumberland’s efforts as
perhaps saving the nation.217
II.
In the very same week Kentucky’s Union soldiers made advances into Tennessee
as either part of the small band who aided General Carter’s expeditionary force or as
enlistees who served in General Rosecrans’s much larger three corps within the Army of
the Cumberland, Confederate raiders made a destructive ride through the western portion
of the state under the direction of John Hunt Morgan. The raiders took a route north out
of Tennessee like General Bragg’s summer invasion and crossed into Kentucky on
December 24, 1862. The Confederates made it to Glasgow, Kentucky on Christmas,
traveled through Munfordville where they defeated a small garrison, and went on to
capture six-hundred Union men near Elizabethtown, Kentucky.218 Historian Christopher
Phillips assessed:
Heavy cavalry raids offered many residents their first glimpse of regular
Confederates since their armies had been forced south. Home guards fled,
useless against such numbers, and raiders tore up railroad lines, destroyed
bridges and depots, and entered communities. For many southerners these
horsemen were bold cavaliers . . . But boasts of chivalry for these
horsemen obfuscated a war they were already experiencing in the West
that was anything but noble.219
One of the primary goals of Morgan’s raids was to cut a major Union supply line that
supported Rosecrans’s army. The raids caught the attention of Union Generals Horatio
Wright in Cincinnati and Jeremiah Boyle in central Kentucky as the two strategized in
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tandem to keep the railroads in Kentucky operating and safe from Confederate harm.
Central Kentucky Home Guards scrambled to protect the vital infrastructure as the
railroads delivered a steady supply of food for Rosecrans’s army during their operations
in Tennessee.220 The Confederate Morgan made his escape through Campbellsville, then
Columbia, and finally Burkesville before reentering Tennessee. And while General
Bragg’s Army of Tennessee continued to take a defensive position at Tullahoma and
General Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia planned an offensive into Pennsylvania,
Kentucky experienced numerous more raids and smaller invasions throughout the first
half of 1863.
The direct path of Morgan’s “Christmas Raid” spared southeastern Kentucky.
But just before spring 1863, violence and theft at the hands of those who supported the
Confederacy engulfed most of the state. Colonel Roy S. Cluke and 750 of his
Confederate 8th Kentucky Calvary crossed the Cumberland River in mid-February to
foray through the Bluegrass, Confederate General John Pegram’s troops captured
Danville on March 24, and General Humphrey Marshall’s cavalry attacked a Union
garrison at Louisa in the northeastern portion of that state during the closing weeks of
March. The war had changed. It was in Louisa, late 1861, that James A. Garfield met his
Ohio troops to first assume command with the order not to steal from local citizens and
declared that he would lead a “regiment of gentlemen.”221 Confederate commanders
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issued similar demands in the early part of the war. But the southern raiders, frustrated
by failed invasions and the inability to bring Kentucky into its fold, abandoned careful
behavior that courted loyalty for more aggressive measures. By April, some of
Marshall’s men made it into southeastern Kentucky. Frances Peters recorded the news in
an April 18 entry into her diary:
. . . ‘Thursday’ says the Observer, ‘Mr. A.B. Gilbert of Owsley County,
former member of [the] Legislature, was at our office and gave a sad
account of the district in which he resides.’ Cluke’s men robbed him of
grain and stock some weeks ago and on Wednesday of last week some of
Marshall’s men under Jack May came to his house [and] in his absence
appropriated 33 blankets and other articles. [They] took all the horses and
robbed the bee hives, and though his wife offered them a thousand dollars
not to do it, burnt two dwelling houses [,] a store house and granery, [sic]
not permitting Mrs. Gilbert to save any clothes or anything but a bed from
the flames. . . . The rebels burnt the jail at Booneville [in] Owsley County
and fired the Court house, but the latter was saved by the citizens, but the
records and papers of the Circuit and County Court were destroyed. They
were torn up and scattered in the streets. And these same men of
Marshall’s in passing through Wolf [sic] County burned forty three
houses. . . .222
Colonel Samuel Gilbert of the 44th Ohio Infantry delivered a May 12 report from London,
Kentucky to Lexington that relayed a similar story. The 44th Ohio pursued three-hundred
Confederates southeast of Manchester near Red Bird River. Gilbert reported:
They [the Confederates] fled at the first fire. Captain Moore pursued for
several miles, and captured some small-arms and other plunder, but his
horses were not fresh enough to catch them. He reports several wounded.
He reports that they have been stripping the citizens of not only horses and
provisions, but even of their clothing, and that they had put some to torture
to make them tell where their horses and arms were hid.223
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While citizens in the Bluegrass Region of the state exhibited an angst against federal
authority, many Kentuckians, according to Christopher Phillips, determined that “the
hard treatment at the hands of rebel horsemen crushed the illusion of the superiority of
the South and its culture.”224 The Confederate pillaging brought a Union presence.
Union Colonels John Marshall Harlan and Frank Wolford chased John Hunt Morgan, and
other Confederate bands, around the Bluegrass portions of the state. Union Generals
Mahlon D. Manson and Samuel Carter worked together to disrupt Confederate activity in
the southern part of the state. During the months of April and May 1863, General
Carter’s men encountered guerillas and other organized Confederates near Somerset.
Carter identified a network of Confederates that stretched back into the southeastern
section of Kentucky. In an April 29 message to Brigadier General O.B. Wilcox, General
Carter reported to have encountered a regiment of 900 enemy soldiers from a Georgia
cavalry supported by a Confederate infantry in Livingston, Kentucky.225 Not only was
the area in the middle of armed conflict, but the communities caught between the
opposing forces suffered through the impact with the loss of local resources. General
Carter concluded his cavalry could not be foraged in his current location and added that
“the country is stripped.”226 After his disastrous defeat in northern Virginia, Union
leadership relocated General Ambrose Burnside to Kentucky to aid in the repulse of the
increased guerilla activity. As Confederates continued to probe portions of Kentucky for
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resources and support, another larger invasion was not out of the question. Historian
Allen Guelzo analyzed the situation Confederates faced in early 1863:
Three times, a Confederate field army tried to recover the lost territory in
Tennessee and Kentucky, in battles at Shiloh, Perryville, and
Murfreesboro. All three times it failed, and now the Confederacy was left
barely clinging to the southeast corner of Tennessee, while a Union army
was fastening its grip on Vicksburg.227
Guelzo added how that Lee, in preparation to his offensive into Pennsylvania, lobbied
Richmond for another joint invasion like the 1862 push into both Maryland and
Kentucky:
This was the moment, Lee politely suggested, for Joe Johnston to take the
Confederate armies in the West on the offensive, and magnify the pressure
on the Lincoln government by invading Kentucky, perhaps even Ohio.228
The Union’s defense in Kentucky against Morgan’s raids, and the resistance to the
broader Confederate efforts that surrounded those raids, may have been just enough to
deter Jefferson Davis from following Lee’s suggestions. The Union’s renewed attention
to the area made a difference as well. In a May 1 report, a Confederate cavalry officer
believed that General Burnside was near Crab Orchard with an army of “15,000 to 20,000
men, the extreme advance of which is known to be at Williamsburg and London,
Kentucky.”229 While Confederates often overestimated or misplaced the enemy presence
in some instances, in other parts of the state the Union continued to initiate important
operations that hindered the South’s overall plans.
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Another expedition took regiments made up of Kentuckians into Confederate
controlled areas. In early July 1863 a group that included detachments from the 39th
Kentucky Infantry, the 65th Illinois Infantry, the 10th Kentucky Cavalry, the 14th
Kentucky Infantry, and one squadron of Ohio volunteer cavalry infiltrated Virginia at
Beaver Creek located near Pikeville. The unit consisted of just under one-thousand men
and crossed into Virginia through Pound’s Gap to target another railroad juncture—this
time at Bristol. Once in southwestern Virginia, the Union force skirmished with
Confederates where they captured one-hundred men and destroyed a cache of military
supplies. After the victory, Brigadier General Julius White split his troops and sent a
detachment of the 39th Kentucky and the 65th Illinois to Tug Fork, located in West
Virginia, to engage a separate group of Confederates. West Virginia had become a state
on June 20, 1863, only two weeks before the encounter. Under Union Colonel Dan
Cameron the detachment managed to defeat the Confederates. In communication to
Burnside, White relayed the news:
Since my last dispatch, a detachment of the Sixty-fifth Illinois and Thirtyninth Kentucky, from this command, under Col. Dan Cameron, have
returned from an expedition up the Tug River into West Virginia, where
they routed and dispersed the enemy, under Buchanan, killing 5 and
capturing 20. The enemy took to the cliffs and mountain sides, but the
brave Illinoisans and Kentuckians vied with each other in climbing the
steeps under a galling fire, and driving the enemy from their mountain
fastnesses. Colonel Cameron and his officers and men have exhibited the
utmost daring and energy, and have penetrated where no Union troops
have been before.230
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The event is evidence of the broader organization and scope of operations supporting
General Burnside’s defense of Kentucky. In addition, the engagement at Tug Fork
included the 39th Kentucky Infantry—a unit comprised of several Appalachian
Kentuckians from the far eastern portion of the state—fighting alongside Illinoisans to
advance Union goals in a newly formed state with another population loyal to the Union.
The soldiers in groups such as these played a small role as part a larger effort to protect
Union objectives. In the following months, West Virginia adopted a state seal that
featured the Latin phrase Montani Semper Liberi—"Mountaineers are Always Free.”
During the summer days of 1863 when Union troops guarded Kentucky against
guerillas and infiltrated Confederate forces across state lines, the nation received news
about two of the most important victories of the war that took place at Gettysburg,
Pennsylvania and at Vicksburg, Mississippi. Skirmishes in the southeastern portion of
Kentucky continued throughout the same month as those monumental victories. On July
26, Union troops skirmished with Confederates in London, at Irvine on July 30, Lancaster
and Stanford on July 31. As General Burnside pushed south, Eastern Tennessee
remained anxious and citizens petitioned both Lincoln and Secretary of War Edwin
Stanton to redeem their area of the state. President Lincoln responded to the petitioners
in early August with the assurance that he was doing as much for East Tennessee as if his
immediate family were there and that Secretary Stanton, General Halleck, General
Burnside, and General Rosecrans were all engaged to relieve them.231 A month after
Lincoln’s promise of a Union effort to help East Tennessee, General Burnside arrived in
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Knoxville with the Army of the Ohio, 24,000 troops strong, and occupied the city on
September 3 with little resistance.232 The Confederate troops evacuated south to join
Bragg’s Army of Tennessee in northern Georgia.
President Lincoln pressed General Rosecrans to make an offensive thrust on the
Confederates collected in southern Tennessee and northern Georgia. Since the Battle of
Stones River, resignations continued to plague the Army of the Cumberland as Rosecrans
had lost additional Kentuckians in protested fallout to the Emancipation Proclamation.
Historian Victor Howard accessed:
Soon after the Battle of Stones River, December 31,1862, some fifteen or
eighteen officers of the Fifteenth Kentucky Infantry tendered their
resignation without giving any special reason. All were sent back by Gen.
Richard W. Johnson, who commanded the division. Within a few days
some half-dozen or more of the same officers again sent in their
resignations without stating a reason, and again were turned down. . .
.Colonel Cochran and other officers of the Fourteenth Infantry resigned
because of the president’s proclamation. More than a hundred men
deserted the Twenty-fourth infantry . . . Many of the Kentucky regiments
under Rosecrans were so depleted of forces that there was talk of
combining some of them. . . .As the epidemic of resignations spread
through Kentucky troops, Col. J.H. Ward, commander of the Twentyseventh Regiment, issued an order reminding his men that it was their duty
“as soldiers to suffer anything, even unto death,” as long as there was at
least hope of establishing the Constitution and perpetuating the Union.233
McCook’s corps is where many of the Kentucky soldiers and officers, disgruntled at
emancipation, served. General McCook, himself, expressed an open opposition to
Lincoln’s approach.234 Going into the Battle of Chickamauga, Union command
reorganized the Army of the Cumberland again and placed many of the Kentucky
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regiments under either General Thomas’s XIV Corps or General Crittenden’s XXI Corps.
Rosecrans’s army added a cavalry corps that pushed his total number to around 56,000
men. As he pursued Bragg’s army into northern Georgia, Chickamauga Creek emerged
as the location the Confederates chose to push back. Named from a Cherokee word that
translated into “River of Death,” Chickamauga developed into one of the deadliest battles
for the Army of the Cumberland.235 The mid-September encounter lasted two days and
produced over 16,000 Union casualties. Rosecrans made mistakes and all his corps,
except General Thomas’s, experienced near annihilation. The 3rd Kentucky Infantry,
made up of soldiers from the earliest 1861 calls for Kentucky volunteers, along with three
Ohio regiments, played a key role in helping to save Crittenden’s corps. Forced to
retreat, Chickamauga represented a low point for the Army of Cumberland and the
battle’s Union hero, General George Thomas, soon replaced General Rosecrans.
Union troops retreated to Chattanooga to regroup after the Chickamauga disaster.
In the two months before the next major engagement, Union leadership made more
changes to the command structure in the Western Theatre of the war. After General
Grant’s success in his siege of Vicksburg, the executive administration placed him in
charge of all Western Armies in October 1863. Grant soon thereafter communicated his
concerns to Secretary of War Edwin Stanton about General Rosecrans’s lack of ability to
follow his orders and selected George H. Thomas to command the Army of the
Cumberland.236 Thomas’s actions at Mill Springs, Stones River, and Chickamauga
helped elevate him to the position. By mid-November, Grant also had moved General
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William T. Sherman’s Army of the Tennessee into Chattanooga to defend against
Bragg’s attempt to force the Union north.
General Bragg looked to dislodge the northern armies from Chattanooga and
established a strong position that held various high points, which included Lookout
Mountain and Missionary Ridge that overlooked the Union position. On November 23
General Grant ordered an attack on the elevated Confederate locations. The Battle of
Chattanooga, with over 120,000 troops engaged between the two opposing sides, lasted
for three days and provided the Union with another important victory. On the morning of
the final day of fighting, the 8th Kentucky Regiment from the Army of the Cumberland,
under General Charles Cruft’s division, volunteered to scale Lookout Mountain. Colonel
Barnes formed the Kentucky regiment in 1861 and recruited men from Estill, Jackson,
and Owsley Counties. When Colonel Barnes asked for a squadron to check the summit
for a Confederate presence, a few soldiers expressed eagerness at the opportunity. Peter
Cozzens summarized the moment:
Captain John Wilson, commander of the color company, jumped up and
begged to be allowed the honor. Barnes granted this request. Wilson
turned to the color-bearer and asked him to follow with the flag. The
bearer hesitated, glanced at the hundred-foot wall of rock and
contemplating the weight of the flagstaff. Wilson grabbed the flag and
handed the reluctant sergeant his sword. Six enlisted men volunteered to
join Wilson. Gripping with one hand a long wild grapevine that dangled
from the summit, Wilson started up the natural stairway of broken rock.
His Kentuckians followed him. They clutched at rocks and bushes,
grasped limbs and vines, and shoved one another upward.237
Once Wilson reached the top, he unfurled the American flag from a vantage point that
caught the Union Army’s attention from many points below. The rest of the 8th Kentucky
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soon followed to Wilson’s position in a skirmish line and only encountered a few
Confederates. General Cruft was “delighted at his boys’ daring.”238 The moment did
little to affect the overall outcome of the larger battle, but Wilson’s actions, along with
the 8th Kentucky Regiment, provided a momentary boost in morale for many Union
soldiers at Chattanooga and the success formed a sense of pride in the Kentucky regiment
that carried over into the years well after the war.
The clearing of Confederates from Chattanooga started a new phase of the war as
the beginning stages of Sherman’s “March to the Sea” unfolded in the aftermath of
Bragg’s defeat. Many of the Union Kentucky soldiers in the Western Theatre of the war
soon found themselves at locations such as Kennesaw Mountain, Atlanta, and other
locations on the way to Savannah. President Lincoln called General Grant to
Washington. Prior to going to the nation’s capital, General Grant passed through
Southeastern Kentucky and lodged at the foot of Big Hill, less than a mile from Jackson
County’s northern boundary. Grant wrote of the experience in his memoirs:
It was an intensely cold winter, the thermometer being down as low as
zero every morning for more than a week while I was at Knoxville and on
my way from there on horseback to Lexington, Kentucky. . . .The road
over Cumberland Gap, and back of it, was strewn with debris of broken
wagons and dead animals, much as I had found it on my first trip to
Chattanooga over Waldron’s Ridge. The road had been cut up to as great
a depth as clay could be by mules and wagons, and in that condition
frozen; so that the six days from Strawberry Plains to Lexington over these
holes and knobs in the road was a very cheerless one, and very
disagreeable. I found a great many people at home along that route, both
in Tennessee and Kentucky, and, almost universally, intensely loyal. They
would collect in little places where we would stop of evenings to see me,
generally hearing of my approach before arriving.239
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III.
The course of the war shifted in the Union’s favor following the federal successes
at Gettysburg and Vicksburg in the summer of 1863, along with fall events at the
Tennessee and Georgia line, as the country entered 1864. But for Kentucky, guerrilla
activity continued across the Commonwealth. The state’s loyalty remained endangered
as splits over emancipation and federal policy threatened to alter the allegiance of many
residents within the army and at home. This situation, combined with the swaths of
population already sympathetic to the Confederate cause since the war’s outset, produced
an environment difficult to control.
The appointment of General Stephen G. Burbridge to monitor potential threats,
and to bring order to areas affected by Confederate defiance, produced mixed results.
Governor Thomas E. Bramlette welcomed the news of Burbridge’s assignment to his
troubled state.240 A native-born Kentucky farmer from Logan County, General Burbridge
took over in Kentucky in February 1864. Louis De Falaise described the general’s
inherited situation:
The most serious problem facing Burbridge as he took his new command
was that of guerilla marauding. As a border state, Kentucky harbored
many with Southern proclivities. The guerillas were of two types. First,
there were detached units of the Southern army. Secondly, there were
brigands, native Kentuckians and deserters from the Southern army, who
were using the war as an excuse for looting.241
Just prior to Burbridge’s new authority on these matters, an officer from the 45th
Kentucky filed a report where the group encountered a band of guerillas attempting to
hang a Union sympathizer and Governor Bramlette had already issued an order that
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directed military authorities to arrest five Confederate sympathizers in every area where a
Union man was targeted.242 But as Burbridge raised the hopes of Governor Bramlette’s
desire to calm Kentucky of guerilla violence, he also emerged as a federal extension of
the new policies of the war. High-ranking officials started to issue directives to
Burbridge. General Sherman ordered the execution of guerillas who interfered with
steamboat supplies, Judge Advocate Joseph Holt recommended the most severe
punishment of southerners who broke parole, and the most divisive issue—what to do
with the impressment and enlistment of African Americans for the war effort—also fell
on Burbridge’s authority.243
John Hunt Morgan’s 1864 raid into Kentucky accelerated the state’s problems.
By late-May, the Confederate raider left Virginia and made entry into Kentucky from the
southeast. Morgan’s raid targeted Mt. Sterling, Lexington, and Cynthiana. The 1864 raid
brought Morgan’s raiders into contact with several southeastern Kentuckians who had
just mustered in with the 47th and 49th Kentucky Volunteer Infantries. The Union Army
stationed the 47th and 49th at Camp Nelson under Brigadier General Speed S. Fry to
protect the training of African-American troops.244 The 40th and 45th Kentucky Infantries
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were also active against Morgan’s men and many of the Kentucky units responsible for
defending against the raids came from the fall 1863 call for recruits.
Murders and harassment of southeastern Kentuckians resulted from the
Confederate foray into the state. As colonel in command of the 47th Kentucky Infantry,
Andrew H. Clark received news of the murder of his father who lived in Booneville,
Owsley County. Confederate Colonel Henry Giltner’s men, including Giltner’s own son,
tortured and murdered William Clark. The Lexington National Unionist reported a story
in the days that followed about a 101-year-old Baptist preacher in Clay County named
John Gilbert. The newspaper claimed that the same Confederate band who killed Clark
also stole Gilbert’s money, all his horses, and all his food.245 A Union veteran of the 7th
Kentucky Regiment, Elihu Webber experienced a similar fate. Confederate guerillas
robbed Webber of all his money and clothing as he returned home to Owsley County
from three years of service.246 Numerous veterans from the 7th Kentucky Regiment filed
a petition to Governor Bramlette to have Webber pardoned for a twenty-five dollar fine
as the robbery left him “destitute of everything in the clothing line and money.”247
Residents in the upper counties of Tennessee sent a petition to General Samuel Carter in
hopes that the general might use his influence in an appeal for help. The request read:
As the harvest is now fast approaching and no help to reap or take care of
the grain, and there being little corn planted this spring, in God’s name,
what will the people of that section do, should they receive no aid from the
Federal Government, and the rebels are permitted to reap and take what
245
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grain is now growing? What will become of the mothers, wives, sisters,
and children of the many soldiers and refugees that are now away from
home? . . .Letters are received here daily from those loyal women who still
remain at home, almost heartbroken, praying that the Federals may send
them protection and relieve them of their awful sufferings. . . .Believing,
as we do, in the Christian people of the United States, they will, they must,
soon give us aid and relief.248
Over three hundred citizens signed the petition and the message echoed the desperation
of the area. Under the command of General Burbridge, soldiers from the 37th and 39th
Kentucky Regiments joined in and helped defeat Morgan at the Second Battle of
Cynthiana. The battle occurred over June 11 and 12 and produced over 2,000 combined
casualties for the two sides. The battle represented an endpoint for Morgan’s final raid,
Morgan escaped back to Abingdon, Virginia.249 But like his earlier raids, the fallout and
increase in violent activity remained in Kentucky.
A series of controversial federal orders followed the May and June violence. On
July 16, 1864, General Burbridge issued General Order Number 59. The order adopted
stringent measures to protect against “the plundering and murdering [of] peaceful Union
citizens.”250 The order called for the arrest of five rebel sympathizers living within a
five-mile radius for every one Union citizen targeted. Furthermore, the federal
government promised to confiscate property in equal value from the perpetrators, and if a
murder was involved, authorities were directed to publicly execute four Confederate
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sympathizers.251 Accompanying the announcement of Burbridge’s new policy, President
Lincoln issued General Order Number 233 that amounted to “a proclamation to suspend
the writ of habeas corpus, and establish martial law in Kentucky.”252 In a July letter from
the Judge Advocate Holt to Secretary of War Stanton, Holt relayed that, “Kentucky has
been for some time and is still in a deplorable condition. A very large part of the State is
completely overrun with guerillas, who plunder farm-houses, and fields, and villages at
will, and often murder the helpless victims of their robberies.”253 Much of Holt’s concern
revolved around Lincoln’s amnesty proclamation meant to quell Confederate behavior
with the administration of an oath of loyalty. Holt expressed his belief that guerillas
manipulated the proclamation and oaths to avoid punishment. In the letter, Holt
communicated his frustrations of prominent politicians defiant to the recruitment of black
regiments. Holt advanced a theory that “a large number of influential men in Kentucky,
embracing several occupying the highest positions under the State government, are found
to be members and officers of this association or conspiracy.”254
Divisions over federal policy swept the state. Many Kentuckians, sympathetic to
Confederate causes, expressed outrage at Burbridge’s approach to justice. Leaders in
Kentucky followed suit. General Burbridge admonished General Speed Fry for his
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treatment of black refugees at Camp Nelson. Officials had already arrested and removed
Union Cavalry Colonel Frank Wolford for a speech critical of Lincoln and the use of
black regiments. Even Governor Bramlette, who had welcomed Burbridge’s
appointment, started to warn that federal policies were driving the state into the
Confederacy. At the federal level, Kentucky Senator Garrett Davis had “begun the year
with a flurry of resolutions condemning the war measures of the Lincoln administration
and in turn faced the threat of expulsion from that August body.”255
Residents in the southeastern portion of the state did not express the level of
resistance as did their counterparts around the state. As central Kentuckians took a firm
political stand against federal policy, many residents of Appalachia either did not hold
that sentiment or chose not to rebel against the authorities offering them protection in any
significant number. The 47th and 49th Kentucky Regiments continued to guard Camp
Nelson under new military leadership. As a preacher of racially mixed ancestry in
Jackson County who pastored at South Fork Baptist Church, John Drew left his
congregation to answer Reverend John Fee’s 1864 August request to aid in the
educational efforts with African-Americans at Camp Nelson.256
In the Presidential election of 1864—an election where Confederate States did not
participate—Lincoln defeated former General George McClellan. The electoral tally
resulted in 212 votes for Lincoln and 21 votes for McClellan. Lincoln carried all states
except for New Jersey, Delaware, and Kentucky—with Kentucky handing Lincoln his
worst popular vote performance in the country.257 Within Southeastern Kentucky,
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however, nine counties returned results in favor of President Lincoln. In Harlan County,
Lincoln captured more than 80% of the vote, in Jackson and Whitley Counties, the total
topped over 90%.258 Nine other Kentucky counties cast the fewest popular votes for
Lincoln in a category that measured the bottom twenty in the nation. Spencer, Meade,
and Clinton Counties returned less than five popular votes each for President Lincoln’s
reelection.259
Enlistments is another area where historians can measure the negative federal
impact in the post-emancipation phase of the war. In 1909, the Secretary of War released
Kentucky statistics from the 1864 draft.260 The release was in response to a United States
Senate Resolution looking to clarify the number of draftees from the various districts in
Kentucky. A preliminary draft occurred in March and a second draft followed on July
18, 1864. In April 1864, the War Department adjusted the quotas, based on a
combination of population and men still in military service, required from each district.
The 1909 legislation was in effort to determine if claimants paid too much money for
substitutes or for commutations. Inside those numbers, however, the report revealed that
most of the districts operated on deficiencies when it came to the number of troops
provided. Of the nine districts, only three provided a number of soldiers that surpassed
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the quota the War Department set forth. The eighth district, comprised of counties from
the southeastern portion of Kentucky, accounted for the most “credits” in the entire
state.261 Pulaski, Estill, Owsley, Clay, and Jackson Counties combined to have a 1,235
surplus of soldiers. In comparison, in the central Kentucky counties of Fayette, Scott,
Clark, Bourbon, and Nicholas Counties, a 1,033 deficiency of soldiers existed.262 The
final recapitulation of the state quota revealed that the War Department set Kentucky a
quota of 80,611 soldiers of which the Commonwealth provided 72,099.263 The ProvostMarshall-General also produced records that revealed over 7,000 either paid substitutes
or commutation money.264 One might conclude that many of those payments did not
come from the Appalachian counties.
As the war entered its final months, the guerilla war did not wane. Even with
John Hunt Morgan’ death at Greeneville, Tennessee, in September 1864, new raiders
arrived in the state to fill the void and new troubles emerged from the Kentucky
population. Dubious individuals such as Sue Mundy and William Quantrill brought a
new terror to the state. J. Michael Rhyne summarized:
On the surface, this guerilla war appeared to be centered on the activities
of well-known Confederate Kentuckians such as John Hunt Morgan or
George M. Jesse. But beneath this veneer, a much more personal war
erupted as Kentuckians took up arms not only for the Confederacy but also
against a federal government seemingly intent on destroying the institution
of slavery, not just in the Confederacy but also in the states that had not
seceded.265
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Determining what drove the sentiments of Southeastern Kentuckians is difficult. But
many continued in military service. Reactions to the violence and plunder to the Unionist
population may have solidified the political and military loyalty in the region as much as
any other factor. One group that captured that spirit arose in the Three Forks Battalion of
Kentucky State Troops. As a captain in charge of the battalion, Elisha Treadway hailed
as the former sheriff of Owsley County. Treadway had also served in the MexicanAmerican War with the 3rd Kentucky and joined the 7th Kentucky in September 1861.266
Seven companies formed the battalion, and the group posted in areas from where the unit
recruited—Breathitt, Estill, Owsley, Perry, and Harlan Counties.267 In a July 1865 appeal
to Governor Bramlette, Treadway requested that the Three Forks Battalion be allowed to
continue their work. Treadway wrote:
I am at this place with Six companies of My Battolion [sic], preparing to
be mustered out, of the State service, I have two more companies on their
way from the Counties of Harlan, and Perry, making Eight in all, I would
verry [sic] Respectfully recommend that three of those companies be
retained in the State Service, Some two or three Months longer, from the
fact, we have not yet established Civil Courts or even yet put down all the
guerrillas in the counties of Harlan, Perry, Breathitt, Letcher , &c. there
are reported to be three Bands of guerrillas in those counties . . . I would
ernestly [sic] recommend that you come to this place next Monday if it be
Possible so to do the Citizens generally expect you, if you could be here
on that day and address the citizens of this county, and my Battolion [sic],
(which represents all Eastern Kentucky) I think it would do more for our
cause than anything that could be done in this part of the State.268
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Historians often overlook Kentucky’s role and experiences from the second half
of the Civil War. After the Confederate retreat following the Battle of Perryville, through
the southern armies’ final surrender, Kentucky played a role in national developments
and they experienced a tumultuous period within the state. Kentucky soldiers fought on
each side of the affair, but a far larger number in military service wore Union blue. Some
Union regiments helped make up the large armies of the Western Theatre that brought the
war to an end. Others who served in Kentucky as Home Guards or in Union detachments
protected resources, maintained transportation routes, and guarded camps where AfricanAmericans trained as soldiers. Federal policies related to conscription and emancipation
nearly tore the Commonwealth apart. During that test, the Appalachian portions of the
state experienced an uptick in the raids and plunder that a split population invited. In the
end, the loyalty of the area hardened at the ballot box and through the continued
enlistment of soldiers. As some portions of Kentucky started to identify with the
Confederate cause or to revolt against federal authority, evidence suggests that the
Appalachian region of Kentucky provided a counterweight, if only a small
counterweight, to that movement.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE MYSTIC CHORDS OF MEMORY:
VOTING PATTERNS, WAR MEMORY,
AND ATTACKS ON THE MOUNTAINEER IMAGE
Historians have elevated Kentucky’s significant role in the Union cause with
Abraham Lincoln’s supposed, yet often repeated quote, “I would like to have God on my
side, but I must have Kentucky.” Modern historians select Lincoln’s 1861 written quip “I
think to lose Kentucky is nearly the same as to lose the whole game,” with more
confidence to capture the President’s opinion of Kentucky’s strategic value.269
Regardless which quote makes it into the analysis; the events in Kentucky throughout the
entire war substantiate the sentiment. Kentucky provided resources, manpower, and an
important geographic position that secured the Union’s victory. Within the state
population, splits occurred. The first split formed during the early debates on secession,
and a minority of Kentuckians tossed their lot in with the Confederates. The second
major split emerged in 1863 when Lincoln’s emancipationist policies took effect. The
federal efforts to curb guerilla violence that accompanied the emancipation phase of the
war resulted in even more Kentuckians who shifted allegiance. A large majority of
Southeastern Kentuckians, however, not only held steady to the Union cause, but also
relied on increasing federal support as Confederate violence threatened the region. The
rise of a Confederate identity during the postwar years in the central and western portions
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of the state signaled a strong disaffection with the war’s impact in those areas.270
Residents of the southeastern counties created a different environment to remember the
war—one that offered support for Republicans and Republican ideas.
In Kentucky, Conditional Unionists, proslavery Unionists, and other conservative
groups formed a political partnership that kept the state out of the Confederacy in the
earliest stages of the Civil War. By 1865, events in the second half of the war had
dissolved much of that coalition. The results from the 1864 presidential election in
Kentucky proved the waning influence and limited support of the federal administration.
The Republican Lincoln and Unionist Democrat Andrew Johnson ran together under the
split-ticket banner of a National Union Party. Kentucky returned the worst vote totals in
the nation for Lincoln and Johnson’s calculated effort at fusion politics. Over thirty
Kentucky counties, mostly in the central and west, produced popular vote totals of 90%
or more for the Democratic challenger George McClellan. The Eighth District, which
included all the southeastern counties, provided a vote total of 6,409 votes for Lincoln
and 3,701 for McClellan. Lincoln garnered only 30.2% of the vote statewide, but it was
an improvement from 1860 and the president carried twenty-five Kentucky counties total
with twelve of those in the Eight District.271
William Harrison Randall represented Kentucky’s Eighth District in the United
States House of Representatives during the latter half of the Civil War era. Randall had
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served as Circuit and County Clerk for Laurel County and after he won the congressional
seat in the 1863 election, Randall allied with the Republican Party. Randall joined a
group of Unconditional Unionists from Kentucky who defected from Union Democrats
and, in one of his first actions, voted for an Army bill that allowed the arming of African
Americans.272 In 1865, when the House voted on the 13th Amendment to abolish slavery
in the United States, Kentucky representatives Lucian Anderson, George Yeaman, Green
Smith, and William Randall cast votes in the affirmative. Representatives Anderson and
Yeaman, from western districts, gambled their political futures and left the House in the
next election. Smith scored a narrow victory in northern Kentucky and Eighth District
voters reelected William Randall by a wide margin.273 Randall went on to lobby for more
rights for African Americans after the war’s conclusion. Historian Victor Howard added:
“William H. Randall of Laurel County represented the eastern district of Kentucky in the
House of Representatives and favored full civil rights for the Negro. In autumn of 1866
he traveled through his district while the county courts were in session and ‘strongly
advocated negro suffrage.’”274
Union veterans experienced political support from the southeastern counties as
well. In the 1867 gubernatorial race that featured Democrat John Helm, Republican
Sidney Barnes, and Conservative William Kinkead, Helm won the race with 65.7% of the
Kentucky vote. Barnes received 24.7% and Kinkead finished last with 9.6% in the three-
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way race. Jackson County led the voting for Barnes with 93.9%, Whitley County offered
the Republican 88.8%, and Harlan County registered 84.9%.275 Barnes raised the 8th
Kentucky Volunteers in southeastern Kentucky in 1861 and was present at Chattanooga
when the group achieved national fame for raising the American flag on Lookout
Mountain.

For comparison, Barnes received 8.3% in Jefferson County, 7.1% in Warren

County, and 0.9% in Fulton County.276 The shift toward the Democratic Party occurred
in locations like Louisville, Lexington, Paducah, and Bowling Green.
In 1871, when Democrat Preston Leslie ran against Republican John Marshall
Harlan, the state produced similar results. Leslie won with 58.6% of the state’s popular
vote. In Western Kentucky, Ballard and Fulton Counties produced vote totals of over
90% for the Democratic candidate; for Northern Kentucky, Trimble and Owen Counties
combined for over 90% support for Leslie as well. Five of the top eight counties for the
Harlan’s Republican candidacy included Jackson, Clay, Owsley, Whitley, and Harlan.277
When the Democratic candidate James B. McCreary defeated John Marshall Harlan in
his second Republican bid to be governor in 1875, just six Kentucky counties favored
Harlan with over 70% of the popular vote—all of those counties were in southeastern
Kentucky.278 The former Colonel of the 10th Kentucky Infantry and future Supreme
Court Justice lost his two attempts to become Kentucky’s governor, but Southeastern
Kentuckians offered John Marshall Harlan his greatest political support of any region in
Kentucky.
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Presidential races in the Commonwealth during the period of Reconstruction
provided results that matched the gubernatorial contests. In 1868, when Union general
Ulysses S. Grant ran as the Republican presidential candidate against Democrat Horatio
Seymour, Kentucky voted just under 75% for Democrat Seymour and over twenty
counties provided over 90% support for the Democratic candidate. Jackson and Harlan
Counties were the only two counties that produced similar lopsided tallies in favor of
Grant, and both counties eclipsed 90% in Republican support.279 Kentucky also provided
Democrat Horace Greely a majority vote in Grant’s reelection bid of 1872. Kentucky
was one of only six states to go to the Democratic challenger. Once again, Jackson,
Owsley, Whitley, and the newly formed Bell County, voted at some of the highest rates
for Grant observed in Kentucky, and the Republican carried most of the mountain district
counties.280 The southeastern area continued with strong support for Republicans
Rutherford B. Hayes and James Garfield in the 1876 and 1880 elections that followed the
two-term administration of Ulysses S. Grant. The state of Kentucky, however, continued
to award its electoral votes to the Democratic challengers.281
Modern historical efforts have downplayed the region’s Unionism. In Kenneth
Noe’s “Toward the Myth of Unionist Appalachia, 1865-1883,” Noe attacked the notion
that Appalachians aligned with the Union as “ahistorical.”282 Noe and Shannon Wilson
coedited a work that made similar claims in The Civil War in Appalachia: Collected

279

Presidential Elections, 1789-2008: County, State, and National Mapping of Election
Data ed. Donald R. Deskin, Hanes Walton, and Sherman C. Puckett (Ann Arbor: The
University of Michigan Press, 2010), 182-190.
280
Ibid.
281
Ibid.
282
Kenneth Noe, “Toward the Myth of Unionist Appalachia, 1865-1883,” Journal of the
Appalachian Studies Association 6 (1994): 73-80.
129

Essays.283 The Civil War in Appalachia suffered from the flawed approach of
deconstructing a stereotype about an entire region and replacing it with an alternative
revision of an entire region. In short, localities within the broad Appalachian portions of
America experienced different levels of loyalty, participation, and outcomes in the Civil
War era. Anne Marshall’s Creating a Confederate Kentucky: The Lost Cause and Civil
War Memory in a Border State offered a better analysis of Kentucky’s complex history.
Marshall’s chapter “Two Kentuckys: Civil War Identity in Appalachian Kentucky, 18651915,” distinguished the experiences of Kentucky, but the historian placed most of the
analysis on exposing numerous outside efforts that embellished Appalachian Unionism.
The chapter also placed significant focus on the rise of violent feuds in the area.
Marshall concluded:
The perceived normality of the Confederate portion of Kentucky—an area
capable of peaceful reunion—exacerbated Appalachian Kentucky’s
growing lawless reputation. Moreover, this perception that made
Unionism seem an anomaly not only legitimized the state’s Confederate
identity but made it look like the preferable, more civilized one.284
Marshall’s treatment of the area revealed significant difficulties in the region and her
work acknowledged some of the unique characteristics of Kentucky’s mountain
populations. But “Two Kentuckys” also fell short in delineating how some localities
developed a postwar culture distinct from the more violent counties. The southeastern
portion of Kentucky experienced racial issues, suffered from lawless violence, and failed
on social issues in the second half of the nineteenth century, as did much of the country.
However, military service records, voting patterns, and other primary accounts suggest
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that many of the southeastern counties of Kentucky aligned with those who sought the
preservation of the Union before, during, and after the war. And unlike much of
Kentucky, a strong combination of Union loyalty and military pride survived the war and
its aftermath.
In June 1861 W.J. Landram wrote Phillip Swagert where he said “Our men are for
the Union—& one thing is certain, Garrard [County] is going to stay in under all
circumstances.”285 Records show that Landram possessed one slave, but went on to serve
in a Union Kentucky Regiment.286 Garrard County stood as one of the northernmost
counties in the Eighth District, but his sentiment at the beginning of the war perhaps
expressed an outlook of the area more than he knew. Charles C. Wells released a
compilation of Union military records with his 1890 Special Veterans Census for Eastern
Kentucky.287 The work listed the veteran records and rolls for thirty eastern counties, but
many of the southeastern counties are not included. For Kentucky’s one-hundred and
twenty counties, only sixty-five of the records remain, as nearly half the state’s veteran
census data was either destroyed or misplaced in transfer to the National Archives.288
Historians face the difficult work in construction of the area’s Civil War history to
resurrect it from its forgotten state.
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CHAPTER SIX
THE FIERY TRIAL:
A CIVIL WAR HISTIOGRAPHY

Serious efforts to understand the Civil War emerged in the years following the war.
Revisiting those earliest works, up through the voluminous amount of scholarship that
exists today, reveals a rise in historical attention toward the subject. A higher quality of
professional historical work accompanied the same trajectory. Biographies on Abraham
Lincoln stand as an important strand of the larger Civil War histography as well. Lincoln
officials and acquaintances such as John Nicolay, John Hay, and William Herndon
produced some of the earliest efforts to capture the president’s life in the years following
the 1865 assassination. Other writers followed with late 1800’s and early 1900s attention
to Lincoln, prominent military leaders, and significant politicians. Inquiry into specific
regional Civil War history, however, marks a more recent turn. As early researchers
placed emphasis on the general history of the war and in producing biographical studies
of its most important participants—with those works improving in quality as a hundred
years passed—it has been only in the last twenty-five years that local histories connected
to the Civil War have attracted historical scholarship. All these developments leave
scholars with a better understanding of the war’s leaders, causes, and consequences
resulting in a rich library to advance new arguments as well as ask lingering questions
worthy of deeper investigation.
132

Questions surrounding the history of the Civil War encountered several
problematic issues near its beginning such as geographic bias, writing tied to personal
experience, and amateur historical efforts. These factors combined to present various
interpretations of the war’s significance in the earliest works. The “Lost Cause”
approach produced many books that suffered from a pro-southern slant during the late
nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century. Soldiers and politicians
offered their memoirs on the conflict during Reconstruction and beyond. Subsequent
historians, such as James Ford Rhodes and his History of the Civil War: 1861-1865,
represented a more academic approach to the field.289 These turn-of-the-century works
from veterans, politicians, and early historians present uneven results but mark the
earliest foundations of the historiography of the Civil War.
By the mid-twentieth century writers such as Douglas Southall Freeman, Bruce
Catton, and Allan Nevins published better researched works than the previous generation
who addressed Civil War history. Freeman’s multivolume study of Robert E. Lee in the
1930s entitled R. E. Lee: A Biography won praise for the depth of historical writing.290
Many still claimed to identify a strong southern bias, or at least an amount of Confederate
romanticism, in Freeman’s account. Later, Catton and Nevins introduced a generation of
Americans to the topic of the Civil War with their narrative histories. Catton’s 1952
trilogy of Mr. Lincoln’s Army, Glory Road, and A Stillness at Appomattox introduced
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many readers to a deeper analysis of the Civil War.291 As a journalist who penned
“popular history,” Catton’s work still stands as an important addition to the subject at a
critical time in the historiography. The work also established what historians have
challenged as an emphasis, or overemphasis, on the Eastern Theatre of the war. Allan
Nevins published an eight-volume history over several decades of the mid-twentieth
century with his The Ordeal of the Union.292 Like Catton, Nevins was not an academic
historian, but he too fused prose and research in an academic way that presented Civil
War history for a wider audience. Some historians have criticized the work as being too
pro-Union, and as with Freeman, historians accused the expansive study of a detectable
northern geographic bias.
Due to the growing interest of the last fifty years, scholars moved Civil War
history forward from its popular and “Lost Cause” state. New scholars shifted from older
“drum and trumpet” military history to “new” military history embedded in society and
culture. The approach to the subject in the closing decades of the twentieth century
challenged long-held assumptions. The topic received an additional boost, around the
turn of the twenty-first century, due to a renewed attentiveness born from these works to
meet the public’s growing demand for new material on the topic. Anniversaries in the
period between 2009-2015 that celebrated milestones of the war’s significance made an
impact as well. But instead of a decline in focus, research continues even with the
passing of Lincoln’s two-hundredth birthday and the conclusion of celebrations
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connected to the sesquicentennial of the war. Historians and publishers show no sign of
abandoning the topic anytime soon.
Much of the attention awarded to the subject is due to the complex and domestic
nature of the conflict, access to new sources, the biographical interest in its participants,
and the uncovering of a vast expanse of topics unknown or previously ignored. More
recent studies have shed new light on traditional subjects at the center of the conflict,
while other historians have revealed original ideas and conclusions about matters long
thought as peripheral. Within this surge of newly published material are also those books
of scholarly recognition that stand the test of time and are viewed as essential reading to
understand the war. These noteworthy scholars receive frequent reference for their
thorough investigations that became indelible academic contributions to the field of Civil
War history. Indeed, the sheer amount of material on the Civil War era, new and old, can
present an overwhelming sensation for those who choose to measure or contribute to the
ever-expanding field of study. It is useful to examine the modern study of the war
starting with the works that appeared after the Civil Rights Movement and the Vietnam
War Era.

I.
Historians have long analyzed the political history of the Antebellum Era and new
conclusions on the topic emerged during the 1970s. During that decade, scholars added
valuable works to the historiography that focused on the political environment
surrounding the Civil War. Some of these efforts challenged prior positions and formed
new views to advance a deeper understanding of the period. Among the most important
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of the new scholarship of the 1970s was Eric Foner’s Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men:
The Ideology of the Republican Party before the Civil War. Foner explored the formation
of the Republican Party with an investigation into the development of a northern
antebellum coalition organized around resistance to the further spread of slavery.293 The
study examined the fusion politics of the period that coalesced members of various
parties—including former Whigs, Know-Nothings, northern Democrats, Free-Soilers,
and other northern political interests—into a political force that carried the 1860
presidential election. Additionally, Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men analyzed the
differences in regional perspectives, notably North and West, and emphasized the divide
between politicians committed to the ideology of free labor, those who advocated
colonization, and various aspects of radical abolitionism. Foner concluded that political
cooperation between these groups increased and “during the 1850s, Republicans accepted
the idea that the Negro should be given an ‘equal chance’ to prove himself capable of
economic advancement, and their actions in state legislatures and in Congress had the
effect of breaking down some of the legal inequalities which surrounded the black
citizen.”294 Completed during the turmoil of the Vietnam War and in a period of
heightened awareness toward civil rights matters, Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men
offered insight to the political history connected to the Republican Party prior to the
outbreak of the Civil War. The work also broke down the southern dominance of the
histography and offered a thorough and fair examination of the Republican Party.
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Daniel Walker Howe’s The Political Culture of the American Whigs provided
another political study of the Antebellum Era at the close of the 1970s. In The Political
Culture of the Whigs, Howe analyzed the philosophies that undergirded the antebellum
Whig Party.295 With a biographical approach, Howe explored the regional and political
diversity of the Whig Party examining politics through the lives of prominent Whig
politicians—a list that included John Quincy Adams, Henry Clay, Alexander Stephens,
and Abraham Lincoln. The distaste for President Andrew Jackson and subsequent
Jacksonians created a political point of interest that held these diverse politicians together
in a loose, yet common, cause. Foner and Howe’s contributions improved political
understanding and advanced the historiography of the Civil War era. With contemporary
political issues, such as Vietnam, the Civil Rights Movement, and Watergate influencing
the generation’s view of history, these two authors allowed further exploration into the
deeper political causes of the sectionalism that led to the American Civil War.
A modern comprehensive analysis of Abraham Lincoln’s life emerged in the late
1970s with Stephen B. Oates’s With Malice Toward None: A Biography of Abraham
Lincoln.296 Oates offered an updated biography of Lincoln’s life with a thorough
examination of his rise from log cabin poverty through his actions as president. One of
the real strengths of With Malice Toward None came in Oates’s efforts to personalize
Lincoln and his connection of the early biographical Lincoln to the political beliefs that
the president later formed. Like Howe and Foner, Oates concluded that the opportunity
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for economic and social mobility shaped Lincoln’s core political philosophy against
slavery. Oates added, “Thus, in Lincoln’s view, slavery not only besmirched the ideals of
the Declaration, but violated the principles of self-help, social mobility, and economic
independence—all of which lay at the center of Republican ideology.”297
Princeton historian James McPherson’s Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War
Era, published in 1988, did much to correct lingering misperceptions and
mischaracterizations of Civil War history.298 Prior to McPherson’s account, a few
historians continued to view the war’s causes with some uncertainty—with many works
still holding to ideas that states’ rights, tariffs, and other economic concerns formed the
main catalysts of the war. Battle Cry of Freedom offered a large synthesis of the social,
political, military, and economic factors of the war. McPherson placed his research in the
broader context of antebellum issues where he argued that sectional strife, debates
surrounding the institution of slavery, and efforts to halt slavery’s expansion led to the
outbreak of war in 1861. McPherson was not the first to link slavery and the Civil War
directly, but the large volume won the Pulitzer Prize in history and represented a
watershed moment in the historiography of the Civil War. Since his work, most scholars
accept slavery as the root cause of the Civil War and what remnants of Lost Cause
explanations that existed declined. The astute work found in Battle Cry of Freedom,
combined with the widespread popularity of PBS’s 1990 release of Ken Burn’s
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miniseries The Civil War, created an environment where scholars and the general
population were eager for more on the topic of the Civil War.299
Gerald Linderman’s Embattled Courage: The Experience of Combat in the
American Civil War was another late 1980s addition that advanced understanding the war
with focus on soldiers’ personal perspectives.300 Linderman examined the lives of
ordinary soldiers who fought in the war to assess the motivations for enlistment, the
characteristics of the men at war, and the outlook soldiers expressed through letters while
surrounded by danger and death. Embattled Courage revealed the experiences of men
who marched and fought on the frontlines and the narrative helped readers to understand
the source of courage that accompanied them during the war. Works such as Battle Cry
of Freedom, The Civil War, and Embattled Courage piqued the interests of historians in
the late 1980s, led the way for more works, and helped to reestablish the war as a central
topic of study.
Perhaps more so than any other topic, the Lincoln presidency benefitted from the
surge in interest and renewed focus. Mark Neeley Jr. cleared some of the charges
attached to Lincoln’s prosecution of the war as Commander in Chief in his 1992 Pulitzer
Prize winning account The Fate of Liberty: Abraham Lincoln and Civil Liberties.301
Neely’s research relied upon a thorough historical examination of Civil War arrest
records to identify any potential motivations of partisanship behind the president’s
controversial executive war measures—a popular charge made by Lincoln critics. The
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Fate of Liberty concluded that Lincoln had not acted with political revenge in mind with
his suspension of habeas corpus or his declarations of martial law; instead the evidence
suggested that he used the executive maneuvers sparingly and only as a necessity to
protect Union interests during the war. This revised perspective on Lincoln’s perceived
blemish regarding his record toward civil liberties represented a perspective shift in the
historiography of the topic. Neely followed up his rich award-winning account with
another look at the presidency in The Last Best Hope of Earth: Abraham Lincoln and the
Promise of America.302 This addition kept the narrowed approach as Neely focused on
the actions, strategy, and decisions that Lincoln made as president. Neely attributed this
change in direction to James McPherson. McPherson led historical efforts to depart from
the pure biographical and introspective psychohistory that dominated Lincoln research in
the years prior to the 1990s with the hope of turning more historians toward examinations
of “the war president.”303 The Last Best Hope of Earth detailed Lincoln’s leadership and
tendencies in carrying out the war. The work also increased focus on Lincoln’s habits as
a war president, his ability to politically manage the war, and the military acumen that he
developed.
David Herbert Donald’s 1995 work Lincoln, released the following year, reverted
to the previous mode of approach with a study large in both breadth and scope.304 In
Lincoln, Donald highlighted a perceived passivity in Lincoln’s nature. Among the chief
characteristics illuminated as central to Lincoln the politician was a religious fatalism
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based on the doctrine of necessity combined with a presidency directed by practical
means. Completed during the Bill Clinton presidency, the study showed signs of
contemporary influence in its findings. Additionally, the large biographical work placed
a high value on the influence of Lincoln’s surroundings from his young days in a log
cabin through his presidential years. This approach began drawing a criticism from some
in the field. The reticent nature of Lincoln has always made him a difficult but attractive
case study to historians; however, new approaches soon replaced the obtuse nature of the
biographical approach.
Prior to Donald’s Lincoln, works such as Michael Burlingame’s The Inner World
of Abraham Lincoln, sought to psychoanalyze the sixteenth president.305 Another
example, Gabor Boritt’s edited collection The Historian’s Lincoln: Pseudohistory,
Psychohistory, and History, presented a group of essays that sought deeper sources of
inspiration to analyze Lincoln’s motives and actions.306 One of the more insightful pieces
included in the edition was Boritt’s own “Lincoln and the Economics of the American
Dream.” 307 Boritt traced Lincoln’s economic philosophy more to his Whiggish leanings
and the emergence of a Republican spirit than to the Jeffersonian philosophy of the
independent farmer. The essay also described the central idea of Lincoln’s vision for
America as a transformational extension of Jacksonian democratic principles of common
advancement combined with an anti-slavery attitude. This combination acted to redefine
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equality for Americans as an “equal opportunity to get ahead in life.”308 The eclectic
collection of essays marked an effort that represented the broader trends in Lincoln’s
historiography that occurred in the last decades of the twentieth-century. Some historians
held to the abstract approach, while others were eager to analyze the better documented
realities of Lincoln’s economic, political, and social reasoning—some tried both.
Another addition into the field on the sixteenth president was Allen Guelzo’s
Abraham Lincoln: Redeemer President.309 Guelzo fused Lincoln’s economic outlook, his
moral principles, and his political reasoning with an effort that produced a deeper
understanding of the president. Using an exploration of Whig political philosophy
leading up to the formation of the Republican Party, along with new arguments centered
on Lincoln’s faith and moral foundations, Guelzo advanced a more complex analysis
about what directed the president’s actions. Guelzo also connected Lincoln’s
understanding of the American founding and concluded that “the Founding Fathers had
never intended that slavery continuously extend itself over the continent and, contrary to
John Calhoun, that the Fathers had always assumed that the federal government had full
jurisdiction over the organization of the territories and the migration of slavery into
them.”310
After passing into the twenty-first century and anticipating the bicentennial of
Lincoln’s birth, historical works on Abraham Lincoln increased in number and quality.
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In 2002, William Miller published Lincoln’s Virtues: An Ethical Biography.311 Miller’s
contribution examined Lincoln through the prism of morality and politics. In a narrowed,
yet biographical approach, Miller traced the shaping of Lincoln’s moral character and
intellectual development through the experiences of his life and gave close attention to
events that either shaped or revealed his ethical disposition. Miller’s conclusions claimed
that Lincoln experienced an escalation of moral character the further he rose in politics.
Furthermore, Lincoln fulfilled the role as president and dealt with slavery with a unique
human agency—much of it drawn from the moral principles that evolved from a lifetime
of exposure to difficulty. Writing from the University of Virginia as a scholar at the
Miller Center of Public Affairs, Miller’s and other historians’ increased attention to
presidents, particularly Abraham Lincoln, represented a trend of scholarly movement that
improved understanding of the executive office.
Richard Carwardine’s Lincoln is one of the most valuable additions to the library
on Lincoln in the modern era.312 As Oxford University Rhodes Professor of American
History, Carwardine offered a transatlantic viewpoint on Lincoln’s contributions to
antebellum America and the Civil War era. The central purpose of Lincoln—later
republished as Lincoln: A Life of Purpose and Power—was to describe the sources of
Lincoln’s power. Carwardine argued that Lincoln’s power came from his personal
ambition, his ability to react to public opinion, and through his political skill to navigate
party politics. Economic philosophy was a source of interest throughout Carwardine’s
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work as well, and the historian suggested that Lincoln “empathized with those who were,
as he had been, struggling self-improvers.”313 Holding firm to his Whig roots, Lincoln
sought to establish a form of meritocracy and Carwardine believed that the “wartime
program of railroad construction, high tariffs on imported manufactures, homestead and
land-grant laws, scientific agriculture, progressive taxation, and a national banking
structure, did indeed draw a line under the republic of Jefferson and Jackson, and
announced the arrival of a national government pledged to a liberated commercial
order.”314 Lincoln used a chronological approach to observe the evolution of the
president’s skills and beliefs.
Carwardine also addressed a topic of interest with Lincoln historians—his faith.
In an earlier work, Evangelicals and Politics in Antebellum America, Carwardine
researched the impact of religion and churches on various regional beliefs related to
slavery.315 In the study, Cawardine gave specific attention to the denominations of the
Methodists and the Baptists to identify any potential influences on the crystallizations of
slave opinion. As an authority on matters of religion and antebellum America,
Carwardine also explored the faith of the president in Lincoln. The historian viewed
Protestant millennialism and Enlightenment rationalism to work in tandem to guide the
president. Over the course of previous efforts to identify Lincoln’s faith, historians have
been quick to point to Lincoln’s deistic tendencies, some have carelessly labeled him an
atheist, while others have found or invented evidence they used to place the president
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under a specific religious denomination. Carwardine used a well-researched and
balanced approach to determine that a broad influence was indeed important to Lincoln’s
development and expression of religious beliefs. Carwardine’s research and synthesis
aided the understanding of the faith of the president thus shaping the historiography with
a lasting perspective on this key aspect of Lincoln’s leadership and life.
In 2005, acclaimed historian Doris Kearns Goodwin, a previous winner of the
Pulitzer Prize, published A Team of Rivals: The Political Genius of Abraham Lincoln.316
Goodwin’s much anticipated book received enormous attention from general readers and
scholars alike. The analysis focused on the political calculations of Lincoln with special
attention on the relationships that he forged with, and between, William Seward, Salmon
Chase, Edward Bates, Edwin Stanton—men that filled part of his cabinet. The large
study explored the skills of Lincoln’s ability to manage political personalities while he
built a coalition of support for his own political and war aims. The work marked a huge
point in the historiography of Lincoln as Team of Rivals appealed to a larger audience as
popular history; yet, the work put forth research valuable to scholars. Another key
element was the emerging focus on specific and narrowed historical aspects surrounding
Abraham Lincoln. Rather than the catch-all biography, Goodwin’s work presented a path
for more nuanced work on the former president.
With the continued growth of interest in Abraham Lincoln, historians began to
offer even more focused works that examined specific events and timeframes within the
president’s life. Harold Holzer’s 2004 release of Lincoln at Cooper Union: The Speech
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That Made Abraham Lincoln President presented an effort that analyzed Lincoln’s
famous New York address.317 Holzer framed the speech as a pivotal moment that
captured national sentiments and concluded that the event gave rise to the political
success that followed. Furthermore, Lincoln at Cooper Union measured the reception of
the February 1860 address and synthesized how that the speech symbolized and
coalesced the political outlook of the North. Louis Mansur’s Lincoln’s Hundred Days:
The Emancipation Proclamation and the War for the Union isolated the specific time
frame of Lincoln’s September 1862 announcement of the Emancipation Proclamation and
the period in January 1863 when the measure took effect.318 Lincoln’s Hundred Days
revealed an in-depth study of a critical policy and timeframe within the larger Lincoln
administration. These works reflected a movement within the historiography of Lincoln
that attempted to isolate political aspects of the administration without revisiting the
broader biography of the president.
Other works took a similar limited approach and examined timeframes prior to the
election and just before the inauguration of the president. Douglas Egerton’s Year of
Meteors: Stephen Douglas, Abraham Lincoln, and the Election that Brought on the Civil
War addressed the critical year of 1860 in effort to advance the historical importance of
numerous events leading up to the election of Lincoln.319 Egerton’s work focused on the
political rivalry between Abraham Lincoln and Stephen Douglas and shed new light on
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the fracturing of the pre-war Democratic Party. Published within a few years of Year of
Meteors, Harold Holzer offered a similar work with his Lincoln President-Elect:
Abraham Lincoln and the Great Secession Winter 1860-1861.320 As a follow-up to
Lincoln at Cooper Union, Holzer continued the trend of examining specific periods
concerning the significance of Abraham Lincoln in a way that allowed historians to fully
explore the events and environment surrounding the Civil War.
With the passing of bicentennial celebrations in 2009 to mark the two-hundredth
birthday of Lincoln, works confronted scholars with new arguments. Mark Neeley
presented another focused approach with Lincoln and the Triumph of the Nation:
Constitutional Conflict in the American Civil War.321 Neeley examined the legal history
of the Civil War with specific interest on constitutional issues, Lincoln’s legal view of the
prosecution of the war, and the elimination of slavery. Neeley asserted that the president
interpreted the Constitution the best he knew how and concluded that the sixteenth
president did not developed a radical new nationalism at the core of his desire for change.
In addition, Lincoln and the Triumph of the Nation revealed an original topic of study
through weaving in the Confederate Constitution and reminding historians “it is
important to recall constitutional history—especially that neglected constitutional history
of the states.”322 Conscription, emancipation, and punishment are a few of the topics that
Lincoln and the Triumph of the Nation addressed with interest in Lincoln’s constitutional
reasoning.
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Eric Foner published The Fiery Trial: Abraham Lincoln and American Slavery
the same year.323 In the historiography of Lincoln, some historians challenged Lincoln’s
views on slavery and race—making special effort to deconstruct the “Great Emancipator”
image. The DeWitt Clinton Professor of History at Colombia University pushed back in
his account. A central purpose of The Fiery Trial was the belief that Lincoln’s fierce
antislavery stance had more in common with the abolitionists than some studies
suggested. To measure Lincoln’s impulses toward slavery, Foner linked the president’s
free-labor outlook to his antislavery views and argued that the ideas conjoined to
concentrate on matters of social and political economy.324 The relevance of this
sentiment underscored the fact that Lincoln wanted a social advancement for the country,
reconciled some matters of race to pursue a legal economic equality in opportunity, and
did not hold, nor project, some of the more extreme views toward free blacks of the time.
Moreover, Foner made a case for Lincoln’s careful handling of the slavery issue with
practical and political realities in mind. The strong contextualization of Lincoln’s views,
words, and policies through his evolution on the issue of slavery was the strength of
Foner’s work. The Fiery Trial won the 2011 Pulitzer Prize for History.
Founders’ Son: A Life of Abraham Lincoln is one of the latest additions to the
crowded field to address the Civil War President.325 As the senior editor of the National
Review, Richard Brookhiser traced Lincoln’s political courage to his high admiration of
the Founding Fathers. Brookhiser connected Lincoln to George Washington, Thomas
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Jefferson, Thomas Paine, and other figures of early American history to derive the origins
of Lincoln’s deeper philosophies. Brookhiser analyzed numerous primary sources from
Lincoln’s speeches and letters to establish a connection to Lincoln’s affinity to founding
documents such as the Declaration of Independence, the Northwest Ordinance, and the
Constitution. Brookhiser argued that Lincoln’s view of the Union, with the eventual
abolition of slavery, reflected an interpretive effort to be congruent with the Founding
Fathers’ long view. In historiographical relevance, Founders’ Son is a strong example of
an opposition to the Lost Cause portrayal of Lincoln as a radical destroyer of liberty, as
well as the more exaggerated claims of his presidency being a drastic progressive
departure from the founding generation. With Lincoln’s newfound popularity and
undeniable historical significance, all sides of the political spectrum stretched efforts and
conclusions to claim him.
A recent effort that made bold claims on Lincoln’s view on national economic
policy emerged in the 2015 work A Just and Generous Nation: Abraham Lincoln and the
Fight for American Opportunity.326 Historian Harold Holzer and economist Nicholas
Garfinkle work together to uncover Lincoln’s economic outlook and conclude that the
president’s desire to create an environment where individuals could self-improve had a
far greater influence on actions than previous historians have addressed. Critics charged
A Just and Generous Nation with modern political bias as the authors used Lincoln’s
economic reasoning to attack contemporary policy. Nonetheless, scholars praise the first
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half of the book for its depth and clarity in examining a specific outlook that influenced
Lincoln’s actions.
While the actions of the newly elected Republican administration of the 1860s
serve as one aspect of a larger body of work on the Civil War, some of America’s most
talented scholars shaped the new historiography of Lincoln with dedicated research. In a
large field where hagiography and biased attacks on leaders of Lincoln’s stature both
exist, these works offer a balanced look at the president and are grounded in good
research and historical methods of study.

II.
As perspectives changed with political and national examinations of the war, new
views related to regional and state history emerged as well. With Kentucky, most
historians identify E. Merton Coulter’s 1926 account, The Civil War and Readjustment in
Kentucky, as the early cornerstone of history focused on Civil War Kentucky.327 Coulter
argued that Kentucky’s economic ties with the North, its beliefs that slavery would be
better protected in the Union, and a long tradition of compromise kept Kentucky, a slave
state, from abandoning the Union in favor of the Confederacy. Coulter also viewed
Kentucky’s policy of neutrality and events that pulled the state into the Union as a
precursor for the trouble that followed the war. In short, Coulter argued that Kentucky’s
Confederate sympathies rose from the sense of betrayal that manifested in the state and
its residents with emancipation as well as heavy handed Reconstruction policies. This
dated work, now approaching one hundred years old, has drawn both praise for its lasting
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influence, but also faces modern criticism in the detection of southern bias in its
conclusions and the number of new sources made available since its completion.
Fifty years later, Lowell Harrison produced a short influential work with focus on
Kentucky’s experience with the Civil War with his The Civil War in Kentucky. 328 This
study offered a concise account of military and political events that occurred during the
war in Kentucky. Though not intended as a comprehensive account of the war in
Kentucky, Harrison’s work provided a valuable summary of military battles in the state.
Long viewed as an essential companion to Coulter’s work, The Civil War in Kentucky
documented the outbreak of war, the Confederate invasions of 1862, and Kentucky’s
reaction to military and executive measures used through the declaration of martial law.
Harrison used military records, political correspondence, and newspaper sources to
highlight the actions of notable politicians and military leaders. Harrison echoed Coulter,
“It has been said with considerable truth that Kentucky joined the Confederacy after the
war was over.”329 Many scholars have repeated this assertion, but the expression
overlooked the diversity of regional sentiments in the state. Harrison and James C.
Klotter coauthored a comprehensive look at the state in A New History of Kentucky.330
The book offered a short update to the Civil War in Kentucky with chapters named “The
Road to War” and “The Civil War.”331 Released in the mid-1990s, A New History of
Kentucky sounded a more balanced tone than earlier works reminding readers that “the
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ties with the Union were also strong. An appreciable number of Kentuckians had
connections with Pennsylvania and other northern states, and Kentuckians were proud of
the reputation they had established in fighting for the nation in several wars.”332
Amid an increased turn-of-the-century focus on Abraham Lincoln at the national
level, Harrison also published Lincoln of Kentucky in 2000.333 Lincoln of Kentucky
explored the relationship between Lincoln and his three law partners, his three romantic
interests, his political idol (Henry Clay), and his best friend (Joshua Speed) who were all
Kentuckians. This approach helped to establish the relevance of the state on Lincoln’s
life. The real strength of Harrison’s book, however, was his analytical approach to
Lincoln’s relationship with Kentucky during the Civil War. The immediate concerns for
Lincoln at the outbreak of war centered around how to hold the slave state in the union.
Harrison traced Lincoln’s handling of Kentucky through numerous state-specific
correspondences between military leaders such as General Ulysses S. Grant and General
Jeremiah Boyle, Kentucky governors such as Governor Beriah Magoffin and Thomas
Bramlette, and information obtained from trusted local individuals—trust he developed
from previous friendships. Lincoln of Kentucky asserted that “with all the other burdens
that he bore as the wartime leader of the nation, Lincoln had to devote considerable
attention to affairs in his native state. He understood prickly Kentuckians better than
most of the military commanders who were assigned there.”334 As admiration for
Lincoln rose nationally, Kentucky, too, celebrated the memory of the sixteenth president.

332

Ibid., 181.
Lowell H. Harrison, Lincoln of Kentucky (Lexington: The University Press of
Kentucky, 2000).
334
Ibid., 213.
333

152

Harrison’s work was an important addition to the historiography of Kentucky in the Civil
War and marked a departure from some of the Confederate sympathies expressed in
works throughout the previous century.
Border State history attributed to the growing historiography of the Civil War and
received increased attention amid the rise of other national efforts in the 2010s. William
C. Harris’ Lincoln and the Border States: Preserving the Union examined Lincoln’s
efforts to maintain Maryland, Missouri, Kentucky, and Delaware in the Union.335
Building on Coulter’s and Harrison’s arguments, Harris used Lincoln’s letters to political
and military leaders to extend the understanding of Lincoln’s careful approach that kept
Kentucky in the Union. Lincoln and the Border States assessed Lincoln’s preoccupation
with problems in the Upper South, his handling of controversies in certain regions, and
the patient management he developed with troubles in the area. Furthermore, Harris
argued that the states were not safely in the Union as early as some historians have
suggested, and that Lincoln’s masterful approach to these areas proved critical for
emancipation efforts and winning the war. Aaron Astor’s Rebels on the Border: Civil
War, Emancipation, and the Reconstruction of Kentucky and Missouri followed a year
later.336 Astor analyzed similarities between Kentucky and Missouri with focus on the
Border States that remained in the Union. Astor’s study examined how guerrilla war,
race, and shifting allegiances combined with broader trends to create a unique and violent
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Civil War experience for these localities. Christopher Phillips’ The Civil War in the
Border South: Reflections in the Civil War Era offered a different view on the Border
States the following year.337 Phillips’ work acknowledged the importance of military
affairs on holding the Border States in the Union and he analyzed the chronological
unfolding of the war with specific attention to the military campaigns conducted. One
chapter connected the Confederate offensive mounted in Kentucky to General Robert E
Lee’s Antietam campaign. The direction of historiography seemed to use the events in
these pivotal states to explain the larger implications on the national execution of the war.
Prior efforts often separated the war into the Eastern and Western Theatres.
Patrick Lewis’ For Slavery and Union: Benjamin Buckner and Kentucky Loyalties
in the Civil War represented a continuation in attention to local Civil War history.338
Lewis’s account, examined Benjamin Forsythe Buckner as a model proslavery unionist.
For Slavery and Union analyzed the deterioration of Buckner’s loyalty to the Union that
resulted from Lincoln’s federal policies and the eventual emancipation of slaves. The
study provided interesting insight on the decline of wealthy Central Kentucky families’
loyalty with regards to support of the Union. Lewis used local history and accounts to
determine that emancipationist policies created a wide disaffection in slaveholding
families within Central Kentucky. The Buckners began the war with a form of
conservative unionism that stood against secession but transformed to represent trends of
defiance with Kentucky’s wider disillusionment toward Republican and military policies.
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War memory has a short yet valuable historiography as well. Barbara Gannon’s
The Won Cause: Black and White Comradeship in the Grand Army of the Republic
explored the integration of GAR posts.339 Gannon noted, “Black veterans were the
political and social equals of white Americans in one of the most prestigious
organizations in the United States. In an era in which race trumped virtually all other
social identities, black and white veterans created an interracial organization at both the
national and state levels.”340 The Won Cause demonstrated the way that Civil War
memory and the celebration of experiences from the war created unique opportunities for
historians to examine social and political change.
Anne Marshall’s Creating a Confederate Kentucky: The Lost Cause and Civil
War Memory in a Border State is another title that contributed to the historiography of
the Civil War.341 In her study, Marshall established a pre-war Unionist majority in
Kentucky and revealed a variety of motives that drove that loyalty. Like other historians
who have examined Kentucky’s diverse and unique Unionism, Marshall found that the
federal protection of slavery, anti-slavery attitudes from Appalachian residents, small
pockets of abolitionism, economic opportunists, and calculating politicians all
represented a conglomerate of Union interests in the state. Marshall’s analysis of the
complex prewar attitudes and her investigation of reactions to interwar events provide an
important pretext to the synthesis located throughout the rest of the book. Political
realignment, racism, and other Lost Cause activities are points of emphasis for Marshall’s
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exploration of post-war Kentucky. As most Kentuckians began to identify themselves
both with, and as, Southern Democrats during Reconstruction, Marshall connected the
strong Republican disaffection to attitudes generated from the military and federal
government’s emancipation of slaves and controversial war measures. Creating a
Confederate Kentucky identified the way memory can change to fit a new political
opinion with a location.
Sister States, Enemy States: The Civil War in Kentucky and Tennessee edited by
Kent T. Dollar and Larry H. Whiteaker offered several essays that investigated the
motivations and historical causes of loyalty within Kentucky and Tennessee.342 A few
works from this collection include Thomas Mackey’s “Not a Pariah, but a Keystone:
Kentucky and Secession” that examined the deeper relationship between Kentucky and
the state’s decision to remain in the Union. Kenneth Noe’s “Battle Against the Traitors:
Unionist Middle Tennesseans in the Ninth Kentucky Infantry” provided insight to
soldiers who left the Confederacy to fight for the Union. John D. Fowler’s "We Can
Never Live in a Southern Confederacy: The Civil War in East Tennessee" also looked at
the regional differences between the Appalachian portion of the state versus the more
pro-Confederate middle and west. This compilation of essays from modern scholars
committed to the study marked an effort to understand the complexities of these two
important border states often ignored by more general Civil War works.
Christopher Phillips’s The Rivers Ran Backward: The Civil War and the
Remaking of the American Middle Border represents one of the most expansive studies
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on the border region to date.343 Phillips’s work investigates the contested loyalties of the
border region with attention to the factors that influenced diverse populations in those
areas. The Rivers Ran Backward sheds light on the complex political and economic
bonds, North and South, to the respective sides that citizens chose to align with across
several states where political opinion varied. The work stands as the first serious modern
effort that attempts to look beyond simple state lines in the hopes of identifying causes
for either support or resistance to the Union or Confederate cause.

IV.
The secondary literature on Civil War history has experienced a dramatic
evolution and improvement in the last fifty years. As the subject continues to receive the
increased attention of scholars, the national complexities of America’s greatest domestic
crisis become clearer and more understandable. It is estimated that a new book related to
the Civil War hits the market each day. The history surrounding Abraham Lincoln has
grown exponentially. Work from scholars like Eric Foner, Mark Neely, James
McPherson, Richard Cawardine, and others have allowed readers to better understand the
significance of his presidency. Local and state history is a beneficiary of the trend as
well. With the rise of genealogical studies, digital record keeping, and technological
means of sharing information, both the interest and the ability to pursue historical
questions have improved.
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Some areas are still catching up and the historiography of the Civil War is far
from complete. Appalachian areas are just starting to receive the contemporary attention
that other topics have long received. Instead of simplifying explanations with blanket
geographical conclusions, historians are now beginning to narrow down to towns and
areas in the search for relevant, unique, and interesting historical studies. An example of
a gap in the literature is the southeastern portion of Kentucky. Union participation in the
war was high, slave ownership was low, and more interesting—the area bucked state
trends and offered sustained support for the Republican party well after the war.
One can look for the trend of the growth in Civil War studies to continue, it will
be both valuable and interesting to see what this renaissance in Civil War history
produces in the decades to come. To match the work of scholars over the last half
century would be a challenge, but one that a new generation of historians is ready to
accept.
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